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A NEO-KANTIAN APPROACH TO THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Statement of Justification
We live in a world fashioned by the spoken word and 
the method in which the word is employed in our world will 
determine in no small part the possibilities for our tomorrow. 
In the cold war of the twentieth century, the power of oratory
is the strength of battle. That democracy lives by talk is
not an idle maxim. Wherever men are free to think concerning
their public well-being, freedom to speek their thoughts con­
stitutes the natural outlet for will to action. Indeed,
Henry N. Wieman seems to adhere to this belief when he says, 
"Language is democracy when language carries the full load of 
a people's most cherished meanings from each to all and back 
again from all to each. The historian Arnold J. Toynbee
^"Democracy and Language," Ethics, 52:221 (January, 
1942), 216.
lends additional support when he writes that only when gov­
ernment was to a great and growing extent a government by 
discussion has civilization been able to reach its greatest
O
height. Thomas Mann, the great German novelist, has written 
that "'speech is civilization,' by which he apparently meant 
that discussion and persuasion are the only civilized way by 
which to settle differences,"^
Yet the right to use language as an instrument af­
fecting the thinking of mankind presupposes moral principles 
by which the results of rhetoric may be, indeed are, judged. 
The rhetoricians, Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, elabo­
rate upon this problem when they state:
If man is a political animal, if he uses speech to 
achieve his ends in deliberative situations, he also 
needs a guiding ethic, a set of principles which will 
enable him to judge the right from the wrong and to 
govern his own conduct by appeal to moral standards.^
Similarly the philosopher Eliseo Vivas, in his book The Moral
Life and the Ethical Life, states:
If . . . [man] loses his primary intrinsic interest in
2
Civilization on Trial (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1948), p. 49.
^Cited in Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persua­
sive Speech (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. 3.
^Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948),
p. 470.
3moral problems and substitutes for it interest in how 
to elaborate his subject matter to meet extrinsic 
standards of rigor and clarity borrowed from logic and 
mathematics, his activity becomes a game in which . . . 
a dialectic of concepts has taken the place of examina­
tion of actual empirical facts.^
The presupposition of moral principles is of special 
concern because the problem of distinguishing right from 
wrong and conducting our appeals accordingly is always with 
us. The British philosopher Stephen E. Toulmin states that 
"scientific problems and scientific theories may from time to 
time intrigue or arrest all of us, but they are of immediate 
practical importance to only a few. Everyone, on the other 
hand, is faced with moral problems.
Yet, in spite of the apparent importance of moral 
problems, relatively few decisions have been made concerning 
the criteria of right and wrong in human actions, including 
those actions employing the art of persuasion. B. J. Diggs, 
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, in­
dicts man for his failure to concern himself sufficiently 
with the problem of ethics in rhetoric and points out the 
consequences of this failure when he states:
^(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 8.
^An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 1.
The unethical use of persuasion is one of man's most 
typical and most glaring faults. Misuse of "the per­
suasive arts" has been so common and at times so 
notorious, that some have regarded persuasion as inher­
ently evil, something which by its nature "ought to be 
avoided," like a lie.7
Indeed, lack of development in rhetorical ethics is 
an unfortunate state of affairs compounded by confusion and 
disagreement. Treatment of the subject of ethics in rhetoric 
consists almost exclusively of writings which point the way 
toward the kind of theory that is needed rather than an at­
tempt to embark upon a trail which could lead to a system of 
ethical principles themselves applicable to rhetorical 
functions.
As a result of the increasing awareness of the free­
dom of speech as the axis guiding the currents of social 
events comes an increasing need for knowledge of the princi­
ples necessary to steering an ethical course of action. 
Thonssen and Baird seem to identify further the need which 
Professor Diggs expresses when they reason that
there is a need for the establishment of a more bind­
ing relationship between the instrumental and the 
ethical components of the speaking art. Overemphasis 
of technique in speaking; the disposition to regard 
rhetoric as an instrument of power, by which a speaker 
may improve himself, make more money, control people--
^"Persuasion and Ethics," The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, L (December, 1964), 359.
these are the snares which beset a sound point of 
view in contemporary public speaking. . . . Society 
needs, and needs desperately, orators who, working 
with facts, are also poets and philosophers, men who 
can costume truth effectively.&
If politics and, in its turn, rhetoric are associated 
with the practical means of getting things done, the uniting 
of ethics and the practical arts is imperative. While there 
has been some disposition to resist the inclusion of a system 
of ethics in the scheme of rhetorical theory, the return of 
ethics as an active force to the field of practical rhetorical 
application is nevertheless of no little consequence. Spe­
cifically this study is projected on the assumption that 
rhetoric as practiced in the world of practical affairs serves 
a utilitarian function in the process of civilization building, 
If such is the case, then the elucidation of a socially de­
sirable ethic establishing guidelines applicable to the 
reasoning practices involved in the art of rhetoric appears 
warranted.
The Problem for Investigation in This Study
The problem posed for investigation in this study 
grows out of the characteristics of and demands placed upon 
the language employed to make value judgments in rhetorical
g
Speech Criticism, p. 471.
discourse. Rhetoric involves a process of making decisions 
regarding the advocacy of certain policies or possible actions 
Inherent in the making of such decisions is the weighing of 
alternative actions, each of which must be based upon reasons. 
These reasons may have relative merit, but ultimately one 
deems that action best which is based upon the best possible 
reasons. The best possible reasons in turn imply "higher 
values" and may be called good reasons.
Previous to modern times the idea that things of 
highest value must have a supernatural origin was generally 
taken for granted. In more recent times, however, this view 
has given way to the feeling that values may not be fixed 
and unchangeably determinate. Rhetoric, a practical art, has 
social consequences; and no matter what the desired objective 
of rhetorical employment, the end result can serve neither 
as justification nor condemnation of the means used to pro­
cure that end. One interesting development of the principle 
of means over end is found in Aldous Huxley's The Devils of 
Loudon, in which he not only condemns
the magic of words and a golden voice, [used to per­
suade] an audience of the rightness of a bad cause,
[but also cautions that] we ought to feel the same 
dismay whenever we find the same irrelevant trick being 
used to persuade people of the rightness of a good 
cause. . . . The belief engendered may be desirable.
7but the grounds for it are intrinsically wrong.^
The difficulty in understanding the problem of inde­
terminate values in rhetorical practices may be explained in 
part at least by the changing conditions existent in the 
knowledge of the origin and nature of values themselves. In 
his work on literary criticism William J. Handy explains that 
"the singular advance made by modern philosophy is one which 
currently is revolutionizing man's traditional view of what 
constitutes human k n o w l e d g e A c c o r d i n g  to Susanne Langer 
this new advance of philosophy is the symbolizing of human 
experiences which logical abstractions are unable to represent 
This new key to philosophy involves the study of symbols and 
meaning; and further than this it insists that there are dif­
ferences in the symbolic formulations of scientific, artistic, 
and axiological meanings. In her Philosophy in a New Key 
Langer says :
And all at once, the edifice of human knowledge stands 
before us, not as a vast collection of sense reports, 
but as a structure of facts that are symbols and laws 
that are their meanings. A new philosophical theme 
has been set forth to a coming age; an epistemological 
theme. . . . The power of symbolism is its cue, as
9,
(New York: Harper and Bros., 1952), p. 219.
^^Kant and the Southern New Critics (Austin, Texas:
The University of Texas Press, 1963), p. 6.
8the finality of sense data was the cue of a former 
epoch.11
Langer demonstrates that the "new key" to philosophy 
is the recognition that logical formulations of human exper­
ience are but one kind of symbolism and that other kinds of 
symbolic formulations are possible which symbolize human ex­
periences that cannot be represented adequately by abstrac­
tions of logic. Some of these "other kinds of symbolic for­
mulations" are expressed by art, myth, or religious ritual; 
but in addition there are differing kinds of symbolic formu­
lations that utilize linguistic symbols; and these are de­
termined to be of varied kinds because of the different kinds 
of meanings they convey. When the materials of valuation 
are said to be different from those of art, myth, or ritual, 
it means that the kind of reality represented by axiology's 
special employment of language is different from that repre­
sented by the formulations of art, myth, and ritual. Yet the 
nature of understanding symbolic formulations conveying ethi­
cal valuations remains to be defined.
A second factor involved in the problem for consider­
ation is the criteria for establishing an ethic of rhetoric.
11 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942),
pp. 16-17.
Many writers treating the problem of knowledge (some from an 
earlier period as well as from more recent times) concur 
that, to be reliably valid, any knowledge must be grounded 
in the facts of the world around u s . Leonardo da Vinci as­
serts that "all sciences are vain and full of errors which do 
not terminate in observation."^^ Roger Bacon testifies that 
"without experience, nothing can be known sufficiently."^3
More recently Irving J. Lee, in his book. Language 
Habits in Human Affairs, comments on the importance of being 
extensionally oriented, People become extensionalized in 
their actions when they go to life's facts first and abide by 
the observations thereof in conducting life's affairs. For 
Lee extensional orientation is the rule of reason in the se­
curing of knowledge to direct our a c t i o n s .
Such views as those of da Vinci, Bacon, and Lee, how­
ever profound they may be, point only to the relative char­
acter of the means and not the means itself. While we may 
realize from the foregoing the necessity for our reasoning in 
matters of ought and ought not, of right and wrong in human
1 2Cited in W. H. Werkmeister, A Philosophy of Science 
(New York: Harper and Bros., 1940), p. 15.
l^ciced in ibid., pp. 11-12.
^^(New York: Harper and Bros., 1941), pp. 123-24.
10
actions, to correspond with the facts of the world around us, 
the method of so doing remains an elusive problem.
One additional aspect of the problem proposed for 
investigation in this study must be considered before the 
problem itself can be stated in its entirety. Richard Weaver 
states, and Marie Hochmuth Nichols affirms, that "there is 
no honest rhetoric without a preceding dialectic," that is, 
without the determination of right from wrong and the ought 
from the ought not in matters of human a f f a i r s . 15 Accordingly, 
whenever confronted by decisions of right and wrong, ought 
and ought not, in matters of rhetorical concern, we are re­
quired to weigh the considerations involved, i.e. the relevant 
facts so far as we are acquainted with them, and then make 
decisions according to those considerations. In so doing, we 
pass from factual reason (R) to ethical conclusions (E). At 
this moment the question to be considered is: in view of what 
I know (R), ought I to choose in this way (E)? Therefore the 
student of rhetorical ethics is naturally concerned with the 
problem of determining whether or not (R) is a good reason 
for (E).
^^Cited in Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and 
Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1963), p. 70.
11
The problem for investigation in this study may now 
be stated in its entirety. Recognition of the "new key" in 
philosophy raises the problem of discerning the epistemologi­
cal nature of symbolic formulations which have axiological 
determinations. The moral consciousness is recognized as 
being different in kind from rational consciousness. What 
is grasped by the moral consciousness is possible because of 
a special kind of cognition which is as significant a symbolic 
representation as are the logical judgments in the work of 
science. Further, the problem for investigation in this 
study recognizes the desirability for symbolic formulations 
of the moral consciousness to correspond to life's facts in 
the world around us, to achieve what Lee calls extensionalized 
behavior by realizing the significance of the "new key" in 
philosophy. If the orator's good reasons adhere to the divi­
sions of symbolic formulations which distinguish between logi­
cal abstractions of science and moral or axiological cognition, 
what possible basis can there be for extensionalization in 
the discovering of good reasons? Indeed, in view of the ap­
parent gulf between kinds of knowledge on the one hand and 
the desirability of being extensionalized on the other, can 
there be such a thing as "good reasons"? As the philosopher 
John Crowe Ransom put it, scientific and other "ways of
12
knowledge should illuminate each other; perhaps they are al­
ternative knowledges, and a preference for one knowledge over 
the other might indicate an elemental or primary bias in 
temperament."16
The problem for investigation, therefore, is three­
fold: (1) the problem of discerning the place of "good reasons” 
in rhetorical discourse; (2) the problem of discerning the 
epistemological character of "good reasons” ; and (3) the 
problem of extensionalization in the symbolic formulation of 
"good reasons.”
The Focus and Scope of This Study
This study proposes to investigate (1) the theoreti­
cal nature of the rhetorical-ethical relationship to discover 
the place of good reasons in the scheme of rhetoric; (2) the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant as an explanation of the particu­
lar characteristics of the language of valuation, and exten­
sionalization of symbolic formulations of axiological valua­
tions; and (3) the relationship of Kant's philosophy of 
ethics to the art of rhetoric.
l^The New Criticism (New York: New Directions Press, 
1941), p. 294.
13
The Rhetorical-Ethical Relationship 
Insight into the relationship between ethics and 
rhetoric can be gained in part by considering three concepts 
which are fundamental to both of these disciplines. The 
first of these concepts is probability. Jebb indicates that 
the earliest concept of probability as an element of rhetori­
cal theory was advanced in the works of Corax. Evidently 
Corax' system of rhetoric was divided into three parts, the 
third of which was an attempt to demonstrate probability as 
an element of rhetorical invention. In developing the doc­
trine of probability, Corax advanced the principle that the 
"likelihood of truth must always be present in order to be 
c o n v i n c i n g . "17 Later Aristotle ascribed to Corax the fol­
lowing illustration of probability: if a physically weak man 
is accused of an assault, he is to ask, "Is it possible that 
I should have attacked him?" If a strong man is accused, he 
is to ask, "Is it probable that I should have committed an 
assault in a case where there was sure to be presumption 
against me?"l® Aristotle further upheld the principle of
l^Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," The 
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VII (February, 1921), 
29.
18
Aristotle, "Rhetoric," trans. W. Rhys Roberts.
The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: 
Random House, 1941), 1402a. 18.
14
probability as an element of rhetoric by maintaining that 
the materials of enthymemes are probabilities when the con­
clusion is derived from such facts as either are or are 
"supposed to be usually true."^^
The terms "likelihood of truth" and "supposed to be 
usually true" pertain to this discussion. Each of the terms 
points to the quality or state of presumption. Accordingly, 
two definitions of actions or prosecutions contingent upon 
presumption exist today. One is that probability is founded 
on the existence of such facts and circumstances as would 
excite belief in a reasonable mind. The other definition is; 
probability means a reasonable ground for suspicion to war­
rant a cautious man in the belief of rightness and propriety. 
The basic distinction between the two definitions appears to 
rest upon a difference in types of evidence necessary to sup­
port presumption. In the first instance presumption is se­
cured by facts and circumstances (examples), while in the 
second by a reasonable ground for suspicion. An analogous 
distinction might be that of Aristotle's delineation of 
scientific-demonstration and dialectic. The one supports 
conclusions based on demonstration of scientific fact and
l^lbid., 1402b. 16.
15
example (water freezes at thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit) 
while the other supports conclusions reached dialectically 
from premises representing something less than exact, sci­
entific truth, i.e. a premise whose truth can only be as­
serted and not positively ascertained (a democratic form of 
government is more likely to promote world peace than a com­
munistic form of government).
That probability serves at the core of rhetorical 
practices, as conceived by Corax and Aristotle and recognized 
by rhetorical scholars even today, determines the involvement 
of choice as a second concept fundamental to both rhetoric 
and ethics. To be probable demands that a thing more nearly 
represent rightness and propriety than a second thing. This 
may be called the "doctrine of possibilities"; for, unless 
there are two or more possibilities between which a choice 
must be made, there is no second thing against which the first 
thing may be measured. Choice, then, may be considered the 
natural consequence of determining probability; for, as 
Aristotle contends, the origin of action is choice and the 
origin of choice is desire molded by reason with a view to 
an end.20 That a "reasonable mind" or a "cautious man" might
20
Ethel M. Albert, Theodore C. Deinse, and Sheldon P. 
Peterfreund, Great Traditions in Ethics (New York: American 
Book Co., 1953), p. 55.
16
act independent of reason with a view to an end appears in­
comprehensible lest he lose his state of being reasonable or 
cautious, the qualities essential to the determination of 
probability. Hence the basis for action is the choice in 
favor of that proposition containing the preponderance of 
presumption among possibilities as would excite belief in a 
reasonable mind or give ground for suspicion to warrant a 
cautious man in the belief of rightness and propriety.
The third concept fundamentally involved in the dis­
ciplines of ethics and rhetoric is derived primarily from 
the conception of ethics which usually refers to some rela­
tionship between customs and habits. John Dewey and James H. 
Tufts in their book, Ethics, point out that the terms "ethics" 
and "ethical" as developed by the Greeks originally meant 
customs, usages, especially those belonging to some group as 
distinguished from another and later came to mean disposition 
or c h a r a c t e r . F r o m  Dewey and Tufts' discussion of the 
meaning of the term "ethics," the rhetorical-ethical relation­
ship may be viewed as the essence of the speaker's disposition, 
habit, or custom of choice which relates his cause with proba­
bility. Recognizing this relationship, however, only enhances
^^(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929), p. 1.
17
the problem for the student of rhetoric and ethics, for he 
must now Inform what "habits and customs of choice" are 
ethically desirable factors applicable to rhetorical prac­
tices In a world of practical affairs.
The Philosophy of--Immanuel Kant and the 
Language of Valuation
The second problem Investigated In this study In­
volves Kant's contribution to rhetorical ethics and may be 
considered under the following three topics: (1) the critical 
circumstances of Kant's eplstemology; (2) the components 
comprising Kant's ethics; and (3) the evaluative nature of 
choosing to act. This study does not propose to consider the 
whole of ethics nor to treat the ethical theories of any par­
ticular school of ethical philosophy. Rather, the questions 
considered In this study are questions which we cannot help 
encountering In every ethical situation; and. In this respect, 
the area of rhetorical practices Is no exception. What Is a 
good reason In ethics as to the orator's rhetorical acts Is 
of more practical Importance In this study than questions 
concerning the nature of right or the nature of wrong. No 
doubt these latter questions would sharpen the critical facul­
ties of the philosopher toward his own pure discipline; but 
such an approach blunts the Interest of other disciplines In
18
a broader, more practical social application: that is, for 
example, in the discipline of rhetoric and those areas where 
the instruments of rhetoric are most useful. As such, this 
study is related to the ethical aspects of a particular rhe­
torical situation much in the same way that conceptual analy­
sis and scientific method are related to the practices of 
scientists. No true scientist would expect a book on scien­
tific method to do the actual work of science itself. And, 
likewise, one must not expect to find in this study any con­
clusion about what rhetorical conduct is right or wrong. The 
purpose of any methodological or analytical study, regardless 
of whether that study is in the area of science or ethics, 
is indirect. It hopes to send others to their tasks with 
clearer heads and a better understanding of the roles they 
perform.
Although the ethical theories of many philosophers 
will be analyzed and expanded upon in this study for the pur­
pose of establishing ethical guidelines for the practice of 
rhetoric, one system of ethics seems particularly relevant 
to the needs of social discourse. The philosopher Theodore 
Meyer Greene observes that, if properly understood, the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant probably has more to offer the 
twentieth century than that of any other single man:
19
Kant, unlike the Ancients and Medievalists, is essen­
tially modern in basic orientation. Indeed, he has 
probably done more to set the modern intellectual 
stage and to mold our contemporary ethos than any other 
philosopher. No competent philosopher today . . . can 
ignore him with impunity. Furthermore, Kant not only 
saw man's perennial problems through modern eyes; he 
also grappled resolutely and powerfully with the prob­
lems which more deeply concern us today. He asked the 
very questions which are uppermost in our minds. His 
answers . . .  are the kind of answers we are looking
for.22
The advantages in following Kant's philosophy for de­
veloping a system of ethics applicable to rhetorical practices 
are probably best explained by the critical method he utilized 
in examining the epistemological basis for ethics. Kant's 
philosophy begins by recognizing differing kinds of conscious­
ness: scientific or logical consciousness, ethical conscious­
ness, aesthetic consciousness, and so on. What is grasped by 
the ethical consciousness, for example, is possible because 
of a separate kind of cognition which is not limited by the 
grasp of logical abstractions. Kant's own examination of 
logical cognition suggests the limits and the scope of the 
rational intellect. As Greene states in his introduction to 
Kant :
Kant was too suspicious of easy thinking ever to rest 
content with what other thinkers might regard either
22Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight (New Bruns­
wick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 11-12.
20
as satisfactory or as Inevitable. The rationalistic 
belief in the power of reason to discover the deepest 
secrets of ultimate reality seemed to him to betray 
a blindness to the limits of human thought, lacking 
in philosophical insight and spiritual profundity as 
it w a s .23
However our failure to grasp ethical reality with 
concepts provided by logical abstractions does not preclude 
our ability to grasp it in some other way. The ontology of 
ethics suggests the approach which any worthwhile analysis 
of its nature must take. In this connection Kant seems quite 
consistent with the "new philosophy" of Handy, Langer, and 
others. Yet, on the other hand, Kant sees in the ontology 
of ethics a dependency or interrelationship of cognition of 
ethical reality and logical abstractions of sensible reality; 
and in this respect Kant's philosophy seems very much in 
accord with the thinking of those who, like da Vinci, Bacon 
and Lee, believe that for knowledge to be reliable it must 
be extensionalized.
Kant's great problem, as he himself envisaged it, 
grew out of the contrasting schools of rationalism and empir­
icism so prominent during his time. As Greene states, "Kant's 
approach is characterized b y ,two major assumptions . . . [both
23
Theodore Meyer Greene, "Introduction," Kant Selec­
tions, edo Theodore Meyer Greene (New York : Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1929), p. LXX«
21
of which] are epistemological; both are concerned with the 
knowing process as such.”^^ Kant recognized that reason is 
indeed essential for knowledge, but he also recognized as
o c
important sensation or primary sensory experience. ^ Both
the empiricists and the rationalists were like men trying to
hop on one leg, observes Greene, while Kant recognized that,
9 f\
actually, walking requires two legs, duly coordinated.^" 
Accordingly, Kant is able to postulate his theory that knowl­
edge is possible only when sensibility and understanding work 
in inseparable harness together. As Greene states, "These 
two faculties, working in conjunction, enable us bit by bit, 
both individually and collaboratively to reconstruct the 
structure and order of the phenomenal world." Kant here 
"assumed that moral experience has its own generic uniqueness 
and its two distinctive poles, the subjective pole of the 
moral agent and the objective pole of the real."^^ In short, 
Kant's philosophy is that of practical reason, reason as a
2 .
Z^Greene, Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight, p . 
25.
'ibid.
Ibid., p . 18 . 
2 6.
^ ^Ibid., p . 24. 
^^Ibid., p . 43.
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cause producing actions; or, as G. C. Field argues, Kant's 
philosophy assumes that practical reason is the capacity for 
finding means to ends in accordance with sensibility and 
unders tanding .^  ^
In accordance with the epistemology he expounded,
Kant viewed ethics as composed of two elements, sensory im­
pulse and rational consideration. Brought together in proper 
proportions, sensory impulse and rational consideration will 
initiate rational action Rational consideration without im­
pulse is incapable of producing action; and impulse without 
rational consideration produces irrational action, the kind 
of action experienced by the brutes. The actor receives an 
initial impulse to act, and the manner in which his rational 
consideration influences that impulse determines the conse­
quence of that particular impulse That is to say, an actor 
may alter, defer, or even deny an impulse, depending upon 
the influence of his own rationale.
On the subject of the goodness or badness of an act, 
Kant is quite specific. Whether choice is determined or free 
is unimportant to the fact that the rule of reason directing 
an act (the maxim) should be correct. Under no circumstances,
2 Q
Moral Theory (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
1921), p. 46.
23
he contends, does an act depend upon the realization of its 
objective as a measure of the choice from which that act 
arises. The effect of an act is determined not by its con­
sequences but by the manner in which the maxim directs the 
impulse initiating the action. Thus, in the strictest 
Kantian sense, the evaluation of the goodness or rightness 
of choice depends not upon effects of choice in the events 
of human actions, but rather upon the maxims of choice from 
whence those actions arise.
The Relationship of Kant's Ethics to 
Rhetorical Practices
The third procedure followed in this study concerns 
the drawing of a relationship between Kant's practical reason 
(ethics) and practices of the art of rhetoric. The drawing 
of a relationship between ethics as an aspect of Kant's 
philosophy and the field of rhetorical theory is predicated 
upon the Kantian categories serving to deduce "good reasons" 
to be employed in rhetorical practices. A "good reason" de­
termines the rightness and appropriateness of what ought to 
be the orator's objective.
The thesis of this study is that ethical guidelines 
applicable to the dialectical process of the rhetorical func­
tion may profitably be developed as a significant contribution
24
to rhetoric as it is practiced in the course of civilization 
building. And the contributions of Kant's philosophy to the 
ethics of rhetorical reasoning in accordance with the purpose 
here stated seems proper in light of the fundamental view 
Kant assumes in the moral philosophy he expounded. An effort 
will be made in this study to set forth Kant's ethical philos­
ophy in support of the stated thesis.
Since this study consists of abstracting from Kant's 
philosophy a system of ethics suitable to the uses of rhetoric, 
this work is not restricted to Kant's organizational develop­
ment. Wherever Kant's organizational pattern is appropriate 
to the need of this study, it is used. However, for the most 
part, the purpose of the study dictates the structure employed 
in the exposition.
Previous Studies
A search of Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by Amer­
ican Universities, the Index of The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, Thonssen and Fatherson's Bibliography of Speech Edu­
cation, Auer's "Doctoral Dissertations, Work in Progress," and 
Knower's "Index to Graduate Work in Speech and Drama" has re­
vealed no previous studies treating the subject of ethics 
and rhetoric as conceived in this proposal.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THE RHETORICAL-ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP
Introduction
In recent years, students of rhetoric have been turn­
ing increasingly to the studies of human nature and conduct 
for insight into the principles of the persuasive arts. The 
alliance of rhetoric and these studies reaches far back in 
history. In the days of the Athenians during the fifth cen­
tury B. C ., the art of rhetoric, says Everett Lee Hunt, con­
stituted a way of life.^ Ethetoric was the major instrument 
for influencing public opinion in Athenian society. Donald 
Lemon Clark reminds us that rhetoric as a formal study first 
grew up in Sicily about one hundred and fifty years before 
Aristotle. Rhetoric was originally conceived as an instru­
ment for training speakers in matters of litigation in the
^"Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," 
Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James 
Albert Winans by Pupils and Colleagues, ed. A. M. Drummond 
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 2.
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law courts; and "since Greek law required every free man to 
speak for himself in court, every free man needed the train- 
ing--not merely a small class of professional advocates.
For Plato, however, the orator of Athens needed to be more 
than merely a rhetorician if he was to influence properly the 
events of his day. To be an adequate master of his subject, 
the rhetorician needed "true wisdom"; and the way to "true 
wisdom," according to Plato, was through philosophy. As 
Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Bard point out, "Aristotle, 
granting rhetoric dignified status, nevertheless joined Plato 
in calling rhetoric a counterpart of dialectic, and in articu­
lating it with ethics."3 Most assuredly, Plato, too, was
r
concerned with dialectis and ethics. Aristotle, though dif­
fering from Plato's positions on the relation of rhetoric to 
dialectic and ethics, nevertheless agreed with him that rheto­
ric should be related to these two philosophical studies.
The classical period, however, is not particularly 
unique in its view of rhetoric as allied with other disci­
plines in the study of human behavior. From the early days
2
Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (Morningside 
Heights, N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 25.
^Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948),
p, 180.
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of our own republic, Daniel Webster observed that "when pub­
lic bodies are to be addressed on momentous occasions, when 
great interests are at stake, and strong passions excited, 
nothing is valuable in speech farther than it is connected 
with high intellectual and moral attainments."^ During our 
present era, the poet Archibald MacLeish asserts that "the 
sickness of our day is the sickness of disordered and multi­
farious phenomena, undisciplined, unorganized and uncomposed. 
Our desperate need is to impose upon the world of chaotic 
phenomena, an order of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . M a r i e  Hochmuth 
Nichols believes that "with respect to verbal phenomena, 
elusive and fleeting, rhetoricians are attempting to impose 
that o r d e r . T h o n s s e n  and Baird further attest that "rheto­
ric has long been the handmaid of politics . . . .  Nowhere are 
the relations of men to their constituencies more fraught 
with social consequences than in the area of political repre­
s e n t a t i o n . R h e t o r i c ,  as the intermediary between the will
-
"True Eloquence," Modern Eloquence, ed. Thomas B. 
Reed (Philadelphia: John B. Morris and Co., 1903), XV, xi.
^Cited in Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criti­
cism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 
p. 32.
^Ibid.
^Thonssen and Baird, p. 466.
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to action and the achievement of the result," continue Thon­
ssen and Baird, "must accordingly be conceived as both a 
political and an ethical instrument."®
As a counterpart of politics and ethics, rhetoric is 
necessarily concerned with decisions influencing human 
actions and as such involves theoretical relationships within 
the framework proposed in the studies of human behavior and 
conduct. Since the days of the ancients, subjects of rheto­
rical consideration have been those subjects which, through 
the instrumentation of persuasion, seek order out of chaos 
fermented with alternative possibilities. In final analysis, 
rhetoric, as Richard M. Weaver views it, "deals with subjects 
at the point where they touch upon actuality or prudential 
conduct."9
The problem of immediate concern, then, is the rela­
tionship between rhetoric and that study of human behavior 
known as "ethics." While rhetoric is recognized as interre­
lated with ethics in the ordering of undisciplined, uncomposed 
phenomena, the theoretical nature of that relationship is not 
so generally recognized. Accordingly, this chapter will
^Ibid., p. 467.
^Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,
1953), p. 5.
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consider (1) the theoretical nature of rhetoric as it af­
fects the actualization of concepts; (2) the theoretical 
nature of ethics as it dictates which concepts ought to be 
actualized; and (3) the interdependency of rhetoric and 
ethics which makes ethics an integral part of a system of 
rhetoric. An understanding of this interdependency is impor­
tant for an appreciation of the role played by "good reasons"
in the area of rhetorical p r a c t i c e s .
The Theoretical Nature of Rhetoric
While the alliance of rhetoric with other studies of 
human behavior has historical precedent, scholars neverthe­
less have often disagreed concerning the nature of rhetoric. 
Not infrequently the focus of disagreement has been concen­
trated on the dialectical-rhetorical aspects of the orator's 
practice. Richard Weaver points to the effects of a confused 
dialectical-rhetorical practice as partial explanation of the 
disagreement of their art. Says Weaver:
The failure to appreciate this distinction [between 
the dialectical and rhetorical processes] is respon­
sible for many lame performances in our public con­
troversies. The effects are, in outline, that the
dialectician cannot understand why his demonstration
^^See chapter one for an explanation of the need for 
"good reasons" in the area of rhetorical practices.
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does not win converts; and the rhetorician cannot 
understand why his appeal is rejected as specious.
Following a similar line of reasoning, Robert Oliver points
to a statement by Thomas Carlyle that seems to indicate a
decisive difference between determining a fact in dialectic
and persuading an audience concerning that fact in rhetoric.
Rhetoric: an Art of Discovery
The confusion and disagreement surrounding dialectic 
and rhetoric are demonstrated in the increased consideration 
of rhetoric as a "science of persuasion" where orators attempt 
to influence their audiences through the various modes of 
persuasion without previously having investigated through 
dialectic pursuit (i.e. the practice of reasoning about mat­
ters of opinion) the facts to which their persuasive efforts 
are applied. In the opening chapter of the Rhetoric, Aris­
totle defines his subject as "the faculty of discovering in 
any given case the available means of p e r s u a s i o n O b v i ­
ously, Aristotle does not consider rhetoric to be simply
^^Ethics of Rhetoric, pp. 27-28.
1 O
Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive 
Speech (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. 21.
1 1
Trans. W. Rhys Roberts, The Basic Works of Aris­
totle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941),
1355b. 26. (Later cited as Aristotle, Rhetoric.)
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persuasion, but also the "discovery" of arguments suitable 
to the case at issue. Surprisingly, the word "discovery" it­
self, as used in the translation of Aristotle's definition 
of rhetoric, has its origin in the Greek word, Ey 
which also serves as the Greek word meaning an investigation 
and the Greek word meaning a choice. Interestingly, Baldwin 
translates Aristotle's definition of rhetoric using the word 
"investigating" rather than "discovering," pointing up the 
interchangeability of certain ideas in the original Greek 
concept of rhetoric.
Since rhetoric is concerned with the discovery of the 
means of persuasion, the process of discovery itself becomes 
an essential ingredient in the theoretical nature of rhetoric. 
Closely allied with the process of discovery, however, is the 
function of choice as it serves to bring certain arguments to 
bear upon the proposition and to disregard others. Accord­
ingly, the process of discovery may be considered a function 
of choice whereby the discoverer rather systematically comes 
to know the conditions pertinent to the subject of his inves­
tigation. The conclusions reached by the investigator- 
discoverer are contingent upon the data he selects (chooses)
^^Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic 
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), p. 7.
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to present.
The Object of Rhetorical Discovery
Surely many may question what the rhetorician seeks 
to discover or choose. Edward Steele points out that for 
Aristotle the end of rhetoric is persuasion; the essence of 
persuasion is proof; the essence of proof is the enthymeme; 
and the essence of the enthymeme is the premise. The premise, 
Steele believes, is the popular conception of the good which 
influences the rational choice of m e a n s . 15 in this scheme 
Steele has indeed made rhetoric a kind of offshoot of dia­
lectic, on the one hand, and the actualization of dialectical 
findings in the ordering of undisciplined, uncomposed phenom­
ena, on the other. Ralph T. Eubanks and Virgil L. Baker as­
sert, "Since man can 'transcend' through consciousness an ob­
jective situation of which he is a part, he can have a hand 
in shaping his destiny by the 'exercise of choice based on 
value,'"16 The means of this transcendency, then, is per­
suasion, the essence of which is proof implemented through
^^"Social Values in Public Address," Western Speech, 
XXI (Winter, 1958), 40.
^^"Toward an Axiology of Rhetoric," The Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XLVIII (April, 1962), 157-58.
33
the instrumentation of the enthymeme. If such is the nature 
of rhetoric and if the enthymeme is the means between per­
suasion on the one hand and the premise as a conception of 
the good on the other, by which man may transcend an objec­
tive situation of which he is a part to influence the future, 
then surely the enthymematic premise is the object of the 
rhetorician's discovery or choice.
The Nature of the Enthymeme
Lloyd F. Bitzer modestly complains that in view of 
the importance Aristotle "has given the enthymeme, we might 
reasonably expect to find it carefully defined. However, al­
though there are many hints as to its nature, the reader of 
Aristotle's Rhetoric will find no unambiguous statement de­
fining the e n t h y m e m e . "17 Bitzer continues by demonstrating 
that the mysteries of the enthymeme are as perplexing to 
scholars in rhetorical theory as to the ablest of Aristotelian 
scholars. Yet certain fundamental principles concerning the 
enthymeme may be deduced from what selected rhetorical 
scholars have said concerning its nature and function.
Aristotle contends the enthymeme is the most effective
17"Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," The Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XLV (December, 1959), 399.
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of the modes of persuasion;^® for, as Bitzer concludes, 
"enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly 
produce them. Because they are jointly produced, enthymemes 
intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the strong­
est possible p r o o f s . Y e t  what is the nature of this mys­
terious but important aspect of rhetoric?
Earl Wiley, in his study of the enthymeme as an 
idiom of persuasion, relates the story of the man who liter­
ally talked himself to death with three short words. He 
shouted, "Down with Stalin." This, according to Wiley, is 
an example of an enthymeme. It signalizes the kind of logic 
we live (or die) by in the give-and-take of controversy, 
when persuasion is the end sought and fact must share place 
not only with probabilities but with behavioral patterns of 
speaker and listener alike.^0 The man who literally talked 
himself to death failed so miserably in his attempt to unify 
behavioral patterns of speaker and audience that he was 
psychologically and politically severed from the body of pop­
ular opinion as a declared enemy of the state worthy of the
^^Rhetoric, 1356a. 23.
^^Bitzer, 408.
O Q
"The Enthymeme: Idiom of Persuasion," The Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XLII (February, 1956), 19.
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punishment of death. Patently the enthymeme, says Wiley,
is not the traditional syllogism of laboratory logic 
employed by scholars in tracking down abstract truth 
and concerned with demonstration. If it were the 
speaker might argue tightly:
Tyrants should be deposed;
Stalin is a tyrant;
Stalin should be deposed;
Such precision in reasoning we leave to the needs of 
demonstration. An enthymeme, on the other hand, is 
one man's judgment of the propriety of events in some 
conflict involving people; being contingent, it is 
not demonstration, and being controversial, it is 
framed in argument.21
Following a similar line of thought, James McBurney
defines the enthymeme "as a syllogism, drawn from probable
causes. . . . As a syllogism drawn from these materials . .
the enthymeme starts from probable premises and lacks formal
v a l i d i t y . "22 McBurney amplifies these characteristics of
the enthymeme by saying:
Both dialectic and rhetoric are differentiated from 
scientific demonstration in the fact that they deal 
with probabilities and do not attempt apodictic 
proof in the sense that it appears in scientific 
demonstration.
Perhaps no other passages in Aristotle bring out 
more forcibly the point that . . . the enthymeme . .
. [is] formally deficient than these explanations
^^Ibid.
22"The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," 
Speech Monographs, III (1936), 58.
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dealing with the refutation of enthymemes. This is 
an exceedingly important point that is almost uni­
versally overlooked. Many rhetorical arguments which 
are perfectly legitimate in reasoned discourse and 
which may establish high degrees of probability are 
formally deficient; i.e. they cannot be thrown into 
a formally valid syllogism. Many enthymemes which 
are wholly acceptable from the standpoint of cogent 
speech are formally deficient from the point of view 
of the apodictic syllogism.23
A third aspect of the enthymeme important to an un­
derstanding of the nature of rhetoric is determined, in 
Aristotle's view, by the place of the enthymeme in the sys­
tem of rhetorical proofs. First Aristotle divides rhetoric 
into the artistic and inartistic application of proofs. By 
inartistic proofs Aristltle means "such things as are not 
supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset--wit­
nesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and 
so o n . By artistic Aristotle means "such as we ourselves 
construct."25 According to Aristotle inartistic proofs "are 
merely to be used," while artistic proofs have "to be in­
vented."2& Clearly, Aristotle is most concerned with artistic 
proofs for they admit of the orator's skill in making choices.
^^ibid.. 51.
2^Rhetoric, 1355b. 38-40.
23ibid., 1355b. 41.
Z^Ibid., 1355b. 42.
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Aristotle examines three kinds of artistic proofs: 
the ethical, which is a means of persuasion when the speech 
is so delivered as to produce an impression of the speaker's 
credibility; the emotional, which results from the audience's 
being worked into an emotional state by the speech; and 
lastly, the logical, which results from the speech itself 
when a truth or apparent truth has been proved by the persua­
sive means appropriate to a particular s u b j e c t . 27 The in­
strument effecting these three modes of persuasion is the 
enthymeme.
The question now arises why, since the syllogism and 
the enthymeme are both instruments of artistic proofs, is 
the enthymeme, which lacks formal validity, more desirable 
for rhetorical proof than the syllogism? In partial answer 
to this question, Charles Mudd in his study of the enthymeme 
and the logical syllogism tells us that "logically, the syl­
logism is an ordered structure of simple beauty, but stylis­
tically it leaves much to be desired. A speaker, then, does
not often use the syllogism as a means of communicating argu- 
28ment." A speaker, if using the syllogism frequently, would
^^Ibid.. 1356a. 1-4.
^^"The Enthymeme and Logical Validity," The Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XLV (December, 1959), 410.
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be required to treat subject matter already familiar to the 
audience. Instead he alters the syllogistic form by leaving 
out whatever premises the audience can infer and including 
only that information necessary to make the argument clear.
In the Rhetoric Aristotle contends that the speaker must not 
carry the chain of reasoning too far back or its length will 
render the argument obscure; and he must not put in every 
single link that leads to his conclusion or the statement of 
what is obvious will render it prolix.^9 The enthymeme, say 
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, "is almost universally under­
stood by rhetoricians and logicians alike as an elided or 
truncated syllogism; i.e. as a syllogism with one of its 
premises or the conclusion omitted. Such an omission, usu­
ally the major premise, is characteristic of rhetorical 
discourse."30
The distinction between the syllogism and the en­
thymeme, then, and thus the distinction between dialectic 
and rhetoric, is in part the consequence of a difference in 
the "functions" of the syllogism and the enthymeme. The
^^1395b. 24-27.
James McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. Mills, 
Argumentation and Debate (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), 
pp. 19-22.
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syllogism of dialectic, containing its ordered structure,
says Aristotle, treats "criticism wherein lies the path to
the principles of all inquiry. The enthymeme, on the
other hand, treats rhetorical problems of which persuasion
is the end sought. As Bitzer concludes:
Dialectic [syllogisms] must ask for premises because 
criticism cannot begin until the parties involved 
agree on some proposition. Rhetorical [enthymemes]
. . . must begin with premises held by the audience 
because persuasion cannot take place unless the 
audience views a conclusion as required by the prem­
ises it subscribes to.^
The Premise as a Concept of the Good
In light of the dialectical-rhetorical distinction 
thus made, the importance of the premise should be obvious. 
Dialectic, being concerned with criticism, asks for premises 
upon which the parties involved may agree. Rhetoric, being 
concerned with persuasion, begins with premises held by the 
audience. Thus the syllogism is appropriate to the employ­
ment of the dialectical premise while the enthymeme, lacking 
in formal validity but accounting for the premises held by 
the audience, is appropriate to the employment of a rhetorical
31Topica, trans. W.A. Pickard, The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 
101b. 3-4.
^^Bitzer, 405.
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proposition. The premise of the rhetorical enthymeme, in 
Steele's thinking, is the popular conception of the good 
which influences the rational choice of means. Steele 
points out that of particular significance to the premise 
"is the idea that human behavior is motivated by concepts 
of the desirable and not just by physiological needs or 
desires."33 He contends that few actions indeed can be 
proved clearly to be made in the service of physiological 
needs and desires. Modern scholars of social behavior 
"find the idea of physiological need or instinct inadequate 
to explain anything as complex as a modern corporation farm 
or a banking system. The same can be said of all cultural 
institutions and folkways."3^
The question now becomes: What "concepts of the de­
sirable" are held by the audience and how may the rhetorician 
discover them in performing his dialectical-rhetorical func­
tion of providing content for enthymemes. Concerned with 
this question, Aristotle proceeded to delineate the popular 
conception of the good and describe the various goods that 
could be utilized as enthymematic p r e m i s e s . 35 in 1925,
^^"Social Values in Public Address," 39.
34
Ibid.
^^See Edward D. Steele, "Value Theory and Rhetoric;
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however, William Utterback pointed to Aristotle's descrip­
tions of the popular conception of the good as a series of 
conceptual systems containing a set of stock major premises 
which were appropriate to the relatively simple society of 
Athens but insufficient to measure the popular conception of 
the good relative to modern society.^6 We live in a world 
of changing values; and, as revealed in Irving J. Lee's 
doctoral dissertation, the failure to recognize this fact has 
led many to a mistaken reliance upon the value system of the 
Athenian society as described by Aristotle which is incon­
sistent with the motivational appeals available to the 
speaker's purpose in the twentieth century.^7 From such a 
delineation of the popular conception of the good as relative 
to the Athenian society, however, we may infer, as Steele 
does, that the persuader has only "two available ethical al­
ternatives in his efforts to influence rational choices made 
by his audience."38 As Steele states, "He must show that
Social Values, the Enthymeme, and Speech Criticism," Western 
Speech, XXXIV (Spring, 1962), 71.
^^Cited in ibid.
37cited in ibid., 72-73. See Irving J. Lee, "Some 
Conceptions of Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory,"
Speech Monographs, VI (1939), 66-68.
38lbid., 73.
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choosing his program is a reasonable deduction from premises 
held by the listner or he must seek to show that the lis­
tener's values are inadequate or unsuitable" and attempt to 
replace them with new concepts of the good derived from the 
speaker's own value-ethical system.^9
Methodologically, then, the speaker seeks to discover 
value premises to be employed enthymematically in his orator­
ical practices. These premises, according to Steele, are 
generalized concepts of the desirable held by the audience, 
a term denoting generalized feeling which is the source of 
motivation and serves as the basis for directing conduct.
Here the primary interest is in the evaluation of alterna­
tives from the viewpoint of their implications for a system 
of action to be followed. In short, whether in the form of 
audience-held concepts of the good or concepts derived from 
the speaker's own value-ethical system which replaces those 
held by the audience, the generalized concepts of the good 
serve as the premises from which the speaker's propositions 
are deduced. Bitzer points out and Steele concurs that "the
39lbid.
^^Ibid., 73-74. See "General Statement," Toward a 
General Theory of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. 
Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), 
p. 29.
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assumption is that the speaker will be effective in persua­
sion if the audience is willing to accept his reasoning as a 
deduction of premises to which it subscribes.
Finally, now, a picture of the theoretical nature of 
rhetoric begins to take shape. Rhetoric traditionally con­
sidered is an art of utility; that is, rhetoric is the means 
by which man transcends through consciousness an objective 
situation of which he is a part to shape his future destiny. 
Such transcendency comes about through the resolution of 
probabilities. That the subjects of rhetoric are topics of 
probabilities has long been recognized. But underlying 
rhetoric's concern with the problematic is the fact that all 
rhetorical discourse is developed in relation to an audience. 
If the orator is to perform his function adequately he must, 
in accordance with Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, dis­
cover (choose) those means for accomplishing the adherence 
of thought of speaker and audience alike. In essence this 
is the end sought through persuasion, and in a major sense 
it accounts for the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric.
The aim of dialectic is criticism--often the aim is 
criticism of the respondent's own position. Since arguments
41
Steele, "Value Theory and Rhetoric . . .,"71.
See also Bitzer, 407.
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are formed from premises supplied by the respondent, dialec­
tical arguments have the virtue of being self-critical.
But the interaction between speaker and audience necessitates 
a different form in rhetoric. The purpose of speaker-audience 
interaction is joint adherence to a unified concept of belief 
for action. "The speaker uses a form of interaction which 
has its counterpart in dialectic," says Bitzer, "but instead 
of using question and answer to achieve interaction, he uses 
the enthymeme, which accomplishes for rhetoric what the method 
of question and answer accomplishes for d i a l e c t i c . T h e  im­
portant factor here, as Bitzer continues to point out, is 
that the speaker draws his premises from propositions which 
members of his audience would supply if he proceeded by 
question and answer.
The point to be emphasized is that the rhetorical 
enthymeme occurs only when speaker and audience join together 
to supply the necessary premises. In the strictest sense, 
the enthymeme cannot be considered a syllogism having one or 
more suppressed premises; for the "speaker does not lay down
^^Bitzer, 407.
43ibid., 408.
44lbid.
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his premises but lets his audience supply them out of its 
stock of opinion and know ledge."45 On occasion, however, 
the speaker's task is compounded because he must supply the 
knowledge to the audience or in some instances alter and 
modify the audience's already existing knowledge out of which 
it will draw the premises for the enthymeme the speaker uses. 
Premises, as a generalized conception of the good, are never­
theless the essence of the speaker's objective when he seeks 
to discover the available means of persuasion in any given 
case.
The Theoretical Nature of Ethics
Wayne A. R. Leys tells us in his book, Ethics for 
Policy Decisions, that "the study of standards for decision 
making is the part of philosophy that has been called 
e t h i c s . " 4 6  This area of systematic investigation has been 
known as the study of ethics for about twenty-five hundred 
years. Leys subsequently reminds us that the word "philos­
ophy" itself, with which ethics is associated, originally 
meant "'the love of wisdom,' and philosophers have conceived 
their task as the discovery of very general principles of
45lbid., 407.
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 4.
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w i s d o m . I f  such is indeed the task of the philosopher, 
then apparently that branch of the philosopher's study called 
ethics needs to concern itself with "discovery of very general 
principles of wisdom in the rather limited area of standards 
for decision making." This at least is the consideration for 
the immediate investigation.
The Theoretical Nature of Ethical Standards
The nature of ethical standards and, correspondingly, 
the "quality of being wise" are two essential aspects for con­
sideration in a study concerning the nature of ethical theory. 
According to Charles Miltner the task of revealing the essence 
of ethics cannot be a historical study of how men acted in 
the past. The scope of ethics involves more than a consider­
ation of how men do act; it involves how men "should act."48 
Patrick Romanell, in advocating a new naturalism, supports 
Miltner's distinction of the "ought" and the "is" in ethics 
by pointing out that
if we take the pragmatic test of truth in its first 
or empirical sense, we are faced with the difficulty 
that no moral hypothesis can be justified. How can 
an idea of life, which a moral hypothesis describes
47 Ibid.
48
The Elements of Ethics (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1957), p. 4.
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and prescribes, be justified by a mere empirical 
study of relevant facts. For it should be obvious 
that it is logically impossible to infer a conclu­
sion containing an ought (expressed through the 
ideal itself) from premises that are, by definition, 
limited to what is.^^
Rickaby, in his work on moral philosophy, explains the scope 
of ethics this way: "The principal business of Ethics is to 
determine what moral obligation is, or to fix what logicians 
call the comprehension of the idea 'I o u g h t . W i t h  this 
scope of ethics in mind the concern for standards of wise de­
cisions men ought to make is considered an important aspect 
of "standards for decision making."
Again, according to Miltner, "policies for decision 
making" in terms of the "ought" in ethical considerations 
have reference to a custom or practice, a more or less invar­
iable mode of behavior observable in deliberate actions of 
rational b e i n g s . T o  this description may be added the idea 
that man is a rational and active being, a being capable of 
choosing deliberately to perform certain actions and to re­
frain from certain other actions. With Saint Thomas, Miltner 
believes ethics to be the practical science which influences
49Toward a Critical Naturalism (New York: The Mac­
millan Co., 1958), p. 46.
^^Cited in Miltner, p. 4.
S^Ibid., p. 3.
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human acts and provides norms for their natural integrity 
and honesty.52 Bertrand Russell goes one step further and 
explains that ethics is commonly concerned not only with the 
questions of what men ought to do and not do, but also the 
basis of reason which determines what men ought to do and 
not do. "It [ethics] is conceived . . .  as [reason] dealing 
with human conduct, and as deciding what is virtuous and 
what vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in 
practice, people are called upon to choose.
Good and Bad--Right and Wrong
The answer to the question, "What do you mean by 
Good?" differs from the explanation which could be given to 
the question, "What do you mean when you say such and such 
is red?" for example. Good is not a quality like redness, 
perceivable by the senses; and, Russell points out, as a re­
sult, "there is less agreement as to the things that are 
good than as to the things that are red."54 a more recent 
exponent of the opinion first set forth by G . E . Moore,
52
^ Ibid.
53*'xhe Elements of Ethics," Readings in Ethical 
Theory, ed. Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 1.
S^ibid., p. 3.
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Russell continues by contending that the failure to compre­
hend the distinction between things perceivable by the senses, 
like redness, and things not so perceivable, like goodness, 
has led many a person mistakenly to think that the notion of 
good could be analyzed into some other notion such as pleas­
ure or happiness.
Somewhat related to the association of good with 
happiness is the problem of associating good with desire.
This view holds that a thing is good when it is desired. Yet 
the view of good as an object of desire fails to account for 
the existence of bad desires. Moore and Russell each point 
out that when someone contends that good means "pleasant," 
or in the substantive sense, "pleasure," he is defining good 
in terms of some natural property that is desired by the in­
dividual. The fallacy of such reasoning may be seen by sub­
stituting the question, "Is pleasure good?" According to 
the logic of this view we can clearly see that we do not mean 
anything like it--we are not asking if pleasure is qualified 
by some unanalyzable and unique property. John Stuart Mill 
furnishes a classical example when he equates pleasure or 
happiness with "desirable ends" and then defines "desirable" 
as "desired." Actually Mill exemplifies his own fallacy by 
describing things as desired, such as virtue, money, or
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health. He thus obliterates his own distinction by attempt­
ing to show that such things as money and health are parts 
of happiness. The disclosure of "desired" as an object of 
sense points to the impersonal nature of ethics, i.e. the 
viewpoint that a thing should be recognized on its own ac­
count, not on account of its consequences. As Russell states, 
"We cannot maintain that for me a thing ought to exist on 
its own account, while for you it ought not; that would merely 
mean that one of us is mistaken, since in fact everything 
either ought to exist or ought not. Russell concludes, 
therefore, that we cannot "infer any results as to what is 
good or bad from a study of the things that exist."56
The same reasoning, however, does not necessarily 
apply to rightness or wrongness as to goodness or badness.
Such would be a confusion of the ought with the is and, as 
previously pointed out, the "ought" and not the "is" is the 
primary consideration of ethics. That consequences do exist 
and are of interest to the acts of man is a recognized fact 
of man's nature as an active being. Since practical judgments 
assert a causal relationship between actions and consequences,
^^Ibid., p. 4.
^^ Ibid., p. 8.
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an empirical method providing right actions for certain con­
sequences is implied. What, then, can be offered as an ex­
planation of right actions with which ethics is appropriately 
concerned?
With respect to the question of rightness, Russell 
contends that since the objectively right act seems in some 
way dependent on consequences, we most naturally start with 
the supposition that the objectively right act is that which 
will have the best consequences.57 The act having the most 
favorable consequences Russell labels the "most fortunate 
act." The most fortunate act is one producing the greatest 
number of things having positive value. And "things having 
positive value" are roughly described as certain states of 
consciousness which contain pleasures of human intercourse 
and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. But, according to 
this view, the most fortunate act cannot always be considered 
the most objectively right act. This is so since the act 
that proves to be the most fortunate may on occasion appear 
to be less fortunate according to the evidence at our dis­
posal at the time of commission. Hence the rightness of an 
act is a probability-type judgment of conduct. That is to
57lbid., p. 13.
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say, the objectively right act is that act which will prob­
ably be most fortunate as judged by a wise man who takes ac­
count of all available data at his disposal. This act Rus­
sell calls the "wisest act."^® Thus the most fortunate act 
involves the actual good, whereas the wisest act may or may 
not involve the actual good.
The description of this "wisest act" presents a spe­
cial difficulty: What may be considered available data? Gen­
erally speaking, all available data have reference to things 
capable of being foreseen, not to things unpredictable. In 
respect to the consequences of an act, those conditions that 
are physically impossible for the agent to perform or impos­
sible for the agent to consider must not be included. Thus 
the objectively right act with which ethics is concerned may 
be described as that act, of all that are possible, which 
will probably have the best consequences as described by all 
available data.
With this description of the objectively right act, 
however, one additional consideration of major importance to 
the essence of ethics remains: namely, subjective rightness. 
The comparison and contrast of subjective rightness with 
objective rightness is important for distinguishing conduct
^^ Ibid.
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that is merely mistaken from conduct that is immoral or 
blameworthy. Russell states that "in the objective sense, a 
man ought to do what is objectively right. But in the sub­
jective sense . . .  he sometimes ought to do what is objec­
tively w r o n g . "59 The act which ensues from the proper amount 
and kind of considered approval is, in some sense, subjec­
tively right, although it may ultimately be determined ob­
jectively wrong. An act is said to be subjectively right 
when judged by the agent to be objectively right. Or put in 
another way, an agent's judgment as to what is objectively 
right may err, but so long as the agent follows what his 
consideration reveals to be probably objectively right, his 
act will be subjectively right in spite of the ultimate error 
of objective consideration. Consequently an act is considered 
moral "when the agent approves it, and immoral when he dis­
approves it, using moral to mean 'subjectively' right and im­
moral to mean 'subjectively' wrong.
The doctrine of "subjective right" and "subjective 
wrong," however, has certain drawbacks in need of modifica­
tion. First, an agent may exist who convinces himself of the
S^Ibid., p. 14.
GOlbid.. p. 15.
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belief that what he wishes to do is right. Of course, the 
belief of self-deception is not a genuine belief; and hence 
an act may be immoral even if an agent judges it to be 
r i g h t . S e c o n d l y ,  an agent may commit an unreflective act, 
one where he has made no judgment but rather has acted from 
impulse. Many of these unreflective acts, such as those 
that spring from malice or cruelty, are blameworthy. Yet 
they have not proceeded from a previous judgment. In prob­
lems where inadequate reflection exists or where reflection 
is non-existent, the blame does not properly belong to the 
act, but rather to the agent's character or habit as revealed 
by the act. Russell therefore concludes that
A moral act should be defined as one which the 
agent would have judged to be right if he had con­
sidered the question candidly and with due care; if, 
that is to say, he had examined the data before him 
with a view to discovering what was right, and not 
with a view to proving such-and-such a course to be 
right.62
Ethics properly concerns itself with the wisdom in 
man's habit or custom of responding to what he ought to do.
It is not only concerned with the "oughts" and "ought nots" 
of man's behavior but also with the determination of the 
ought and ought not in directing man's behavior. The
61 
•Ibid.
Ibid., p . 16 . 
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involvement of wisdom in ethics implies reasoned behavior, 
and the reasoning employed for making judgments of "right and 
wrong" requires a special body of laws fitting the peculiar 
characteristics of the knowledge involved therein. The 
nature of this knowledge of "ought and ought not" and the 
laws of reason to procure such knowledge constitute the spe­
cial concern of this study yet to be considered.
The Interdependency of Rhetoric and Ethics
The British philosopher Stephen Toulmin, in his work 
on philosophical ethics, tells us there are many philosophers 
for whom the search for ethical standards has a political aim. 
For this class of philosophers ethics has a "rhetorical force" 
useful in forwarding their particular p o l i c i e s . I n  fact 
Toulmin goes so far as to describe Jeremy Bentham's philo­
sophical ethics as having been required in order to counter­
balance by rhetoric the existing prejudices. In this sense 
rhetoric appears as an instrument for the propagation of 
ethical precepts, as indeed it may be. Yet the theoretical 
nature of rhetoric and ethics reveals an interdependency of
ft ^
Stephen Edelston Toulmin, ^  Examination of the 
Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960), p. 195.
G^ibid., p. 199.
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rhetoric and ethics more subtly and more intimately involved 
than is indicated by the view that rhetoric exists merely as 
an instrument of ethics.
Wayne C. Minnick, in his book, The Art of Persuasion, 
tells us there is general agreement that some means of per­
suasion are unethical. He lists them as follows:
1. It is unethical to falsify or fabricate.
2. It is unethical to distort so that a piece of evi­
dence does not convey its true intent.
3. It is unethical to make conscious use of specious 
reasoning.
4. It is unethical to deceive the audience about the 
speaker's intent.^5
"A person who wishes to be ethical," says Minnick, "must 
avoid these practices" and with this most rhetoricians will 
a g r e e . W h a t  this view fails to consider, however, is the 
necessity for maintaining the appearance of properly con­
sidered ethical precepts as an integral part of rhetorical 
practices without which a theoretical rhetoric would be non­
existent. That an abuse of the rhetorical faculty can work 
great mischief is not to be denied. But the failure to 
realize the necessary interdependency of the orator's cause 
with recognizable values as a basis for all persuasive
^^(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), pp - 283-84. 
GGlbid.
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discourse has long been overlooked in specious and question­
able rhetorical practices.
Thus neither the view that rhetoric is an instrument 
for propagating ethical precepts nor the view that selected 
ethical criteria apply to rhetorical practices fully explains 
the theoretical nature of the dependency of rhetoric and 
ethics.
The Nature of Proof in the Rhetorical-Ethical 
Relationship
The nature of the rhetorical-ethical interdependency 
may be explained by reconsidering the theoretical nature of 
rhetoric and the theoretical nature of ethics already dis­
cussed. As a beginning for this explanation, Aristotle's 
definition of rhetoric as "the discovery of the available 
means of persuasion" must be recounted. Rhetoric is an act 
of discovery and the object of rhetorical discovery is "the 
means of persuasion." Thus persuasion is the sought-after 
end of rhetoric; and, as Edward Steele tells us, the means 
to this end is "proof." Or, said chronologically, the act 
of the orator is to discover the proof essential for securing 
persuasion.
The immediate problem for consideration here, then, 
is to recount the nature of proof and of persuasion. Douglas
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Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede in their book, Decision by De­
bate, define proof as "the process of securing belief in one 
statement by relating it to another statement already be­
lieved. As already noted, Edward Steele describes the 
premise as the "concept of the good"; and thus, in relation 
to the Ehninger and Brockriede definition of proof, the object 
of rhetorical discovery is the process of securing belief in 
one concept of the good by relating it to another concept of 
the good already recognized. In this process of drawing re­
lationships, persuasion is accomplished insofar as the audi­
ence is united with the speaker in accepting the speaker's 
premised good.
The point of juncture between rhetoric and ethics 
comes straight to the problem of probabilities. The process 
of proof just noted involves the process of speaking judgments 
covering the popular concept of the good that may be either 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. One commonly alludes to the 
character of these judgments by saying they are "probably" 
worthy of praise or worthy of blame.
Obviously, then, when considering the nature of the 
interdependency of rhetoric and ethics, there is need to mark
^^(New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1963), p. 99.
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out clearly the kind of probability determination rhetoric 
and ethics are involved with.
The Nature of Probability in the 
Rhetorical-Ethical Relationship
Most important is the fact that the probability of
the rhetorical-ethical relationship is a "logical determinant
type probability" and not a "relative frequency determinant."
The method for logically determining probabilities is most
easily seen in C. D. Broad's interpretation of the inductive
argument. Having argued that induction by simple enumeration
involves a formal fallacy, Broad continues by stating that
the conclusion of inductive argument must therefore be 
modified and the most reasonable modification to make 
is to state them in terms of probability. . . . With 
suggested modification of our conclusion the logical 
difficulty vanishes. Suppose the conclusion becomes 
that it is highly probable that all S's are P. There
is then no illicit process. We argue from a certain
proposition about some S's to the probability of a 
proposition about all S's. This is perfectly legiti­
mate . 68
Considering Borad's view of probability as a natural result
of inductive logic, Max Black, in his book. Language and
Philosophy, points out that
this view that categorical inductive conclusions are 
not legitimate and ought to be replaced by probability 
statements, is very popular today. (Indeed it is
68„The Problem of Induction," Mind (1918), 391.
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commonly taken as almost too obvious for discussion 
that inductive conclusions ought not be regarded as 
more than probable.
According to Rudolf Carnap "inductive logic is here conceived 
as the theory of an explicatum for probability."70 while in­
ductive logic is not the same as probability, the method of 
making probability determinations is nevertheless meaningfully 
explained by the concept of inductive logic.
Some further explanations are needed, however, con­
cerning the method of qualifying with probability the conclu­
sions of logical induction. Suppose Mr. X. would like to 
know whether the prediction, "It will rain tomorrow," is true 
or false because it is relevant for a practical decision he 
has to make. To formulate sharply the distinctive feature of 
this probability is more troublesome than might appear be­
cause a probability-type conclusion can become entangled with 
different matter from some conclusions asserted categorically; 
it sometimes is to be taken hypothetically only. As Clarence 
Irving Lewis contends, "The distinction here is that between 
conclusions which are merely valid, being correctly drawn from
^^(Ithaca, N. Y .: Cornell University Press, 1949),
p. 391.
7^Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 161.
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the premises, and those which, the premises being factual, 
are also asserted as true."^^ Because a probabilized conclu­
sion is relative to its premises, and because the full state­
ment of it must be of the form, "on data *D,' 'P' has prob­
ability a/b," the maker of such a conclusion does not deem 
necessary the remarking of the difference between valid con­
clusions which are merely justified hypothetically and those 
which, the premises of them being factual, are categorical 
and asserted t r u e . 72 On this matter, Lewis points out that 
"if data 'D' hold, then on data 'D,' '?' has probability a/b
would be a neoplasm; the hypothesis here is superfluous, and
on data 'D,' ' P' has probability a/b tells the whole story." 7^ 
Yet Lewis further remarks that the distinction between the 
hypothetical and categorical as a qualifier of the data still 
holds. Lewis says, for example.
If one assert, "judging by the barometer, tomorrow 
will probably be fair," one does not mean merely "if
the barometer is high, then tomorrow will probably
be fair." The intention is to assert the premises 
as factual, and the conclusion, "on the barometer 
data, tomorrow will probably be fair," is meant as a 
categorical probability statement. One has still to 
retain reference to the ground of judgment because,
Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, 111.: 
The Opçn Court Publishing Co., 1946), p. 268.
72ibid.
73Ibid.
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for example, it could also be simultaneously true 
that judging from radio reports from the west, it 
will probably rain tomorrow, and there is no such 
thing as the probability of tomorrow's weather ex­
cept relative to the data on which it is j u d g e d . 74
A probability theory of the logical inference type 
takes its point of departure from our concern in making prob­
ability determinations for predicting results of acts yet un­
certain. The method of making such predictions is logical 
induction and the product of such a method is probability 
inference. At most, the assigned probability can only be 
taken as having predictive significance which is more or less 
well confirmed by the data of its premises collated by the 
correct procedure of induction. On this basis, we presume 
further behavior to have empirical determination on the same 
assurance as the data themselves.
Here, in terms of the "ethical ought" and the "popu­
lar conception of the good" in rhetorical premises, we are 
concerned only with probability determinations. The "ethical 
ought" and the "popular conception of the good" are kinds of 
probability statements; and, as Henry Kyburg states in his 
book. Probability and Logic of Rational Belief, as probability 
statements they "serve in discourse not only to express
74ibid., pp. 268-69.
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opinions (well grounded or otherwise) about future occur­
rences, but to guide our decisions and inform our actions in 
an uncertain w o r ld ."75 Rhetoric finds its province in estab­
lishing unanimity of audience and speaker in accepting the 
conceptualized good, while ethics finds its province in mat­
ters determining what the good ought to be. The underlying 
relationship between rhetoric and ethics is that a "concept 
of the good" as a rhetorical premise is impossible to attain 
apart from a consideration of the ought and ought not pro­
vided for in the province of ethics. While good and bad may 
be, as Russell believes, indefinable in the philosophical 
sense of their involvement, they are nevertheless expressible 
in the valuation of human conduct as a matter of right or 
wrong actions. The underlying assumption of value judgments 
concerning praiseworthy and blameworthy actions is that value 
accrues in direct relation to the probable "rightness" of the 
actions considered.
Summary
Rhetoric is an art of utility. It is conceived as 
the means for getting things done through influencing
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press,
1961), p. 2.
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decisions that have to be made concerning the actions that 
men perform. To supply the material for expediting its 
functions, rhetoric seeks to discover the available means of 
persuasion where persuasion is considered the uniting of 
speaker and audience in the common acceptance of a given 
proposition. The object of this discovery is the enthymematic 
premise which is a "popular conception of the good." In this 
connection the enthymeme is based on probability and relies 
on the audience to supply missing premises.
Through its influencing of decisions regarding actions 
to be performed, rhetoric is intimately dependent upon ethics. 
The objective of both rhetoric and ethics is rightness of 
action and only through rhetoric directed by ethical precepts 
may the probably right action be achieved. Rhetoric seeks to 
persuade to the probably right actions and ethics seeks to 
determine which actions probably ought to be considered the 
right actions of persuasion.
CHAPTER III
A DEVELOPMENT OF THE "SYNTHESIS A PRIORI"
FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT
Introduction
Because of rhetoric's concern for issues bearing 
ethical consequences and because ethical standards serve as 
measurements for the orator's actions, a question arises con­
cerning the method for resolving rhetorical problems in an 
ethical manner. This question has particular interest for 
the "laws of ethics" that affect the realization of ought- 
type determinations in the rhetorical process. John Dewey, 
in his work. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, tells us that
laws . . . are means of prediction only as far as they 
operate as means of production of a given situation.
. . . Laws . . . are instrumentalities in determining, 
through operations they prescribe and direct, the 
ordered sequence into which gross qualitative events 
are resolved.1
Also speaking on the nature of laws, Bella K. Milmed
^(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938), pp. 454-56.
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paraphrases a statement made by the philosopher Immanuel
Kant, pointing out that
the epoch-making discovery of Galileo and other early 
experimenters was the discovery that reason has insight 
only into that which it produces after a plan of its 
own, and . . . must itself show the way with principles 
of judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature 
to give answer to questions of reason's own deter­
mining . ^
The similarity of these two statements concerning 
the nature of laws, the first issued by the twentieth century 
philosopher John Dewey, and the second by Immanuel Kant in 
the year 1781, seems to lend credence to the view expressed 
by A. R. C. Duncan when, in considering moral laws, he wrote 
that the "philosopher in the twentieth century who pays any 
attention to what is being said and suggested in the field 
of . . . [moral philosophy] cannot avoid facing Kant's prob-
q
lem." "Indeed, according to the Critical interpretation, 
the argument of the . . . [moral law] does not begin to be 
intelligible until it is taken in relation to the Critical 
philosophy developed in the Critique of Pure Reason.
2
Kant and Current Philosophical Issues (New York:
New York University Press, 1961), p. 10. A similar compar­
ison of Dewey and Kant is made by Milmed which supports Dun­
can's conclusions cited here.
^Practical Reason and Morality (New York: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons, 1957), p. x.
^Tbid.. p. 40.
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This problem which each philosopher must face in his
quest for laws and principles (and particularly moral laws
and principles) is indeed the problem that Kant so readily
recognized. Frederick Copleston, in his work, A History of
Philosophy, succinctly states the problem with which Kant
dealt: "How, for example, can we reconcile with the scientific
conception of the world as a law-governed system, in which
each event has its determinate and determining course, the
world of moral experience which implies freedom?"^ In his
introduction to Kant's work Norman Kemp Smith states the
problem of concern to Kant, and correspondingly the problem
of concern to students of philosophy in general, in terms
similar to those of Copleston: "The fundamental principles
upon which all experience and knowledge ultimately rest are
synthetic in nature: how is it possible that they should also
be a priori?"^ Elsewhere, Smith analyzes the problem that
Kant first dealt with by expounding the
self conflict of Reason in the form of a broad judi­
cial statement of the grounds and claims of the two 
opposing authorities which divide the allegiance of 
the human spirit, namely, the intellectual and the 
moral science with its cognitive demands on the one
^(Westminster, M d .: The Newman Press, 1961), VI, 186.
^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Nor­
man Kemp Smith (New York: Random House, 1958), p. x i .
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hand, the consciousness of duty with its no less im­
perious prescriptions on the other.7
Kant's work, as Copleston and Smith so aptly point 
out, was born in the attempt to reconcile the two influential 
schools of philosophical thought currently at his time-- 
British empiricism as represented by Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume; and continental rationalism as represented by Descartes, 
Leibniz, and Wolff. In examining these two schools of 
thought, Kant reasoned that a metaphysics of science might 
be possible only if there exist knowable truths different 
from the synthetic truths of nature and knowable through 
sense experience such as advocated by the empiricists, or 
from the analytic truths that owe their validity to the mean­
ings of their terms (that is, true by definition) as advo­
cated by the rationalists.
The problem of the source and nature of knowledge is 
indeed a problem with which any student of philosophy and 
not least of all the student of moral philosophy must be 
concerned. To this end, the student of rhetorical ethics is 
no exception. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the 
juncture between rhetoric and ethics involves the nature of
^Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan and Co., 1923), p. 436.
69
rhetorical judgments which is that these judgments are 
either probably worthy of praise or probably worthy of blame. 
The ethical soundness of these judgments is dependent upon 
the laws for developing good reasons used for making such 
judgments. The understanding of these laws is dependent 
upon understanding the epistemology formulating the rational 
basis from which such reasons may be developed. For a con­
sideration of the source and nature of these laws, we now 
turn to Immanuel Kant's first critique, the Critique of Pure 
Reason.
The Distinguishing of Pure and 
Empirical Knowledge
Obviously, the problem of Kant's concern does not 
pertain only to knowledge of ethical laws and maxims but con­
cerns human knowledge in general. Kant begins his inquiry 
into the conditions of knowledge by saying that in the order 
of time no one has any knowledge whatever prior to experience, 
that is, prior to that knowledge which comes to us somehow 
through the medium of impressions of sense.
There can be no doubt [says Kant] that all knowledge 
begins with experience. For how should our faculty 
of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects 
affecting our senses partly of themselves produce 
representations, partly arouse the activity of our 
understanding to compare these representations, and, 
by combining or separating them, work up the raw
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material of the sensible impressions into that knowl­
edge of objects which is entitled experience.®
On the occasion of sense impressions, then, our faculty of 
knowledge is called into activity with the result that some­
how we come to have knowledge of sensible objects.
While granting that our knowledge originates in ex­
perience, Kant does not assume, however, that there is in 
knowledge no element which has an origin different from that 
of sense impressions. To the contrary, Kant remarks that 
"though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does 
not follow that it all arises out of e x p e r i e n c e . Here Kant 
is suggesting that sense impressions in and of themselves do 
not constitute knowledge, but rather that knowledge is ob­
tained when the mind contributes something peculiar to itself.
A Priori Knowledge as Distinguished from 
A Posteriori Knowledge
We must therefore inquire whether there is in knowl­
edge an element which is not derived from experience. Knowl­
edge of this character Kant calls "a priori" as distinguished
g
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Nor­
man Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1953), p. 41. All 
subsequent references to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason will 
refer to this translation unless otherwise specified.
9
^Ibid.
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from that derived from sense experience and called "a pos­
teriori.” For Kant "a priori” knowledge is that knowledge 
consisting of judgments independent of sensible experience.^® 
This a priori knowledge is further divided by Kant into (1) 
pure, and (2) mixed. "Pure a priori” knowledge exists when 
no sensible element whatever is involved in the object about 
which there is a judgment. "A triangle has three sides,” for 
example, is a pure a priori judgment because a triangle is a 
determination of space; and, as Kant later shows, space is a 
pure form of perception. Conversely the judgment, "every 
change has a cause,” is also a priori but it is not "pure” 
because there is no knowledge of change except in relation 
to sensible objects; and knowledge of sensible objects neces­
sarily implies an element of sense perception.
In what follows, the Critique of Pure Reason has two 
questions for consideration: (1) Is there an a priori element
l°Ibid., p. 42.
l^These two examples are given by Watson as exemplary 
of what Kant means by pure and mixed a priori knowledge.
John Watson, The Philosophy of Kant Explained (Glasgow: James 
Maclehose and Sons, 1908), p. 50. Watson describes the Kant­
ian concept of experience as the apprehension of individual 
objects in space and time and their connection with one an­
other. This concept will be elaborated upon under the con­
sideration of space and time. Watson's interpretation of 
Kant's controversial definitions of experience will continue 
to be relied upon in this study.
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in experlence?--obviously, if such an element does exist in 
experience, it will be of the mixed a priori kind; and (2)
Is there a priori knowledge that transcends experience? Ap­
parently, if there is an a priori element in experience, that 
element, unlike the a posteriori element, must be such that 
it cannot be other than it is. As Kant says, experience
teaches us (i.e. a posteriori knowledge) that a thing is so
and so but not that it cannot be otherwise.
Thus we would say of a man who undermined the foun­
dations of his house, that he might have known a
priori that it would fall, that is, that he need not
have waited for the experience of its falling. But 
still he could not know this completely a priori.
For he had first to learn through experience that 
bodies are heavy, and therefore fall when their sup­
ports are withdrawn.
While the man who undermines the foundations of his house
does so expecting the house to fall because past experience
is predictive of this eventual outcome, he yet does not know
of the house's falling a priori--i.e. experience teaches us
that such and such is the case in a particular instance but
not that it cannot be otherwise without actually experiencing
the happening thereof.
12
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 43
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A Priori Judgments Are Universal 
and Necessary
Thus if we mean, as Kant does, that a priori knowl­
edge is not knowledge independent of this or that experience, 
then there should be no difficulty seeing that the a priori 
element of knowledge, unlike the a posteriori element, must 
be such that it cannot be other than it is. Hence every 
judgment that can only be thought "as necessary" is a priori. 
But further, because a priori judgments are necessary under 
all possible circumstances, they are, in the strictest sense, 
also universal. These two criteria imply each other, for 
whatever is necessary under all possible circumstances must 
be universal and whatever is universal under all circumstances 
must be necessary.
Hence the Critique of Pure Reason is an attempt to 
discover (1) if there is an element in experience that is 
universal and necessary and (2) if such an element transcends 
experience. Since an answer to the second question presup­
poses an answer to the first, it is set aside temporarily.
The Distinction between Analytic and 
Synthetic Judgments
In examining the problem of a universal and necessary 
element existing in experience, Kant begins by pointing out
74
that every judgment exists in some form of relationship be-
11
tween subject and predicate. Watson remarks that the dis­
tinction of these forms is important because upon it depends 
the fundamental distinction between the content of analytic 
and synthetic j u d g m e n t s . This distinction must be carefully 
observed, however, so that analytic and synthetic judgments 
do not seem to correspond to a priori and a posteriori knowl­
edge. Though all a posteriori knowledge is synthetic, all a 
priori knowledge does not necessarily follow from analytic 
judgments. On the contrary, the main problem for Kant, as 
previously pointed out, is to consider a priori knowledge 
which is yet synthetic.
The Subject-Predicate Relationship 
of Judgments
The problem of synthetic and analytic judgments is a 
matter of the kind of relationship existent between the sub­
ject and predicate expressing the judgment. According to 
Watson's interpretation of Kant's verbose descriptions on 
this point, "an analytic judgment is one which expresses in 
the predicate what is already, though perhaps obscurely,
^^Ibid., p. 48.
^S/atson, p. 57.
l^Ibid.. pp. 57-61.
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inç>lied in the subject; a synthetic judgment is one which
adds something to what is already involved in the conception
expressed by the s u b j e c t . A s  Kant states:
I can apprehend the concept of body analytically 
through the characters of extension, impenetrability, 
figure, etc., all of which are thought in the con­
cept. Now, however, looking back on the experience 
from which I have derived this concept of body, and 
finding weight to be invariably connected with the 
above characters, I attach it as a predicate to the 
concept; and in doing so I attach it synthetically, 
and am therefore extending my knowledge. The possi­
bility of synthesis of the predicate "weight" with 
the concept of "body" thus rests upon experience.
The Relationship of A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge 
to Analytic and Synthetic Judgments
To obtain the predicate in the analytic judgment, 
then, one is not required to go beyond the concept of the sub­
ject; and as a result, the predicate is formed independently 
of sensible experience and is, therefore, a priori. In the 
synthetic judgment, however, the predicate is not implied in 
the mere conception of the subject. No judgment can be syn­
thetic unless it is an actual addition to knowledge in which 
the predicate is obtained through sense experience and thus 
goes beyond the conception of the subject.^®
l*Ibid., p. 57.
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 50.
IGlbid.. pp. 50-51.
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Obviously, fron Kant's point of view all analytic 
judgments are a priori and therefore are logically necessary 
and universal. This is true both of judgments whose content 
is derived from reason alone and those based upon sense ex­
perience. The first is known as analytic judgments of the
pure type and the second as analytic judgments of the mixed 
19type. Though we can no doubt obtain a priori analytic judg­
ments both of the pure and the mixed type, as Kant contends, 
we cannot necessarily affirm anything except in regard to our 
own conceptions. As a result, the combination of the a 
priori with the synthetic seems an impossibility; at least 
this was the position held by the two schools of philosophical 
thought so prominent during Kant's time. And yet, unless we 
can show the legitimacy of judgments which are at once a 
priori and synthetic, we can have no knowledge of real exist­
ence whatsoever.
The Problem of A Priori Synthetic 
Judgments
An answer to the question concerning the relationship 
of a priori and synthetic judgments, Kant believes, will 
enable us to see how a pure science of nature is possible.^0
19
Watson, p. 58.
20
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 55.
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The "sciences” to which Kant has reference are the mathe­
matical sciences which determine the universal form of the 
sensible world, and the physical sciences which determine
the principles underlying the system of connected objects of
21sense. Thus Kant seeks to discover how pure mathematics 
and pure physics are possible. If an answer to this search 
can be formulated, then Kant has cause to suspect that a sys­
tem of reason is possible for resolving the problem of orig­
inal concern, namely, the reconciliation of the scientific 
world as a law-governed system with the world of moral ex­
perience. For an explanation of the "synthetic a priori" 
possibility, Kant proceeds by analyzing the "transcendental 
Doctrine of Elements." The investigation of the "Doctrine of 
Elements" is divided into two parts: (1) "The Transcendental 
Aesthetic," which treats the a priori elements presupposed in 
perception; and (2) "The Transcendental Logic," which treats 
the a priori elements presupposed in thought.
The Transcendental Aesthetic
Philosophy, Kant tells us, explains "the principles 
of the rational cognition that concepts afford us of
Z^Ibid., pp. 52-54.
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t h i n g s .”22 the concluding remarks to the introduction of
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states: "I entitle trans­
cendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with 
objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so 
far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.”23 
Robert Paul Wolff, in considering these two statements, 
points out that "Transcendental Philosophy,” therefore, "is 
a self-reflective, second level investigation whose purpose 
is to test and pass judgment upon the claims of reason in all 
its manifestations.”24 Wolff states:
All knowledge, or knowing, involves both an object 
and a subject. As the student of knowledge--the 
transcendental philosopher . . . cannot place these 
two elements on equal footing, but must instead make 
the subject primary and the object secondary. In 
other words, before he can investigate the nature of 
objects, he must determine the powers and limits of 
the subject. Thus, Transcendental or Critical Phi­
losophy can be viewed as a systematic inventory of 
the possessions of the human mind, a catalog of the 
functions, capacities, modes of representation, pas­
sions, and actions of the self, all with an end to 
establish the validity or invalidity of their cog­
nitive claims.25
22
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, 
trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), p. 8.
23Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 59.
^^Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 35.
2^ Ibid.
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Assuming the role of philosophy to be "self-reflec­
tion,” then, Kant proceeds in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" 
by treating perception as if it involved consciousness of an 
object, independent of any activity of thought. However, 
when he treats the "Transcendental Analytic," he considers 
the conditions in thought of experience and clearly indicates 
that there can be no knowledge of objects proper without the 
activity of thought. Therefore the point of view exhibited 
in the "Aesthetic" may be regarded in a certain sense as pro­
visional to the total concept of knowledge.
The Isolation of Sense Perception--the Elements 
of Matter and Form
What Kant sets himself to do in the "Aesthetic" is, 
therefore, to point out that, assuming perception to be a 
form of knowledge in which individual sensible things are 
apprehended, we must maintain that perception contains two 
elements: (1) matter, coming from without; and (2) form, be­
longing to the very constitution of our perceptive faculties.^^
In the opening paragraphs of the "Aesthetic," Kant 
points out that the condition of perception is sensation when 
a modification of the subject is called forth through the
26
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 65-66.
80
influence of an object.27 A perception is a mode of con­
sciousness that reflects itself directly to an object. The 
product of this reflection is sensibility which Kant defines 
as "the capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations 
through the mode in which we are affected by objects,"^8 i.e. 
the receiving of certain ideas (ideas being any mode of theo­
retical consciousness).
Here, therefore, the term "object" is used in refer­
ence to the object in consciousness and not the thing in 
29itself. Hence the "object," as it exists apart from con­
sciousness and in the world of the real, must be kept in con­
trast to the "object" as it exists in consciousness. The ob­
ject in consciousness is the only object that can really be 
known; for, as Kant later shows, the object out of conscious­
ness can exist only as an object of thought. This distinc­
tion between the conscious and the real objects is the dis­
tinction later drawn between the phenomenal object and real 
or noumenal existence. Such an object is a phenomenon inas­
much as it is not the thing in itself and is an object of
27lbid.
Z^Ibid., p. 65. 
29watson, p. 75.
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consciousness. Thus a phenomenon may be defined as any sen­
sible object whatever of which we are c o n s c i o u s . O n  the 
occasion of sensation, an object is produced in the form of 
a phenomenon comprised of two distinguishable elements: (1) 
matter (or content) which corresponds to sensation; and (2) 
form which is the ordering of the sensible manifold in re­
lations of space and time.^l
Kant's point is that sensations become an element in 
the perceived object (i.e. the phenomenon) when they are 
given form. Sensations are the matter to which form is given; 
and as sensations they are a "manifold," i.e. individual sen­
sory stimulants given to us in sequences through time. But 
once sensations are given form through consciousness, as is 
required in order that a perceived object may result, they 
are no longer mere sensations but are ordered and formed and 
given the title "content of phenomenon." Hence the matter or 
content of the phenomenon corresponds to what previously was 
pure sensation.
The other element of the phenomenon, "the form," is 
likewise essential to a perceived object. As a result of
30lbid., pp. 75-76.
OT
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 65-67.
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form, the manifold sensations are ordered in certain rela­
tions. What Kant says, in effect, is that no perceived ob­
ject (i.e. object internal to the self) can exist unless the 
sensible manifold is ordered into certain relations of space 
and time. The ordering of the sensible manifold, however, is 
not a distinguishing among parts of things or things in them­
selves, but rather a distinguishing among sensations that 
affect the self and are perceived as representative of things 
in themselves. And, as Watson points out, "since sensations 
are in themselves mere particulars without relations of any 
kind, we can only explain the perceived object by recognizing 
that the relations between sensations are due to another ele­
ment, its f o r m . "32
Kant, having distinguished between form and content, 
is now ready to make a major assumption concerning the origins 
of form. He assumes that in their own nature, sensations are 
mere particulars of experience; and from this he infers that 
the form applied to sensations must therefore come from some 
source other than the sensuous world. This form, in its pure 
sense, is the capacity for ordering sensations in certain re­
lations; and this capacity, when actually exercised in
32watson, pp. 77-78.
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relation to sensations, yields perceptions of sensible ob­
jects. As Kant says: "It will be found that there are two 
pure forms . . . serving as principles of a priori knowledge, 
namely, space and time."^3
The Exposition of the Concept of Space
Kant seeks to show in the exposition of space that 
space is not an empirical idea. When he says that "in exter­
nal sense we are conscious of objects as outside of our­
selves," he does not have reference to things in the world 
of the real or the extended world, but to objects as they 
exist within our consciousness, i.e. perceived objects or ob­
jects of apprehension. What exists "outside of ourselves" is 
what we perceive in space as being extended from ourselves. 
And what we perceive as inextended exists only in time. Or, 
in other words, what is perceived as extended and what is per­
ceived as inextended is the distinction between objects we 
perceive as existing in space and objects we perceive as ex­
isting only in time. What, then, Kant asks, are space and 
time?
Are they [he inquires] real existences? Are they only 
determinations or relations of things, yet such as would
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 67.
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belong to things even if they were not intuited? Or 
are space and time such that they belong only to the 
form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective 
constitution of our mind, apart from which they could 
not be ascribed to anything whatsoever?^^
In analyzing these questions Kant concludes that (1) 
space is non-empirical, (2) space is a necessary a priori, 
and (3) space is a pure intuition.
First, space is not an empirical concept,
for in order that certain sensations be referred to 
something outside me . . . and similarly in order 
that I may be able to represent them as outside and 
alongside one another, and accordingly as not only 
different but as in different places, the represen­
tation of space must be presup posed .35
Space, therefore, cannot be empirically obtained from the 
relations of outer appearance. As a result, a perceived ob­
ject cannot exist in space prior to its apprehension as so 
existing. But the object as it exists for the conscious 
subject (i.e. the conscious self) came into being in the 
perception. In other words, the sensations are in the act 
of perception ordered "specially"; and, as Watson concludes, 
only in this way can sensations designate perceived objects. 
The external object as it is known comes into being with its 
presentation as spacial; and unless the spacial determination
34ibid., p. 68.
^^Ibid.
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is presupposed, there can be no known external object what- 
soever.
Second, space, Kant argues, is necessarily an a 
priori idea because, while we can think away any sensible ob­
ject presented as in space, we cannot think away space it- 
37self. The idea of space is thus necessary to any percep­
tion whatever. The necessity for space, however, does not 
prove that we are unable to think the absence of space, but 
only that the presentation of extended objects is impossible 
if we suppose the absence of space.
Third, since we can present to ourselves only one 
single space, space is a pure perception. Here Kant not only 
argues that space is an a priori idea, but he also specifies 
the kind of a priori idea it is. Space, he says, is a pure 
a priori idea because there is only a single space, not sev­
eral spaces.38 Space is itself a concrete, immediate idea 
of which the so-called spaces of individual experiences are 
only parts or determinations of one single space. There are 
no specifically different spaces; each particular space is
O g
Watson, p. 83.
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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 68.
38lbid., p. 69.
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space. Further, Kant contends, space is pure a priori be­
cause the "parts" of space do not precede the idea of space 
as constituents out of which it is made up, but are thought 
of as in the one all-embracing space.39 The parts of space 
are not first given as parts and then put together so as to 
form a whole, but are rather a unity as an "infinite given 
magnitude," i.e. they "coexist ad i n f i n i t u m .
Space, then, first because it is non-empirical, 
second because it is a priori, and third because it is a 
pure idea, cannot be said to have any independent reality.
It exists only for beings who, as we, know under sensible 
conditions the perception of specially located objects; for, 
if we suppose the removal of subjective conditions under 
which we have the perception of external things, space no 
longer has any meaning. Space is a determination given to 
sensible matter of our apprehension or added by the mind 
itself.
The Exposition of the Concept of Time
Kant's exposition of time is similar to that of space, 
Any differences are due primarily to the distinctive features 
of the former. Therefore the exposition of time may be
40lbid.
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stated very briefly. Kant assumes that perception yields 
(1) knowledge of individual things as co-existent and (2) 
knowledge of the changes of things as successive. Watson 
points out that, on the basis of this assumption, Kant is 
now able to argue that knowledge is possible only under the 
presumption of time. For, unless the existence of time is 
presupposed, the consciousness of objects as existing units 
or events as following one from another is impossible to 
o b t a i n . " T i m e  is a necessary representation," Kant states, 
"that includes all intuitions. We cannot, in respect to ap­
pearances in general, remove time itself, though we can 
quite well think time as void of appearances. Time is, there­
fore, given a priori.
As in his consideration of space, Kant demonstrates 
certain a priori judgments based upon the "idea" of time and 
shows that these judgments are explicable only if we take a 
certain view of time. Kant assumes that a priori judgments 
are based upon the concept of time since obviously the judg­
ments, "time has only one dimension," and "different times 
do not co-exist but follow one another," are a priori and
41
Watson, p. 92.
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 74-75.
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based upon the idea of time.
What Kant now needs to prove is that the judgments 
we make under the perception of time are universal and neces­
sary. On this subject, he relies heavily on his exposition 
of the concept of space. "Time has only one dimension," says 
Kant; and "different times are not simultaneous but succes­
sive (just as different spaces are not successive but simul­
taneous)."^3 That is to say, "different times are but parts 
of one and the same time."^^ Time is not discursive or what 
is called a general concept, but is a pure form provided for 
by the formulation of sensible intuitions.
Further, and still relying upon the exposition of 
space, Kant says we are conscious of the parts of time only 
in so far as we consider "the one single time."45 Time is 
only a perception which can yield consciousness of one in­
dividual whole. It is the method in which the mind orders 
its ideas, and the ordering of ideas is undoubtedly a real 
function. Without the capacity to order the sensible in time, 
we could have no experience. But time cannot be predicted as 
a determination of things in themselves just because it is
43lbid.. p. 75.
44ibid.
45lbid.
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the subjective condition of experience. Thus, while we af­
firm the "empirical reality" of time, we must also maintain 
its "transcendental ideality," meaning that time is neither 
a real thing nor a property or relation of real things, but 
merely the manner in which objects are presented to us under 
the necessary conditions of experience. As such, time itself 
is a priori.
The assumptions involved in Kant's exposition of 
space and time are in fact the fundamental assumptions of his 
entire Critical philosophy. But Norman Kemp Smith, concerned 
only with the problem of immediate consideration, namely, iso­
lation of the a priori elements in sensory content, points 
out that
the proof that space and time are subjective forms 
establishes the phenomenal character of everything 
which can be apprehended in and through them, and is 
meaningless except on the assumption that things in 
themselves exist. This assumption, Kant argues, is 
already involved in the very word "appearance," and 
unless it be granted, our thinking will revolve in 
a perpetual circle.46
Perhaps one's difficulty in understanding Kant's 
reasoning lies in the expectation of any proof at all. Kant 
might have been simply explaining his position. How else 
can one convince someone of a principle so basic that there
Smith, p. 406.
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is nothing more ultimate from which to argue? Subordinate 
principles can be proved by deducing them from more funda­
mental premises; but ultimately these premises must stand 
without proof. When one comes to first principles there is 
nothing to do but explain their meaning and rest the case 
there. Apparently this is the position in which Kant finds
himself.47
Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic:
Space and Time
In the introduction to the "Aesthetic," Kant ques­
tions how a priori synthetic judgments may be possible. This 
problem has been partly answered in the discussion of the 
"Transcendental Aesthetic," in the consideration of space 
and time.
The problem was to explain the existence of a priori 
judgments in which the predicate is ascribed to the subject 
and not analytically contained in the conception of that sub­
ject. Or, to restate the problem, the question was to ascer­
tain the X or middle term which provides for the legitimate
^^There is, to be sure, other evidence of an object's 
existence, such as the way others describe the object, the 
frequency of light waves it reflects, etc. But for Kant this 
other evidence is all indirect evidence based upon sensory 
perception. Thus, ultimately, perceiving an object's exist­
ence is the only evidence of the object's really existing.
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connection of the predicate with the subject when the predi­
cate involved a determination that transcends the subject. 
This X or middle term is revealed as the pure forms of per­
ception, namely, space and time.
The judgments based upon the concepts of space and 
time have, by virtue of their very nature, a limited range, 
however. Based upon perception, they have no meaning except 
in relation to objects of our sensible experience. In other 
words, we must not suppose that we have justified the appli­
cation of such judgments to all possible objects whatsoever, 
but only to all possible objects of experience. A consider­
ation of the ultimate connection of a priori judgments to 
all perception whatsoever is left to the "Transcendental 
Logic."
Transcendental Analytic
When Kant passes from the "Transcendental Aesthetic" 
to the "Transcendental Logic," he modifies and supplements 
the conclusions reached in the former to meet the needs of 
the latter. He repeats that there are two stems of human 
knowledge: sensibility and understanding, by which he means 
sense impressions and reasoning. As Kant says: "Without 
sensibility no object would be given us, without understanding
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no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.
In the introduction to the "Transcendental Analytic," 
which is the first major division of the "logic," Kant re­
peats the distinction between sensibility and understanding 
in a slightly modified form. Here he says there are two ul­
timate sources of knowledge. The first is sense perception 
which he has discussed in the "Aesthetic"; the second is 
thought or understanding which he proposes to discuss in the 
"Logic." Watson believes that Kant speaks of sensibility as 
if it of itself were sufficient to give us knowledge of in­
dividual objects and as if thought, starting from these given 
objects, proceeds by thinking t h e m . B u t ,  as Kant proceeds 
to point out in the "Logic," the "Aesthetic" has not given a 
full answer to the question: "How is the synthetic a priori 
possible?" A perception without the exercise of thought is 
inadequate for making judgments about individual objects. In 
the "Aesthetic," Kant describes space and time as "pure per­
ceptions"; but in the actual practice of making judgments.
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 61.
4^See Watson, p. 107, for an analysis of Kant's views
on sensibility apart from thought
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they are shown only as "pure forms" of perception.^® A pure 
form of perception is simply a capacity for ordering sensible 
impressions in certain fixed ways, and this capacity can yield 
us knowledge of objects only when it is actualized or deter­
m i n e d . P u r e  forms of perception will not yield knowledge 
of objects without some unity or combination of the parts of 
the object to be perceived. Therefore the problem with which 
Kant must now contend is that objects can be made known only 
in their combined or synthesized form and perception cannot
52combine. Combination or synthesis is the work of reasoning;
and in the case of perceptions, the work of reasoning operates
in an unconscious or unreflective way. When it so operates,
Kant calls it productive imagination; and, Watson remarks,
productive imagination is really thought operating directly
in relation to sensible content.
Thought, therefore, in the form of a direct action on 
sense, is presupposed even in perception. The result 
of its action, however, is only to produce a percep­
tual image. In the strict sense of the term there is
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 67.
51%bid., p. 96.
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Kant here uses the word "understanding" rather than 
"reasoning"; but greater insight into what Kant had in mind 
may be gained if we remember that understanding in Kant's 
frame of reference is more nearly like our present day conno­
tation of the word "reasoning."
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as yet no knowledge of objects, i.e. no connected sys­
tem of perceptions. Hence . . .  a further action of 
thought is required in the explanation of experience.^3
In leading up to this problem, Kant seems to have in 
mind a new distinction between perception and thought. Sen­
sibility, no matter how we view it, is concerned with the 
mind's perception of sense impressions. In other words, im­
pressions of sense constitute the content that the mind re­
ceives as it is affected by sense stimuli received from ob­
jects external to the self. Thought, on the other hand, is 
the formulation applied to the content of sense impressions. 
When no sense impressions are given to the mind, thought in 
and of itself cannot constitute knowledge of the real and ob­
jective world. According to Watson's analysis of Kant, ana­
lytic judgments of thought, in which general or abstract con­
ceptions are manipulated, have no objective meaning except 
in reference to the perception of individual objects. 
Knowledge, setting aside for the meantime the ideas of reason 
alone (formal logic, for example), arises only from the united 
action of thought and perception. In the "Aesthetic," Kant 
isolated the sensibility in order to inquire into the a priori
53
Watson, p. 109. --
S^ibid., p. 110.
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forms of perception. Similarly, he must now isolate the 
understanding in order to inquire into its a priori forms if 
indeed such should exist.
The Logical Employment of Reasoning
Kant's "Transcendental Logic" is divided into two 
parts: (1) "Transcendental Analytic," and (2) "Transcendental 
Dialectic." The object of the "Analytic" is to show that 
pure a priori conceptions do exist in analytical type judg­
ments and that there are pure a priori judgments based upon 
them (analytical type judgments) which determine the condi­
tions under which all sensible experience is possible. Obvi­
ously, then, the nature of reasoning is of prime importance 
and consequently is the first subject Kant takes up under the 
"Analytic."
The character of a conception is such that it presup­
poses perceptions; and hence reasoning is always an indirect 
or mediating process of knowledge. It operates, not directly 
with objects, but only with conceptions which are relative to 
perceptions. The one function of thought is to inter-relate 
conceptions. The use which reasoning makes of conceptions is 
to judge by means of them; and we may properly say, therefore, 
that all reasoning is judgment.
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This is indeed the point that Kant so laboriously
makes. As he explains:
Since no representation . . . is in immediate rela­
tion to an object, no concept is ever related to an 
object immediately [directly], but to some other 
representation of it. . . . Judgment is therefore the 
mediate knowledge of any object. . . .  In every judg­
ment there is a concept which holds for many repre­
sentations, and among them of a given representation 
that is immediately [directly] related to an object.
. . . Accordingly, all judgments are functions of 
unity among our representations.55
With the role of judgment delineated as the function 
of uniting various representations, Kant believes that all 
acts of reasoning may be reduced to judgments and reasoning 
itself may be represented in the mind's actions as a "faculty 
of j u d g m e n t . I n  this way Kant moves to what Robert Paul 
Wolff calls "the most important consequence of the 'analytic,' 
namely that judgment rather than conception is the fundamen­
tal activity of the mind."^^
Up to this point Kant has presented no clear explan­
ation of the "concept" and "perception." As a result, Wolff 
comments: "It is a remarkable fact that after nearly two cen­
turies of intensive criticism and study, commentators have
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 105.
5*Ibid.. pp. 105-06.
S^Wolff, p. 63.
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not come to an agreement about the precise nature of Kant's 
argument in the 'Transcendental A n a l y t i c .'"58 %he explana­
tion most frequently given for the "Analytic" is the one 
Wolff attempts to clarify and is the explanation adopted 
here. "Concepts," explains Wolff, "'rest on functions,' and 
a function is 'the unity of the act of bringing various rep­
resentations [perceptions] under one common representation.'"59 
The difference between saying that a concept "rests on a 
function" and saying that "it is a function" is further ex­
plained by Wolff as follows: "Concepts turn out to be rules 
[or laws] for the performance of mental activities, and ac­
cording to Kant these rules are built upon certain underlying 
simple 'f u n c t i o n s . A s  an example, the concept (rule) of 
cause and effect is based upon the temporal relation of suc­
cession; the concept of reciprocity is based upon the tempo­
ral relation of contemporaneity, and so forth. A concept, 
therefore, is a rule or rules for the function of unifying 
several perceptions by abstracting from their differences and 
attending only to their common characteristics. Thus the
^^Ibid.
59lbid.
*°Ibid.
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function upon which concepts rest is, in a strict sense, de­
ductive judgments. Concepts relate to objects only mediately, 
or indirectly through judgments which combine "perceptions of 
a perception" of an o b j e c t . P e r c e p t i o n s  of an object are 
given by means of the senses; and they are, in turn, combined 
or synthesized by the functions of judgment which are directed 
by concepts. The fundamental activity of the mind, then, can 
thus be revealed if the functions of unity in judgments can 
be completely exhibited. This is the next task of Kant's 
concern.
The Table of Judgments and the 
Table of Categories
Hitherto Kant has generally spoken of the pure or a 
priori concepts of the understanding. But now he also calls 
them "categories."^2 Wolff states that Kant here has in mind 
the works of Aristotle, from whom he takes the term "cate­
gory
The understanding possesses an a priori categorical 
structure which, because of what it is, necessarily
61
Ibid. The fact should be noted that Kant uses the 
term "judgment" as interchangeable with "reasoning."
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Copleston, p. 250.
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synthesizes perceptions in certain fundamental ways in ac­
cordance with certain basic categories. As Copleston ex­
plains, the categories are the a priori conditions for the 
possibility of objects being thought. And without being 
thought, the objects cannot really be said to be known.
For the sake of convenience Copleston gives the "Table of 
Judgments" and the "Table of Categories" side by side, show­
ing which category corresponds, or is believed to correspond, 
with each judgment. The tables of Kant's judgments and cate­
gories, as given by Copleston, are as f o l l o w s
Judgments
I Quantity
A. Universal
B. Particular
C. Singular
II Quality
A. Affirmative
B . Negative
C. Infinite
III Relation
A. Categorical
B. Hypothetical
Categories
I Quantity
A. Unity
B. Plurality
C. Totality
II Quality
A. Reality
B. Negation
C. Limitation
III Relation
A. Inherence and substance 
(Substance and accident)
B. Causality and dependence 
(Cause and effect)
64
65
Copleston, p. 250. 
Ibid., pp. 250-51.
100
c. Disjunctive C. Community (reciprocity
between agent and 
patient)
IV Modality IV Modality
A. Problematic A. Possibility-impossibil­
ity
B. Assetoric B. Existence-non-existence
C. Apodictic C. Necessity-contingency
The categories of understanding, which are functions 
of unity, are devised to express the universal character of 
objects a priori. Inasmuch as the categories are the neces­
sary functions of unity, they are inseparable from the very 
constitution of knowledge. Following this principle to its 
logical conclusion, Kant finds that an equal number of cate­
gories of understanding (knowledge) and functions of concepts 
in judgments must exist if indeed those functions of judgment 
are to constitute the essence of understanding. Without an 
equal number of categories we cannot judge at all.
In the deduction of the categories, Kant faces the 
difficulty of explaining or justifying the contention that 
they are universal and necessary principles of understanding. 
As Copleston explains, no such difficulty exists concerning 
the employment of the a priori forms of sensibility, because 
no objects can be given to us at all except through the sub­
jection of sensory content to the forms of space and time.
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Copleston states: "It would be foolish to ask how we are 
justified in applying the forms of sensibility to objects.
For these forms are a necessary condition of there being 
objects at a l l T h i s  is not the case, however, with the 
categories of understanding. Kant explains that, unlike sense 
perceptions, in the understanding the objects are already 
present in the form of perceptions^^ and as such the cate­
gories may give a distorted representation of them. Kant pro­
ceeds to resolve this problem by means of the deduction of 
pure concepts of understanding.
Transcendental Deduction of the 
A Priori Concepts
What remains to be explained is the actual systematic 
connection by the mind of all objects of experience into a 
whole. Consciousness must, therefore, be itself a unity. As 
a result, Kant presents the disjunctive argument that either 
the object alone must make the representation possible in its 
connected form or the representation alone must make the ob­
ject p o s s i b l e .68 Kant's consideration of these two alterna­
tives may be summarily set forth in the following manner.
66lbid., p. 252.
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 121.
GGlbid., p. 125.
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The perception of an object involves the presence to 
consciousness of various elements viewed by the mind as a 
single whole or totality. This is called synopsis; but evi­
dently, since no distinctive elements can ever be presented 
to the mind unless they have been distinguished and combined 
by the mind, synopsis must necessarily imply some form of 
synthesis. The explanation that objects of perception refer 
merely to sensibility is not adequate; for the sensibility 
is purely receptive, and as such it can yield only an uncon­
nected manifold. With the receptivity must be combined the 
spontaneity of synthesis born out of the categories. But a 
category has absolutely nothing in common with perception.
In the example given by Watson, the category of cause, viewed 
purely in itself, "is simply the conception of the relation 
between a condition and that which is conditioned or de­
pendent upon i t T h e  question specifically asked, then, 
is: How can a sensible object legitimately be brought under 
a pure conception or category, seeing that they have nothing 
in common? What must be shown is how pure conceptions of 
understanding (reasoning) may be employed in the actual de­
termination of objects of sense even though objects of sense
69
Watson, p. 170.
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have nothing in common with these conceptions• As Wolff be­
lieves, Kant's development of the synthesis is the most im­
portant and central concept of the entire Critical Philos­
ophy .
The "Schema"
In Kant's thinking a mediatory idea must operate be­
tween pure conceptions and possible objects, an idea homo­
geneous with the object of sense on the one side and with the 
categories of judgment on the other. In addition, this medi­
ating idea (called an idea at this point of Kant's analysis 
because of the inconclusiveness of its present development) 
must be pure, because what has to be explained is how there 
can be a priori synthetic judgments in regard to objects of 
sense. Kant explains this important and central problem of 
the "Critical Philosophy" in the following terms:
Now among the manifold concepts which form the com­
plicated web of human knowledge, there are some which 
are marked out for pure a priori employment, in com­
plete independence of all experience; and their right 
to be so employed always demands a deduction [i.e. 
the deduction of the categories]. For since empirical 
proofs do not suffice to justify this kind of employ­
ment, we are faced by the problem how these concepts 
can relate to objects which they yet do not obtain
70
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from any experience.71 
Inasmuch as the mediating element is to connect pure con­
ceptions, which are intellectual, with the object of percep­
tion, which is sensuous, it must therefore be at once intel­
lectual and sensuous.
The categories, as have been shown previously, con­
stitute the mode of producing synthetic unity in sensuous 
elements of which we are conscious as different. The ques­
tion then arises concerning the manner in which pure concep­
tions of understanding introduce unity so as to enable us to 
make universal and necessary judgments. If there is a uni­
versal and necessary way of combining the elements of sense 
in relation to time, for example, then the manner in which 
the categories are related to objects of sense can be made 
known. This is so because the universal manner of determin­
ing the sensible in relation to time is (1) homogeneous with 
the category and thus universal and (2) rests upon an a 
priori rule.
Kant calls such a representation as that connecting 
the category with the object the transcendental schema. The 
schema, says Kant, "is in itself always a product of
7^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 120-21.
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72imagination” ; but as he goes on to show, it is a particu­
lar product of the imagination. Since the object which the 
schema produces is not individual but universal, or rather 
is not the production of an individual object, it is thus a 
certain "universal method” of producing an individual object. 
Kant explains this crucial point in the following manner:
Since . . . the synthesis of imagination aims at no 
special intuition, but only at unity in the determi­
nation of sensibility, the schema has to be distin­
guished from the image. If five points be set along
side one another, t h u s , .......... , I have an image
of the number five. But if, on the other hand, I 
think only a number in general, whether it be five or 
a hundred, this thought is rather the representation 
of a universal procedure of imagination in providing 
an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this 
concept.
The schema of a number, then, for example, is the 
method by which the number five, or any other number for that 
matter, is produced. In other words, the schema is the idea 
of the successive combination of units into a whole in con­
formity with the conception. Obviously, there is a differ­
ence between the image and the schema; for, while the schema 
enables us to realize the conception, a certain difficulty 
arises in attempting to show that the image is adequate to
^^ Ibid., p. 182.
73lbid.
106
the conception.
While the above description explains "what" the 
schema does in Kant's view of category-object relations, it 
does not explain "how" the schema establishes its relations 
of categories to objects. For an explanation of the "how," 
two previously discussed factors must be reconsidered, namely, 
"time" and "causality."
To repeat, schema is a transcendental product of the 
imagination, i.e. it is the means of bringing sense percep­
tions under the form established by the categories (which are 
a priori) by virtue of the imagination. A sense perception 
(i.e. a sensation) is not an extensive magnitude. That is 
to say, each sensation must be conceived as occupying only a 
single moment of time. The quantity of sensation is, there­
fore, not extensive quantity. Every sensation fills a given 
moment of time with more or less of itself.
The schema, then, in some way must imply the rela­
tion of the sensible to time. It does this through the cate­
gory of "cause." Causality is the conception of the condition 
and conditioned: the logical dependency of one thing upon 
another. The schema here assumes the special form of ordered 
succession in time, so that cause and effect as known in our 
experience necessarily imply the regular or ordered succession
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of phenomena in time. In other words, a cause is always an 
antecedent, an effect always a consequent; and the antecedent 
and consequent are so related that without the former the 
latter cannot b e .
The schema, then, is a determination of the inner 
sense; it brings the sensible into relation with time, time 
being a form of the inner sense as considered under the "Aes­
thetic." This determination of the sensible relative to time 
is a necessary condition of knowledge, because apart from 
this process the categories have nothing to which they can be 
applied. And inasmuch as the application of the categories 
to the sensible is a condition in us, with schemata there 
would be no unity of apperception.^^ Hence Copleston con­
cludes by restating that
time is the only feature which is common to all ap­
pearances whatsoever, including the states of the 
empirical self. . . . Time is the formal condition 
of the connection or conjunction of all representa­
tions. And a transcendental determination of time, 
which is a product of the imagination, has, as it 
were, a footing in both camps. It is homogeneous 
with/the category of which it is the schema in that 
it is universal and rests on an a priori rule. It 
is homogeneous with appearances [objects] in that 
time is contained in every empirical representation
"Apperception" is a term used by Kant to express 
consciousness of self as distinguished from and related to 
objects. See Copleston, pp. 255-58.
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of the manifold.75
In Kant's own words :
Thus an application of the category to appearances 
becomes possible by means of the transcendental de­
termination of time, which, as the schema of the con­
cepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of 
the appearances under the category.76
One may question why Kant so completely ignores space
as the second a priori element of the "Aestietic." Norman
Kemp Smith states:
No really satisfactory answer seems to present it­
self. It is true that time is the one universal form 
of all intuition, of outer as well as of inner ex­
perience. It is also true that, as Kant elsewhere 
shows, consciousness of time presupposes consciousness 
of space for its own possibility, and so to that ex­
tent may be regarded as including the latter form of 
consciousness within itself.77
Admittedly, Kant gives no real explanation for dis­
regarding the idea of space as a component of the schema.
Yet, as Kemp Smith points out, the answer may not be totally 
lacking. Since the taking place of events in time necessar­
ily implies their taking place in space, it seems unnecessary 
to expound upon the obvious. This is at least one approach 
to resolving the question of space that may otherwise go
^^Ibid., p. 258.
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 181.
^^Smith, p. 341.
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unanswered.
Similarly, Kant does not discuss at much length the 
schemata as corresponding to the categories. "And what he 
does say is in some instances extremely difficult to under­
stand," Copleston points out.78 For most practical purposes, 
what Kant has to say concerning the correspondence of the 
schema to the categories may be summarily stated in the fol­
lowing manner. The schema of "quality" is the consciousness 
of an object generated by a successive synthesis in time, a 
synthesis which at once generates time itself. The schema 
of quality is the synthesis of sensation fulfilling a given 
moment of time. The schema of relation is the relation of 
different perceptions to one another at all times or in con­
formity with a rule for the determination of time. Lastly, 
the schema of modality is the relation of objects to time 
itself, whether that relation is the relation to time in 
general, to a specific time, or to all time.79 The schemata 
are, therefore, the modes in which the categories may be 
determined in relation to the sensible elements of perception 
by reference to time. Because things take place in time and
^^Copleston, p. 258.
7^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 182-87.
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because causality relates events one to another, we imagine 
a unity or synthesis of intuition which brings sensible ob­
jects under a given form known as a category. In a summary 
type statement of Kant's total argument, Kemp Smith states 
that "the true Critical teaching is that the category and 
intuition, that is to say, form and content, mutually condi­
tion one another, and that the so-called schema is simply a 
name for the latter as apprehended in terms of the former."80
Transcendental Dialectic
As Kant passes from the first part of the "Transcend­
ental Logic," namely, the "Transcendental Analytic," to the 
second part, the "Transcendental Dialectic," he enters upon 
a new problem. Kant has set forth in the "Analytic" the con­
ditions under which logic, or judgment, as he frequently calls 
it, may be related to sensuous content of objects. Through 
the "Analytic," we become aware of the fact that our knowl­
edge of objects cannot be the same as the ultimate nature of 
things. Implied in this fact is a reality beyond our capa­
bilities of understanding. The problem for the Dialectic, 
then, is to discover the limits of reasoning in determining 
ultimate reality. As a result of Kant's investigation, the
^^Smith, pp. 335-36.
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conclusion is reached that pure reason cannot determine 
things as they absolutely are.
The examination of the limits of pure reason is 
titled by Kant, "Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental 
Illusion." The term "illusion" is here given as an all- 
important concept, for Kant's belief is that in attempting 
to determine ultimate reality from pure conceptions a kind of 
illusion arises that comes from confusing understanding with 
things in themselves.
In the concluding remarks of the "Analytic," Kant 
prepares the way for clarifying the limits of pure reason by 
introducing and distinguishing between the terms "Phenomena" 
and "Noumena." Wolff says that in the strictest sense "phe­
nomenon" means for Kant the "object of sensibility," while 
"noumenon" means the "object of intelligence."®^ Kant de­
scribes "noumenon" as a new element of knowledge he intro­
duces to contrast with phenomenon in the following manner:
If by "noumenon" we mean a thing so far as it is not 
an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract 
from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in 
the negative sense of the term. But if we understand 
by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we 
thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, 
the intellectual, which is not that which we possess 
and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility.
81
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This would be "noumenon" in the positive sense of 
the term.
If by a "noumenon," Kant means an idea of an object 
that is not an object of sense, he is then setting up a con­
ception of that which transcends phenomena. Perceptions in­
volve sensibility, but nothing in perception precludes the 
existence in the object of something knowable only by intel­
lection. The value of the concept of a "noumenon" is to 
prevent us from assuming that objects of experience are the 
objects in and of themselves.
To deal with the differentiation of "noumenon" and 
phenomenon, Kant proposes still another distinction in knowl­
edgeable processes. In the first part of the "Transcendental 
Logic," he treated understanding as somewhat synonymous with 
what may be thought of as "reasoning" or the faculty for 
drawing knowledgeable conclusions under the direction of 
rules. Here in the "Dialectic," Kant distinguishes reason 
from understanding by entitling it the "faculty of prin­
ciples."®^ He states that "understanding may be regarded as 
a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of 
rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the
82
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 268.
B^Ibid., p. 301.
113
unity of the rules of understanding under p r i n c i p l e s ."84
By virtue of the distinction thus made between under­
standing and reasoning, reasoning does not deal directly with 
objects of perception, but with judgments containing concep­
tions already derived from perceptions. The relation of 
reason to perception is thus indirect. As an example, Kant 
explains that the process of a syllogism consists of bringing 
a certain conception under the condition of a rule with which 
principles of reason directly o p e r a t e .85 in the distinction 
between reason and perception, pure reason is intellectual 
and is not directly related to perceptions of sense but 
rather presupposes the work of understanding. Reason in its 
pure logical use (transcendental use) searches for the uncon­
ditional, assuming that when a condition is given by the 
understanding, reason can pass to the conditional. If reason 
is capable of leading us to knowledge of reality in its com­
pleteness, then the knowledge of that reality must be pos­
sible because reason can pass from the conditioned as revealed 
in experience to the unconditional without having recourse to 
experience.
G^ i b i d . ,  p. 303 .
G S lb id . ,  p. 304 .
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The illusion to which Kant has reference in the in­
troduction to the "Dialectic" may now be explained. Without 
the distinction of understanding and reasoning and the proc­
esses to which they are applicable, one is apt to confuse 
the intellectual world with the sensuous world. In other 
words, "Transcendental Illusion" arises from the confusion 
of phenomena and things in themselves. The maintaining of 
this distinction, however, i.e. between reason and understand­
ing, and "noumenon" and phenomenon, by no means allows us to 
determine reality by reason alone. On the contrary, while 
reason is capable of application beyond the sphere of sensi­
ble phenomena, the understanding does not enable the securing 
of any real extension beyond that supplied by sense percep­
tions. No knowledge is possible for use, except in so far 
as perceptual elements are given which, in turn, can be sub­
sumed under the rules of the understanding. Where no such 
elements are given, the conception is merely a logical one.
Yet one should note that the categories do have a 
problematic extension beyond the sphere of e x p e r i e n c e . T h e  
very fact that when viewed in themselves they are non-sensuous 
implies that the categories, in limiting their actual appli­
cation to phenomenon, are at the same time setting up
BGlbid.. p. 457.
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conditions of that which transcends phenomena, i.e. condi­
tions in the conception of the noumenon. In the end, how­
ever, we can form no definite idea of any object non- 
sensuously. All that we gain directly from the conception 
of the noumenon is that we are prevented from declaring 
phenomena to be things in themselves, and thus we leave open 
a possible sphere beyond phenomena which can be filled by 
the exercise of reason. The categories help form the basis 
of the content for this reasoning.
The Synthesis A Priori and the 
Rationality of Laws
The question of Kant's original concern was how the 
reconciliation of fixed laws of judgment with the constrain­
ing characteristics of nature can be possible when laws are 
invariable and nature flexible and changing. Kant himself 
asks :
But as regards the empirical rule of association, 
which we must postulate throughout when we assert that 
everything in the series of events is so subject to 
rule that nothing ever happens save in so far as some­
thing precedes it on which it universally follows-- 
upon what I ask, does this rule, as a law of nature, 
rest? How is this association itself possible? The 
ground of the possibility of the association of the 
manifold, so far as it lies in the object, is named 
the affinity of the manifold. I therefore ask, how 
are we to make comprehensible to ourselves the 
thoroughgoing affinity of appearances, whereby they
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stand and must stand under unchanging laws?
Kant's interpretation of laws, like knowledge in gen­
eral, is founded in the analysis of the conceptual element of 
the knowing process. "Rational structure in things," Milmed 
reminds us, "is a product of our ways of understanding them, 
by virtue of which they are constituted as physical objects; 
but rational structures by themselves are empty and irrelevant 
to knowledge unless there is sensory subject matter that fits 
into them."88 Kant's own contribution to the analysis of the 
character of laws states that
understanding is something more than a power of for­
mulating rules through comparison of appearances; it 
is itself the lawgiver of nature. . . . Understanding 
is itself the source of the laws of nature, and so 
of its formal unity. . . . [And] certainly, empirical 
laws, as such, can never derive their origin from 
pure understanding. . . . All empirical laws are only 
special determinations of the pure laws of understand­
ing, under which, and according to the norm of which, 
they first become possible.89
Empirical laws, then, are regarded by Kant as the 
fundamental laws of science which are deductively derived 
from the very principles by which physical objects are con­
stituted, i.e. from the principles of understanding. Laws
G^ Ibid., p. 139.
^^Milmed, p. 51.
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of nature, says Kant, are special "determinations of still 
higher laws, and the highest of these, under which the others 
all stand, issue a priori from the understanding itself."90 
Just as appearances do not exist in themselves but only rela­
tively to the subject in which, so far as it has senses, they 
inhere, so the laws do not exist in the appearance but only
relatively to this same being, so far as it has understand- 
91ing. Consequently, empirical laws, Milmed concludes, 'de­
rive their existential subject matter from sense perception,
ii92but their structure . . . from logic.
But laws are special cases of applied logic; they 
exist only in accordance with logic's application to sensory 
material. Milmed explains that laws are not entities "which 
somehow exist independently of us waiting to be discovered, 
nor are they a by-product of our senses; we understand sen­
sory material by means of them, and we develop them in so 
93
doing." She believes we may come closer to the real nature 
of laws as Kant viewed them by thinking of them in terms of
90
Ibid., pp. 147-48.
91%bid., p. 172.
^^Milmed, p. 51.
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an applied logic or a "logic of p h y s i c s . S u c h  an inter­
pretation of logic is obviously consistent with Kant's dis­
tinction between sense content and thought as the irreducible 
elements of knowledge, i.e. between the material and formal 
components of knowledge where the formal components (cate­
gories) are the ruling principles of thought.
Certainly such an interpretation is consistent with
what Kant himself explains in selected passages. "Categories
are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances and
therefore to nature the sum of all appearances."^^In the
Prolegomena, Kant explains that the
"formal conditions of all judgments in general . . . 
offered in logic . . . constitute a logical system"; 
the categories "grounded thereupon" constitute a 
"transcendental system"; and the principles, by means 
of which all phenomena are subsumed under these con­
cepts, constitute a physical system . . . which pre­
cedes all empirical knowledge of nature, and makes 
it possible.96
The "logic of physics," then, is the system for con­
ceptualizing the laws of knowledge generally. "Thus the 
understanding is something more than a power of formulating 
rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the
94
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lawgiver of nature."97
But what, then, are we to believe concerning the 
nature of laws? Are we to believe that laws are categorical 
applications of form to sensory content in accordance with 
some supreme and possibly unknown guiding principles? Surely 
not, for Kant never pretends that specific a priori laws may 
be known in each and every instance. Contrarywise, he ex­
plains that
if . . . wax, which was formerly hard, melts, I can 
know a priori that something must have preceded, . . . 
upon which the melting has followed according to the 
fixed law, although a priori, independently of experi­
ence, I could not determine, in any specific manner, 
either the cause from effect, or the effect from the 
cause.98
Thus the laws which we know a priori are not the 
"many laws of nature which we can know only by means of ex­
perience; but conformity to law in the connection of appear­
ances."99 All this tells us, however, is that laws must be 
present in the application of logic to objects; but it does 
not tell us what these laws are, nor does it give any real 
clue to their nature except in so far as laws may be defined
97Rant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 148.
98ibid., p. 610.
Immanuel Kant, The Prolegomena to Any Future Meta­
physics , trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: The Liberal Arts 
Press, 1951), p. 65.
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by the categories of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 1 ^ 0  still, nothing 
is seen to indicate that laws differ from other categories.
Kant now points out, however, that the determining
of individual and specific laws must occur in the context of
each happening under consideration as it may be perceived by
means of the categories. In the sense that laws are thus
determined on the basis of individual happenings, a distinct
and decisive difference between categories and laws appears.
The occurrence of an event goes unknown unless it be brought
into being through the medium of the categories by which it
becomes knowable. Laws, on the other hand, come into b^ing
by virtue of events being known. In this connection, Milmed
refers to Kant's example illustrating that we sometimes find
in perception
"that a certain appearance is constantly followed 
by another (though not conversely); . . . for in­
stance, . . .  if the sun shines long enough upon a 
body it grows warm." Here, in this very statement 
of the facts perceived, we are applying a "conditioned 
judgment," or "hypothetical judgment," the "form" of 
which is "first given a priori, by means of logic."
This form is applied whenever we have one cognition 
given as antecedent and another given as consequent.^01
Kant's above statement may be further explained in
100
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the following manner. The transformation of a proposition 
which may be merely a subjective connection of perceptions 
into a proposition that explains and, as Kant would have us 
say, objectively legislates to nature, demands that such a 
"connection of perceptions" be both necessary and universally 
valid. But since we cannot, according to Kant, completely 
and objectively account for either the sun or the body warmed 
in terms of objects in and of themselves, we cannot make the 
necessary transformation of subjective statements of past per­
ceptions into objective law about future events except in a 
hypothetical sense: that if the antecedent be true, the con­
sequent likewise is true. "For experience can be nothing but 
objectively valid knowledge of appearances and of their suc­
cession, only so far as the earlier can be joined with the 
latter according to the rule of hypothetical judgments.
In essence, then, the answer to Kant’s problem con­
cerning laws and the way out of the apparent dilemma in which
he finds himself is the logical inductive inference.
Several particular instances, which are one and all 
certain, are scrutinized in view of the rule, to see
whether they follow from it. If it then appears
that all particular instances which can be cited fol­
low from the rule, we argue to its universality, and 
from this again to all particular instances, even to
102
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those which are not themselves given.103
Because the process of reasoning in the securing of 
law is based upon ideas as problematic concepts, Kant gives 
to it the title of "the hypothetical employment of reason." 
Because it is hypothetical, its products in terms of the laws 
it helps establish are not, properly speaking, constitutive. 
That is to say that, as laws, they are "not of such a char­
acter that, judging in all strictness, we can regard . . . 
[them] as proving the truth of the universal r u l e . "104 Qn 
the other hand, laws established through the hypothetical em­
ployment of reason are regulative so far as may be possible, 
for their sole aim is "to bring unity into the body of our 
detailed knowledge, and thereby to approximate the rule of 
universality."^®^
In short, laws are a special kind of category. Cate­
gories issue forth a priori from the understanding and are 
necessary to the apperception of natural objects. Just as 
physical objects are defined by the categories, so is "nature," 
as the sum of physical objects, defined by the categories.
103
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Happenings in the objective world are subject to the cate­
gories and thus cannot violate the laws of their application 
without becoming irrelevant in their existence.^^6
But, while categories are necessary to perception of 
physical objects, categories themselves do not constitute laws 
Laws are the rule of catholicizing numerous perceptions under 
a single principle. They are derived from logical inference 
and thus are a logical formulation which in turn becomes ap­
plicable to further happenings in order to bring universality 
into the nature of objective occurrences. Milmed states:
Laws are not, then, deducible from the actual struc­
ture of the understanding, as Kant has elsewhere as­
serted, although they may be deducible from other 
scientific laws. The form of scientific laws, however, 
the assumption (that of a universal system) in line 
with which science advances, is derived from the actual 
structure of reason, although only as its ideal limit.
Thus the laws are not arbitrary; those laws are to be 
regarded as valid that most advance that structure in 
the direction of (unattainable) completeness, besides 
being empirically applicable.
As such, laws are logically speaking hypothetical as 
opposed to the categorical nature of knowledge concerning ob­
jects given. Consequently, laws cannot be constitutive. In 
contrast to the categories of the understanding, laws, because
lO&Milmed, p. 56.
^^^Ibid., p. 70.
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they introduce universality into the manifold of understand­
ing, are regulative. Laws, being regulative, require that 
nature should direct itself and indeed depend upon our sub­
jective ground of apperception in respect to its conformity 
108to law. Kant concludes that "if we do not . . . proceed 
in accordance with laws, . . . our guessing or enquiring into 
the existence of anything will only be idle pretense.
Laws, like knowledge in general, begin with experience but 
arise a priori from the understanding only to return to ex­
perience as a regulative factor of a manifold perception.
Summary
Duncan assures us that "any brief account of such a 
complex work as a [first] Critique is bound to be dogmatic 
and is open to the dangers of d i s t o r t i o n . T h i s  is espe­
cially true when the purpose for considering the Critique is 
to abstract from it only those concepts and ideas that may 
have bearing upon an allied but otherwise unconsidered sub­
ject such as rhetoric. Remembering the limited intent for
108
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 140. 
lO^Ibid., pp. 243-44.
Duncan, p. 40.
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this analysis, however, will allow for alteration in perspec­
tive if such an analysis is desired for purposes other than 
the one here intended.
The immediate line of thought leading to the first 
Critique was Kant's realization of the problem of objective 
validity of intellectual presentations. Here Kant is chiefly 
concerned with an inquiry into speculative and cognitive em­
ployment of reason. Knowledge, according to Kant, is possi­
ble only when sensibility and understanding work together 
inseparably in the same harness. When such is the case, syn­
thetic a priori truths are possible. Synthetic a priori 
truths are universally and necessarily true; but unlike ana­
lytic truths, their necessity cannot be derived from defini­
tions of the subject term involved. Space and time are the 
a priori forms of sensibility; quantity, quality, relation, 
and modality are the a priori categories of our understanding. 
The categories of the understanding organize the contents of 
sense experience in terms of the rules they establish. What 
the categories order are the items of experience--tactile 
impressions, sounds, shapes, sizes, odors, etc. But Kant 
still recognized the problem of showing how a priori princi­
ples relate to empirical data. The answer to this problem is 
found in the mediatory power of time--time itself being one
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of the necessary conditions of sense experience. Through 
the presupposition of substance and the relating of the con­
cepts of causality and time, the synthesis of the categories 
to objects and hence the knowledge of things making up the 
natural world is made possible. According to the critical 
position here established, Kant is forced to make a distinc­
tion between the phenomenal world which can be known and the 
"noumenal" which can only be thought. Following this line 
of reasoning, the regulative factors of man's existence, i.e. 
the laws that direct his activities, are seen as products of 
reasoning and not of sensory perception. The actual nature 
of these laws, however, revealed in Kant's later works, will 
be the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
THE "SYNTHESIS A PRIORI" AND PRACTICAL REASON-- 
A DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
Introduction
Louis Infield, in his "Proem" to Kant's Lectures on 
Ethics, states that "philosophy is either theoretical or 
practical. . . . The theoretical form judges the object; the 
practical produces i t P a u l  Schilpp, in his work on Kant's 
pre-critical ethics, points out that "from the beginning,
Kant wanted to lay definite and lasting foundations for the 
philosophical disciplines."^ In light of the theoretical and 
practical dichotomous nature of philosophy and Immanuel Kant's 
desire to include in his works the determinable basis for the 
differing philosophical disciplines, the student of Kantian
^Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis In­
field (New York: The Century Co., 1930), p. 1.
^Paul Arthur Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1938), p. 1.
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philosophy should not be surprised that the broad sweep of 
Kant's mind includes considerations of practical concern as 
well as a theory of epistemology. Kant's pursuit of the 
conditions of knowledge as in the Critique of Pure Reason 
appears to be only preparatory to the discussion he under­
takes in his works on ethics. The problem of the first 
Critique was forced upon Kant by the apparent irreconcilabil­
ity of the rule of law in nature with the reason of man.
For if man is, as other animals appear to be, a product of 
natural causation, then apparently he cannot be capable of 
personal deliberation and determination. If knowledge is 
limited to that which falls within the sensibility of exper­
ience, then the resolving of critical problems only partly 
encompassed by experience becomes impossible.
The results of Kant's first investigation show that 
we have no knowledge of the objects of what he terms "ideas." 
According to these findings, the supersensible in any form 
is beyond the reach of theoretical reason; yet we can think 
or believe in the supersensible. In fact, the very nature 
of knowledge is such that we cannot fail to see its essential 
limits. While the Critique of Pure Reason denies that we 
can have certain knowledge about the world of the noumena, 
it in no way excludes the possibility of the noumena's
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existence. Knowledge is not a complete whole; but, since 
the mind cannot be satisfied by less than a complete whole, 
we are compelled to investigate further to see if man himself 
possesses a condition that can account for and direct the 
decision-making process of his activity apart from the super­
sensible or noumenal world.
H. J. Baton believes that if it is the part of a
philosopher to ask questions concerning the nature of man's
being in the noumenal world,
it is still more the part of a philosopher to ask 
"What is philosophy?" According to Kant, what was 
wrong with philosophy before his time was this--that 
philosophers blundered along trying to solve philo­
sophical problems without ever asking themselves what 
it was that they were doing and whether what they were 
doing was something that could be done. He may have 
been unduly hard on his predecessors--most philosophers 
are--but in any case this was what he thought. For 
him a sound philosopher must know clearly and reflec­
tively what he is doing, and only so is philosophy 
likely to succeed. This is one reason why Kant's 
philosophy is called the Critical Philosophy.^
For the reason Baton cites, Kant's work in moral philosophy
is in no small way related to and dependent upon the findings
of his earlier work, the Critique of Bure Reason. In the
first Critique Kant held expressly that no knowledge is prior
to experience in time and that with experience all knowledge
3
The Categorical Imperative : A Study in Kant s Moral 
Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 
p. 19.
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begins. The principles of experience, however, point beyond 
experience itself. In his ethical treatises, particularly 
the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant approaches the problem 
of ordinary moral consciousness by examining our noumenal 
being to discover the essential ideas of morals. His object, 
therefore, is to set forth the nature of moral laws in their 
purity.
The Theoretical Nature of Morality 
In the preface to the Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysic of Morals, Kant restates the findings of the first 
Critique by once again pointing to the conditions of all 
rationality. All knowledge is either formal or material: the 
former considers the forms of the understanding and is called 
logic, while the latter concerns determinate objects and the 
laws to which they are subject. Material philosophy is fur­
ther divided into two areas: (1) that area concerned with the 
laws of nature and called physics; and (2) that area con­
cerned with the laws of freedom and known as ethics. They 
are also called natural philosophy and moral philosophy 
respectively.4
4
Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Meta­
physic of Morals, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and 
Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill
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In such a division as this Kant is attempting to de­
lineate clearly the boundaries of the specific field to be 
included in his ethical considerations. This is Kant's 
habit--to strive in each way possible to keep clearly before 
him the field of his inquiry. While, as Lewis White Beck so 
appropriately claims, Kant was inclined to explore blind 
alleys and get almost lost in tangents,5 he nevertheless ad­
heres to a single line of argument: empirical judgments are 
always judgments of fact. Experience can tell us that such 
and such is the case, but it cannot tell us that it ought not 
be otherwise. This is the conclusion of Kant's earlier crit­
ical analysis and is the starting point for his inquiry of 
the metaphysics of morality.
That the direction of Kant's future work was to in­
clude and, in fact, concentrate upon the obligations we have 
for knowing right and wrong actions is purposely clear from 
what is said in the first Critique. To profess to solve all
Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 1. This 
work may be variously titled The Fundamental Principles of 
the Metaphysic of Morals or Foundations of the Metaphysic of 
Morals, depending upon the translator's preference of trans­
lation. Hereafter cited as Metaphysic of Morals.
Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 3. 
Hereafter cited as Beck.
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problems, says Kant,
would be impudent boasting, and would argue such ex­
travagant self-conceit as at once to forfeit all con­
fidence. Nevertheless there are sciences the very 
nature of which require that every question arising 
within their domain should be completely answerable 
in terms of what is known, inasmuch as the answer 
must issue from the same sources from which the ques­
tion proceeds. In these sciences it is not permissible 
to plead unavoidable ignorance; the solution can be 
demanded. We must be able, in every possible case, in 
accordance with a rule, to know what is right and what 
is wrong, since this concerns our obligation, and we 
have no obligation to that which we cannot know. In 
the explanation of natural appearances, on the other 
hand, much must remain uncertain and many questions 
insoluble, because what we know of nature is by no 
means sufficient in all cases, to account for what has 
to be explained.6
Kant feels that whether the writing of a moral philos­
ophy entirely devoid of everything empirical is of utmost 
necessity or not, the possibility for such a philosophy is 
evidenced in the common idea of duty and moral laws that most 
men have. Not only are moral laws distinguishable from all 
other knowledge containing anything empirical, but all moral 
philosophy whatsoever rests wholly on its pure parts.^ So 
long as we are without the clue and supreme canon of a pure
^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans.
Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1953), pp. 430- 
31.
^Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Meta­
physics of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), p. 4.
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moral philosophy by which to estimate moral actions cor­
rectly, morals themselves are open to all sorts of corruption.
That which mingles these pure principles with the 
empirical does not deserve the name of philosophy 
(for what distinguishes philosophy from common 
rational knowledge is, that it treats in separate 
sciences what the latter only comprehends confusedly); 
much less does it deserve that of moral philosophy, 
since by this confusion it even spoils the purity of 
morals themselves, and counteracts its own end.®
Kant's philosophical morality, then, is concerned 
not only with the limited area of philosophy known as ethics 
and involving the laws of freedom, but also with the knowledge 
of what is right and what is wrong in its pure parts. Kant 
uses the method of analysis employed in the Critique of Pure 
Reason when, in his study of ethics, he attempts to isolate 
from the nature of man or the circumstances in the world in 
which he is placed the pure characteristics of morality.
Though Kant is the first to recognize that moral laws require 
a judgment sharpened by experience^ and a practical applica­
tion for obtaining their intended realization,^® he also
^Ibid.. p. 5.
9
Moral laws require such a judgment in order that 
they may distinguish cases to which they are applicable and 
gain for themselves effectual influence on conduct.
^^Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of 
Ethics, p . 5.
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recognizes the need to locate the unconditioned condition 
for all conditions if moral laws are to have a binding and 
unifying effect in their application. The nature of moral 
laws requires that they be independent of contingent require­
ments if they are to have legitimacy for more than each in­
dividual respective act of experience. For Kant the function 
of connecting pure reason with its practical or ethical qual­
ities is known as the activity of the will; and his purpose 
is to show that the will is not divorced from reason, con­
trolled internally by psychological stimuli or externally by 
pleasure stimuli. In this capacity the will is a purely 
rational enterprise; it is pure reason which controls drives 
and determines external ends.
Rational Knowledge and Morality
"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or 
even out of it which can be called good without qualification 
except a Good Will."^^ This opening sentence of the first 
section of the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of 
Morals strikes the keynote of Kant's moral philosophy. His
Immanuel Kant, Critical Examination of Practical 
Reason. In Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other 
Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 9.
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consideration of this theme is three-fold: (1) as in the 
first Critique, Kant begins with a careful and thorough 
analysis of man's moral experience; (2) he then explores by 
means of transcendental inference the freedom and responsi­
bility of the moral agent; and (3) Kant examines at length 
the entire nature of the moral law.
While Kant's consideration of practical reason fol­
lows in accordance with the three-fold division here stipu­
lated, the order of analysis according to its logical rela­
tions cannot be so divided. As the task of the first Cri­
tique was to reveal the a priori or categorical laws of cog- 
nitivity, the task of the second Critique is to discover the 
a priori or categorical laws of the rational good will. At 
the heart of the problem of the will's activity is, first, 
the problem of freedom; for without freedom of the will 
morality is an impossibility.
The importance of freedom in Kant's scheme of things 
may be seen by recognizing that if the will is free, then 
Kant believes the possibility exists for showing the capacity 
of pure reason to determine the will's total a c t i v i t y .  
According to Kant's reasoning the only possibility for the
1 o
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 101.
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objectivity of ethics is reason presupposing nothing else 
but itself; for rules or laws can be objective and universal 
only if they are not subject to contingent-subjective condi­
tions. Ethics, as an outgrowth of Kant's epistemology, can­
not be based on the happiness or pleasure principle because 
happiness and pleasure can only be identified empirically and 
thus have no universal objective necessity. So-called ethical 
rules or laws can gain the status of being ethical not accord­
ing to their content, which is always gained from experience, 
but only according to their form, which is supplied by reason 
and is itself universal and necessary.
The Conditions of Freedom in Morality
While speculative reason strives to explain the 
noumenal world, the antinomies of the first Critique render 
the conditions necessary for noumenal existence merely prob­
lematic. Fundamental among the conditions necessary for 
noumenal existence is the freedom of the will. Reasonably, 
then, before Kant can properly declare the autonomous nature 
of the will, he must first determine the possibility of free­
dom for the will's existence. From the studies of such men 
as Lewis White Beck and Henry Sidgwick, there appears reason 
to suspect that throughout his work Kant has used two
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different concepts of freedom interchangeably without realiz­
ing their indeterminateness. Beck warns that "discussions 
of freedom are so frequent in Kant's work that the full com­
pass of the concept and its attendant problems cannot well 
be surveyed in a running commentary on passages taken seri­
a t i m . A c t u a l l y ,  Beck contends, the different theories of 
freedom appear to be theories about different things and 
answer different questions.
One theory of freedom appears to come from the Cri­
tique of Pure Reason and the other from the Foundations for 
the Metaphysic of Morals which was published four years after 
the first Critique and three years before the Critique of 
Practical Reason. Beck contends that from the Critique of 
Pure Reason "there is inherited the concept of freedom as 
spontaneity, the faculty of initiating a new causal series in 
time. From the Foundations there is taken the concept of 
freedom as autonomy, as lawgiving and hence as independent 
from any pregiven law."^^ Sidgwick believes that in this 
latter sense freedom equals rationality so that man is free
^^Beck, p. 176. 
l^ibid., pp. 176-77. 
l^ibid.. p. 177.
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in proportion to his acting in accordance with reason.
Sidgwick's consideration of the Kantian view of free­
dom is more in the form of criticism than analysis. Sidgwick, 
like Beck, believes Kant uses two different concepts of free­
dom interchangeably. But, unlike Beck's analysis, Sidgwick's 
criticism produces an impossible-intolerable situation for 
the entire "critical philosophy of practical r e a s o n . T h e  
two "kinds of freedom" considered by Sidgwick are seemingly 
contradictory in part to the two types of freedom discovered 
and explained by Beck. Yet Sidgwick's view helps point up 
the nature of the subject considered.
Sidgwick's view is fixed on the differences between 
what he discovers in Kant as the "Rational or Moral Freedom" 
and the "Freedom of Caprice" as "the power of acting without 
a motive, or against the strongest motive when the competition 
is among merely natural or non-rational desires or aver­
sions."^^ But, as Sidgwick points out, man acting without a 
motive could certainly have no "power" (that is of and 
through himself) at all. "The power of choice between good 
and evil . . . lies in its complete avoidance of Capricious
^^Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 511.
^^Ibid.. p. 512.
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Freedom or the power of acting without a motive in any par­
ticular volition," and this most assuredly is not Kantian.^® 
But, while rejecting the "Freedom of Caprice" theory 
as inappropriate for explaining Kant's concept of Freedom, 
Sidgwick also theorizes certain inadequacies in the "freedom- 
Rationality" theory which has generally maintained that man 
is free to choose between good and evil, demonstrated by his 
deliberate choice of evil as well as good. Sidgwick believes 
this theory is untenable since "if we say that a man is a 
free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also 
say . . . that it is by his free choice that he acts irra­
tionally when he does so act."^^ With Sidgwick's criticism, 
then, appears an impossible situation in Kant's whole ethical 
viewpoint. Since the will cannot responsibly act without the 
underlying presumption of the "freedom of the will," and 
since the equation of "freedom with rationality" appears in­
adequate under limiting conditions, the whole concept of "the 
freedom of the will" appears under a shadow of great doubt.
Sidgwick's criticism of Kant's concept of freedom is 
representative of the many criticisms of Kant on this partic­
ular point. What Sidgwick's criticism does is to point up
^^Ibid.
l^Ibid.. p. 511.
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(1) the Kantian contention for a free-will and (2) the re­
quirement of a rational determination of the will. What re­
mains to be seen, however, is that Kant's freedom-rationality 
theory provides an additional factor that Sidgwick, like many 
opponents of the Kantian theory of ethics, unfortunately 
seems to overlook: a factor that makes possible a rationally 
determined free will. This additional factor is left for 
Beck to explain.
To repeat: "From the Critique of Pure Reason there 
is inherited the concept of freedom as spontaneity, the 
faculty of initiating a new causal series in time. From the 
Foundations there is taken the concept of freedom as auton­
omy, as lawgiving."20 Beck points out that later Kant gives
21
these two views the title of Willkur and Wille respectively.
Beck distinguishes between Kant's Willkur and Wille in the
following manner:
Will is the faculty of determining our causality 
through a conception of rules, . . . and, since for 
the derivation of an action from a rule or law 
reason is required, will is nothing but practical 
reason. It is the relationship between understanding
^°Beck, p. 177.
2^Ibid. Beck explains that considerable difficulty 
exists in translating Willkur and Wille. As a result. Beck 
leaves these terms in German. This procedure will be fol­
lowed here.
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and the faculty of desire. . . . The faculty which 
makes a rule of reason the efficient cause of an 
action through which the object is to be made real 
is will; the will is never determined directly by 
the object or our conception of it, but always by a 
rule of reason. . . . That the will is, in this 
sense, free from direct sensuous necessitation is 
an empirical fact. This conception of will, as a 
faculty of desire guided by a rule of reason taken 
as a maxim, later becomes more specifically Willkur.
. . .  It has, therefore, an incentive (Triebfeder) 
for action in addition to law, while Wille has no
Triebfeder.22
If the Willkur is responsive to desire and natural 
impulses, then anything that tries reducing it to the obedi­
ence of pure practical reason destroys its freedom. The 
Willkur and freedom, then, are not synonymous terms neces­
sarily. The Willkur is free only in a comparative sense, 
and this in no manner explains the existence of freedom. To 
this degree Sidgwick's criticism is fitting and appropriate. 
But yet one still must ask the origin of the law. While the 
Willkur may be appropriate for explaining the application of 
the maxims to natural impulses for the guiding of right 
actions, it in no way accounts for the origin of the law from 
which maxims are derived.
Here once again Kant has reached the point of "first 
principles." The problem is to determine a law that Willkur
Z^lbid., p. 178.
142
can obey without losing its freedom through the very act of 
obedience. Kant's major contribution here is that "law" is 
not a restriction on freedom but rather the very product of 
freedom itself. Beck explains that in this sense
there is a concept of will not as the direct de­
terminer of action but as the lawgiver to the maxims 
which will determine action. In this sense, Kant says 
. . . that laws determine what ought to happen and 
maxims determine what does happen. . . . Reason is 
necessary to the formulation of a law, but a maxim de­
termines behavior directly. In the formulation of a 
law, we have to do with the real use and not with the 
mere logical use of reason: by the "real use" is meant 
the establishment of an a priori synthetic proposition, 
and by the "logical use" is meant merely the inferring 
of action from a rule.
If practical reason determines the will (Willkur), 
then we can say that the latter is free in the psycho­
logical or comparative sense . . . even though there 
may be a natural law connecting the conception of prac­
tical reason with the action and even if connecting 
this law is itself a naturally caused event in the in­
ner life and even if law is a practical translation of 
a natural law.23
The concept of will, then, not as the direct deter­
miner of action, but as the giver of laws to maxims which 
determine action, is the function of Wille and not Willkur. 
"The law is a product of the freedom of Wille as pure prac­
tical reason. . . . Wille gives only a law . . . from its 
own nature. It does not mediate laws of nature to
^^Ibid., pp. 178-79.
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Willkur■ The nature of Wille is that of autonomous law­
giver. Since we have the right and even the need to use the 
concept of freedom, or since "the actor in a moral situation 
must act as if he were free and thereby shoulder all the re­
sponsibilities that he would have if it were theoretically 
proved that he is free,"^^ the Wille exists autonomously and 
not in accordance with anything else in the world or even out 
of it. The Wille is completely free; it gives the rational 
law that the Willkur would follow if it were completely and 
purely rational. Although the Willkur can fail to abide by 
the law of the Wille, i.e. it can give way to the importuni­
ties of sense stimuli, the Wille, on the other hand, as pure 
practical reason, cannot fail to be free. The moral law is 
an a priori statement of what the Willkur ought to do; and, 
as Beck says, "however depraved Willkur may be, it still 
hears the 'heavenly voice' of pure practical reason, so that
even the most hardened criminal trembles before its tri- 
,.26bunal.
A statement of caution must be observed here, however.
^^Ibid., pp. 179-80,
Z^ibid., p. 194.
26
Ibid., p . 203.
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Kant does not claim to have proved the existence of freedom 
or even to have explained it. However, some philosophers, of 
whom Sidgwick is representative, have inaccurately accredited 
Kant with such an accomplishment and this accreditation has 
been responsible for their criticism of him. This error 
should not be repeated. Kant does assert that from a practi­
cal point of view we must assume freedom to be present in 
human actions and, as just demonstrated, this can be done 
without incurring any real contradiction between freedom and 
physical necessity of the same human actions. This and this 
alone constitutes the sole objective of Kant's consideration 
of the issue of freedom.
The Good Will
Having outlined the conditions necessary for the ex­
istence of morality, Kant can now bring into these conditions 
the elements of the human actions through which the moral at­
tainments of man may be realized. Primary among these elements 
is the good will. Recognizing of course that the will may act 
under the nature of the autonomous law-giver, what then is the 
nature of the will that so acts as opposed to the will that 
acts contrary to the laws established autonomously?
In dealing with freedom, we do more than establish the
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conditions necessary for morality; we also give explanation 
to the rational idea of the will. The faculty by which 
reality is given to the super-sensible is the will, or prac­
tical reason, "a faculty either to produce objects correspond­
ing to ideas, or to determine ourselves to the effecting of 
such o b j e c t s . "27 obviously, then, Kant has re^ason for assert­
ing in the first section of the Metaphysic of Morals that "no­
thing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of 
it, which can be called good without qualification, except a
no
Good Will. Kant suggests that this is so in the most un-
qualified sense of the term:
Intelligence, wit, judgment, and other talents of 
the mind, however-they be named, or courage, resolu­
tion, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are 
undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but 
these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad 
and mischievous if the will which is to make use of 
them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called 
character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts 
of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and 
the general well-being and contentment with one's 
condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, 
and often presumption, if there is not a good will.29
From the above, one should not assume, however, that 
good will is the only good. On the contrary, many other
27
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 101.
28
Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. 9.
Z^ Ibid.
146
things are good, but they are not good under all circum­
stances. These other things--qualities of mental talents, 
temperament, and gifts of fortune--are good in many respects 
but may become bad under certain circumstances. Kant even 
refers to the good qualities here mentioned (qualities of 
temperament, for example) and points out how these gifts in 
certain circumstances are not only dangerous but actually 
more abominable than bad character alone would otherwise be.
David Ross contends that the high esteem Kant ex­
presses for "goodness" is no passing phase of his thought.^0 
In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant states
Before a humble plain man, in whom I perceive upright­
ness of character in a higher degree than I am con­
scious of in myself, ra^  mind bows whether I choose it 
or not, and though I bear my head never so high, that 
he may not forget my superior rank. Why is this? Be­
cause his example exhibits to me a law that humbles my 
self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct: a law, 
the practicality of obedience to which I see proved by 
fact before my eyes. Now, I may even be conscious of a 
like degree of uprightness, and yet the respect remains. 
For since in man all good is defective, the law made 
visible by an example still humbles my pride, my stand­
ard being furnished by a man whose imperfections, what­
ever they may be, are not known to me as my own are, 
and who therefore appears to me in a more favorable 
light. Respect is a tribute which we cannot refuse to 
merit, whether we will or not; we may indeed outwardly 
withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly.31
30
Kant's Ethical Theory, A Commentary on the 
Granlegunz zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1954), p. 8.
31
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 169-70.
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For Kant the ordinary mind does not hesitate to set 
aside as irrelevant to morality all those inward or outward 
advantages which distinguish one man from another. A man is 
not inherently good because he is endowed by nature with 
superior intelligence or because he has acquired external 
advantages such as great wealth. There is, therefore, that 
common opinion that man is unworthy of the title "a good man" 
who has not a good will.
What, then, is a good will? Ross appropriately 
points out for us that neither "here nor elsewhere does Kant 
try to define 'good,' either as it occurs in the phrase 'a 
good will' or as it occurs in the phrase 'the only good thing 
in the w o r l d . K a n t  nevertheless has his view about the 
nature of "the good will." The will is not good simply be­
cause its actions produce good consequences or because it ob­
tains the sought-after end, but solely because the good is 
willed. Evidently, when Kant denies that the consequences of 
an act determine its moral character, he means consequences 
such as happiness to the individual or others. His view, 
therefore, is opposed to that taken by some other philosophers, 
such as John Stuart Mill. According to Kant an act is good
32Ross, p. a.
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if the will is good, that is, if the motive for acting in a 
given way is solely and entirely good.
Kant's position is that goodness may not be judged 
by the successes a man has in obtaining the end of action at 
which he aims. Although the aim or objective of an act may 
be good, its actual results may go unrealized and thus all 
acts that failed to secure their stated purpose would be 
deemed morally not good. This naturally would include all 
such acts as might have a worthy end objective but exist in 
an impossible situation--for example, an unsuccessful attempt 
at saving a person's life. Kant believes that the good will, 
not to be judged by its end results, is a persistent and 
resolute endeavor to secure a good end and nothing short of 
such an endeavor can deserve being called good.
Even with such a persistent and resolute endeavor to
secure a good end, certain qualifications to the naéure of
the will remain. Kant states:
I omit here all actions which *are already recognized 
as inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful 
for this or that purpose, for with these the question 
whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, 
since they even conflict with it. I also set aside 
those actions which really conform to duty, but to 
which men have no direct inclination. For in this case 
we can readily distinguish whether the action which 
agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish
view.33
^^Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. 13
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We must therefore inquire as to the ground for the 
belief in a good will. Kant answers this inquiry (although 
he does not so title it at this point of his analysis) by 
pointing out that for an act to have moral worth it must is“ 
sue from a sense of duty. Such a proposition requires an 
analysis of the concept "duty," a conception not wholly iden­
tical with a "good will" but compatible with a will that is 
good as manifested under the limitations of our external- 
sensuous nature. This duty excludes all acts that result 
from a motive stemming from natural inclination, even when 
inclinations are not opposed to duty. In this connection, 
one may speak of the maintaining of one's life as a duty.
"But on this account," says Kant, "the often anxious care 
which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth. . . .
They preserve their life a^ duty requires, no doubt, but not 
because duty requires. Thus Kant believes that self- 
preservation, which is the outcome of natural inclination, 
has no moral value, for moral value lies only in that which 
springs from duty itself.
The second proposition supporting a belief in a good 
will is that the moral value of an action is determined
^^Ibid., p. 14.
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entirely by a maxim or subjective principle independent of 
an object of desire. As Kant previously pointed out, an act 
may still have moral worth although it fails to attain its 
objective. Conversely, another act may attain its end objec­
tive and not be morally good.
The third proposition may be explained as the obliga­
tion to act from reverence for law. As Washington says: "For 
Kant, Ethics is the science of Law; of a law expressing it­
self concretely in the single word D u t y . "35 Kant himself 
states: "The notion of duty stands in immediate relation to 
a law,"^^ and "is in itself already the notion of a constraint 
of the free elective will by the l a w . "37 The character of a 
law, then, includes the idea of determining the will inde­
pendently of all desire and thus of all consequences in the 
way of happiness. Since the will must not in any way be moved
35
William Morrow Washington, The Formal and Material 
Elements of Kant's Ethics (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1898), 
p . 19.
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(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 299.
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by desire, obviously the principle of the will must be abso­
lutely universal, i.e. the law must determine the will before 
the object be presented. Duty, therefore, may be termed ob­
ligation to act from pure reverence of the law independent 
of sensuous desire. This is the only motive of a good will, 
a will which is good without limitation.
The Categorical Imperative: The Objective
Moral Law
The theory of moral duty as responsive obedience to 
law theoretically implies a formal determination of law to 
which duty must be obedient if it is to be judged morally 
good. Washington believes that "the moral law is a formal
OQ
determining principle of action by pure practical reason." 
While maxims determine the nature of our acts, the moral law 
points to those maxims having the force of universal law and 
to which we ought to be obedient. Nothing less is consistent 
with moral law.
The formula of the moral law is repeated by Kant in 
various forms depending upon the point under consideration. 
Paton, for example, finds five different formulations of the 
categorical imperative, while Kant himself, curiously enough,
^®Washington, p. 19.
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tends to speak as if there were only three.39 Its most fre­
quently cited and most widely accepted form, however, is: "I 
am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that 
my maxim should become a universal law."^®
The reasoning by which Kant reaches his first formula 
of morality is substantially as follows. Because man has 
rational capabilities, he is not necessarily subject to laws 
in a purely mechanical way. That is to say, man is not the 
object of natural causation; he is, through the Wille, a free 
agent, able to respond to natural instincts or refrain from 
acting from them. More specifically, man's nature presup­
poses the consciousness of a law which he may or may not obey. 
Because man finds in himself certain inescapable desires, the 
moral law presents itself as an imperative, the claims of 
which determine actions that nature refuses to acknowledge. 
Thus the pure consciousness of self is bound up with the 
willing of a universal law. Hence the formula: "Act as if 
the maxim from which you act were to become through your will 
a universal law of nature."
The analysis of the conception of a categorical
39
Paton, p. 129.
40
Kant, Metaphysic of Morality, p. 18.
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imperative corresponds to what Kant, in the Critique of Pure 
Reason,calls the metaphysical deduction of the categories.
We assume in the meantime that there is a categorical imper­
ative, and we simply ask what must be its character. From 
our discussion so far we learn three things: (1) all moral 
conceptions proceed from the Wille a priori; (2) the setting 
of moral conceptions and laws before the mind in their purity 
is of supreme importance--the purity of moral conceptions and 
laws is not merely in the interest of a true theory of 
morality, but also is an aid to practical life--and (3) the 
principles of pure practical reason are derived from the very 
conception of a rational being and thus do not depend upon 
the peculiar character of man. Hence objectively necessary 
acts are subjectively accidental, i.e. though man through his 
reason recognizes he ought to do certain acts, he yet may act, 
not from reason, but from sensuous desire. The determination 
of man's will by objective laws presents itself to him as an 
obligation to obey them and not as the spontaneous expression 
of his will. Reason, therefore, commands obedience to its 
objective principle, and the formulation of its command is in 
the nature of an imperative. A perfectly good will agrees 
with the rational will of man in conforming to objective laws, 
but its distinctive character is that it is under no
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obligation to conform to objective law. An imperative has 
no meaning for the divine will or any other holy will--such 
a will by its very definition is in harmony with the law of 
reason. Imperatives are limited, therefore, to beings with 
an imperfect will such as that of man, expressing as they do 
the relation of objective law to an imperfect will.
The Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives
In connection with the Kantian concept of an impera­
tive, two problems arise: (1) the nature of the imperative 
involved in an act that finds its obligation in pure reason, 
and (2) the distinction between imperatives and laws which, 
according to Beck, is one of the most celebrated distinctions 
Kant makes
"Now all imperatives command either hypothetically 
or categorically,"^^ says Kant. Thus we have a double nature 
of the imperative. The hypothetical imperative arises in the 
pursuit of happiness or wealth. If we will the end of happi­
ness (for example) we must also will the means by which hap­
piness can be obtained. The hypothetical imperative is, in 
this sense, both problematic and assertoric; it is problematic
^^Beck, p. 84.
^^Kant, Metaphysic of Morality, p. 31.
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when it tells us what actions are good relative to a certain 
end, and assertoric when it tells us that certain and actual 
ends are good that result from a given action. The former of 
these two natures is called "rules of skill"; the latter, 
"counsels of prudence." Thus an imperative supplies the prac­
tical rule for a will that may not will the good either from 
ignorance or through the influence of maxims opposed to the 
objective principles of a practical reason, i.e. maxims which 
are based upon sensuous desire.
In contrast, the categorical imperative commands an 
act without limitation. It is an apodictic or absolutely 
necessary principle. The categorical imperative commands us 
to will an act for itself, and not merely as a means to an 
end. This imperative springs straight from reason and direct­
ly connects the act with the conception of the rational being 
as such. It has nothing to do with the special kind of act 
or with the consequences expected, but solely with the prin­
ciples or motive of the agent.
The Character of an Imperative 
as a Law
A distinction remains to be made between an imperative 
and a law. In the Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals 
Kant contrasts imperatives and laws by comparing an imperative
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to a practical rule by which an action is made necessary and 
contending that a law, on the other hand, is merely the ob­
jectively valid cognitive component in the determination of 
choice by a rational being.43 The consciousness of law may 
be said to be a fact of reason because law cannot be reason 
resolved into anything higher than itself. The imperative, 
however, provides us with the necessary clue to the existence 
and nature of those farther reaches of reality which Kant 
prophetically entitled "noumenal." Theodore Meyer Green 
states :
It is this Law [the moral law as stated in the cate­
gorical imperative] which man apprehends in his most 
profound moral insights. It is that higher rationality 
which man's "moral reason" . . . discerns in moments of 
moral vision. It is what evokes man's highest spon­
taneous loyalty, and what impells him to formulate and 
obey the categorical imperative. . . . He is therefore 
free to obey it without any external compulsion, 
finite or divine.44
The importance of the distinctive nature of the im­
perative is that it makes the imperative not just a law but a
^^Kant, Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals in 
Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the 
Theory of Ethics, p. 278. Beck appropriately points out that 
this is a distinction Kant repeatedly ignores by using the 
terms "law" and "imperative" interchangeably. See Beck, p. 84.
44
Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight (New Bruns­
wick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 48.
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special kind of law. The imperative is in the strictest 
sense of the word "the law of the noumenal world" comprised 
of the "objects of intelligence."^^ In such a nature as this, 
the moral law (called the imperative) is set off squarely 
against the natural laws of the phenomenal world (the world 
encompassing the "objects of sensibility"). An imperative 
exists simply for the sake of being obeyed when it is called 
forth out of volition. Regulative techniques from threats of 
external enforcement, police powers, for example, may cause 
an individual to abide in accord with natural laws, but no 
pressures whatsoever can require anyone to stand helplessly 
by in the presence of the imperative. In final analysis, 
the imperative is the a priori law of pure intelligence.
Justification of the Categorical Imperative
An analogy may be drawn between the problem of knowl­
edge and the problem of morality. The question in the prob­
lem of knowledge was: How are a priori synthetic judgments 
of knowledge possible? Similarly, the problem of ethics is: 
How are a priori synthetic judgments of morality possible?
When the nature of the imperatives is considered, no
^^Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activ­
ity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.
314.
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difficulty arises in discovering how problematic imperatives 
are possible; for in this case the imperative merely tells 
us that if a particular end is sought, we must employ the 
means for the attainment of that end. This imperative of 
skill, as it is also called, is therefore an analytic judg­
ment. The imperative implies that in the idea of willing a 
certain end objective is directly implied the willing of the 
acts necessary to the attainment of that end. Undoubtedly, 
certain synthetic judgments of knowledge are presupposed in 
willing the means to an end, but these judgments are not 
synthetic judgments of morality; for, as has been shown, 
these synthetic judgments of knowledge have nothing to do 
with the principle of the will.
The case of the assertoric imperative is quite the 
same. Each person desires his own happiness, but no one can 
give a universal description of what happiness is. It is 
certainly not the ever-present end of desire, for experience 
teaches that one can desire something which is undesirable.
One may desire to take in the beauty of a blooming orchard 
until he suffers an allergic reaction.
One may argue further that since each person desires 
his own happiness, happiness is the desirable for that per­
son; and therefore happiness is the desirable end for everyone.
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The transition from "each" to "every," however, is on the 
level of the desirable and not the desired. If one accepts 
the inference from being desired to being desirable, the 
argument is cogent. But such an inference does not show that 
everyone's happiness is equally relevant to the obligation 
of a given individual. Even granting that happiness is uni­
versal, what is one man's happiness may be another man's un­
happiness. Pleasant experiences are desired by their re­
spective owners, but experiences are as individualistic as 
the persons who own them.
If each person could tell precisely wherein happi­
ness consists, then, as such, happiness as a universal would 
be a recognizable fact and the imperative of prudence would 
obviously be analytic. We may therefore say, notwithstanding 
its differences from the problematic imperative, that like 
the problematic imperative, the imperative of prudence com­
mands that he who wills the end should will the means. No 
deduction or justification of either of these imperatives is 
required. Both are obviously analytical in character.
The real difficulty appears in the justification of 
the categorical imperative as an a priori synthetic judgment. 
We cannot say that the end of the categorical imperative is 
presupposed and that the only question regards means. The
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categorical imperative does not have an end objective as 
such, nor can the categorical imperative be based upon exper­
ience, for no number of instances ever establishes a univer­
sal and necessary proposition. Experience may tell us what 
has been done but never that what is yet to be done can only 
be done in accord with past experience. What must be shown, 
therefore, is that the categorical imperative can never be 
reduced to a hypothetical imperative. Kant puts it this way:
Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical 
position, since it has nothing to support it either 
in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity as 
absolute dictator of its own laws, not the herald of 
those which are whispered to it by an implanted sense 
or who knows what tutelary nature. Although these may 
be better than nothing, yet they can never afford 
principles dictated by reason, which must have their 
source wholly a priori and thence their commanding 
authority, expecting everything from the supremacy of 
the law and the due respect for it.^o
Quite evidently, then, Kant considers the categorical 
imperative the only imperative with the dignity of practical 
law--that is a principle forever binding upon all men. Other 
imperatives presuppose a certain end which is not absolutely 
necessary and is therefore regarded as contingent. But how 
can a categorical imperative or an unconditional law of moral­
ity be justified?
^^Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 43-44.
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Kant's inquiry into the justification of the cate­
gorical imperative resembles the metaphysical deduction of 
the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. The first 
Critique examined the nature of knowledge in general. Since 
morality for Kant is founded in rationality, the metaphysics 
of practical reason must then be consistent with what is be­
lieved to be the nature of knowledge elsewhere if indeed 
practical reason is to have any legitimate basis.
The conception of the categorical imperative implies 
that the subjective principles by which the will of the agent 
is to be determined must be connected to the objective prin­
ciples of the law. Not only must the imperative, as an ob­
jective principle, be connected with the very conception of 
the will, but it must be so "altogether a p r i o r i . I n  
terms which the Critique of Pure Reason establishes, the 
motive of the act as corresponding to the categories must be 
joined to the content of the act as it corresponds to the 
content of sense in the phenomenal world.
If the consciousness of an agent who acts in viola­
tion of the principle of duty were examined, a conditional 
principle of the act that could not be willed as a universal
^^Ibid., p. 44.
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law would be revealed. What is actually willed is that an 
exception to certain duties should be made and made as a favor 
under "special circumstances." Hence, if each act were con­
sidered under similar circumstances and the totality of 
actions followed to their logical conclusions, a contradic­
tion between the will and the willed of the objectively neces­
sary conclusion should be revealed. The will attempts to 
order conditions after a certain fashion, but the fashion 
after which the conditions are to be ordered constantly 
changes to meet the "special circumstances" of each and every 
situation as the situation changes in its own time sequences. 
Thus as many individual distinctive "wills" as elapses of 
time would result ad infinitum. Such a result would be wholly 
contrary to the very nature of man which is dependent upon 
consistency and order. In such a nature, Kant finds his 
reason for asserting that the law of morality must be derived 
a priori from the very idea of a rational will, without any 
reference to the peculiar constitution of human desire. A 
rational being is by its very nature an end which can never 
be regarded as a means to some other end. As such, no object 
of natural desire can have more than a conditional value, for 
its value depends entirely upon its being desired by this or 
that individual. In contrast, non-rational beings have only
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the relative value of means and are therefore called things
while rational beings are ends in themselves and ought never
to be treated otherwise.
If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in 
respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it 
must be one which, being drawn from the conception of 
that which is necessarily an end for every one because 
it is an end of itself, constitutes an objective prin­
ciple of will, and can therefore serve as a universal 
practical law. The foundation of this principle is: 
rational nature exists ^  an end in itself. . . . Ac­
cordingly the practical imperative will be as follows:
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own per- 
son or in that of any other, in every case as an end 
withal, never as means only.
The Maxim
Clearly, man is obliged to obey the law of duty. But, 
since this is a law which man imposes upon himself, in obey­
ing it he is but realizing his own rational will which by its 
very nature lays down universal laws. As the principle of 
moral law is really self-imposed, it may very properly be 
called the principle of the autonomy of the will and be dis­
tinguished from all other principles which are rightly called
48
For Kant's discussion of the justification for the 
categorical imperative, see Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 
39-47 and pp. 73-75.
^^Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. 47. Kant's impera­
tive here stated is of course recognized as the categorical 
imperative, but of varied form from that stated earlier.
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principles of heteronomy. Chief among these latter princi­
ples in the moral matrix, however, is the "maxim.” Maxims 
are practical principles that are known subjectively or ob­
jectively. They are subjective when they are known by the 
subject as valid only for his own will, but objective when 
the condition is valid for the will of every ^tional being.
Beck tells us that the term maxim is "taken from 
logic, deriving from sententia maxima, the name of the first 
major premise in a p o l y s y l l o g i s m . I n  Kant's first Cri­
tique, he tells us what kind of logic he has in mind. Gen­
eral logic, he says, is not to be associated with the pro­
cedure of discovering content for knowledge. Rather, logical 
rules are to be "applied in the examination and appraising of 
the form of all knowledge before we proceed to determine 
whether their content contains positive truth in respect to 
their o b j e c t . A  maxim, then, taking its nature from logic, 
is a regulator of form and not creative of content. In this 
connection. Beck analyzes Kant's consideration of the maxim 
under the following three questions which require answering: 
(1) Are maxims the form of laws? (2) What is the supreme
S^Beck, p. 81.
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 98.
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maxim of practical reason? (3) Can a law itself be a 
maxim?
Maxims in the Form of Laws
In the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant distinguishes 
sharply between a maxim and a law. A maxim, according to 
Kant, tells us how we do act; a law tells us how we ought to 
act. "A law is prescriptive whether it is a theoretical or 
a practical l a w . A  law cannot be based upon any actual 
features inductively discovered in the generality of man­
kind. A maxim, on the other hand, depends upon conditions 
that reflect individual differences among rational beings.^5 
Meanings that direct activities are maxims and thus maxims 
become a part of the "is." This "is" is the condition of 
will, recognizable in its very evident characteristics of 
actual experience.
Kant is pointing out a very clear and important dis­
tinction in morals. Beck states: "There is no possible in­
ference from how men do, in fact, behave to how they ought
^^Beck, p. 82.
^^Ibld.. p. 83.
S^ibid.. p. 82.
^^ Ibid.
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to behave. No empirical generalization can do anything but 
surrender in the face of a well-authenticated exception.
But a pure practical reason which necessarily wills in ac­
cordance with law as such is not present in every man. Con­
sequently, an action can only be willed through a maxim and 
not through a moral law such as that of the categorical im­
perative. According to Paton,
this serves to bring out Kant's view of spontaneity 
or freedom. On the one hand he insists > . . that
the free and autonomous and moral will must be influ­
enced by no needs, no desires, no pathological in­
terests in determining its duty. On the other hand 
he does not forget that our sensuous motives must be 
"taken up" into our maxim, if they are to influence 
action; nor does he forget that if we are to have 
moral action, our maxims must in turn be taken up 
into our rational volition of law as such. Because 
of this it is possible for moral man to make, or to 
give, particular moral laws through their maxims.
A discussion of Kant's view of maxims and their re­
lation to laws leads straight to the most important part of 
the second Critique. The purpose of the first Critique is 
to show how a priori categories of thought may be related to 
objects of sense. The purpose of the second Critique is to 
show how a priori categories of thought (moral laws) may be 
related to actions. Just as in the first Critique a third
5*Ibid.. p. 83.
57paton, The Categorical Imperative, pp. 182-83.
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element (schema) is needed in order to relate the categories 
of understanding to sense objects, so a third element is 
needed in the second Critique order to relate moral laws to 
man's actions. As Paton explains, this element must be some­
thing that will not leave out our sensuous motives on the one 
hand, but will consider the pure a priori concepts of law on 
the other.
Until now Kant has considered man as noumenon and 
man as phenomenon as having no possible interrelation. Surely 
the concluding remarks of the first Critique could scarcely 
leave any doubt as to the limits of objective knowledge. Thus 
far in Kant's ethical writings, the categorical imperative has 
been considered in its ideal nature, without deciding whether 
it is ever actualized in man. Such, however, is not Kant's 
conception of the nature of man. "Homo noumenon and homo 
phenomenon are two utterly irreducible elements of the one 
man. . . . They act indissolubly and together through the or­
ganic unity of the i n d i v i d u a l . "^9 xhis comes about, not by 
an inquiry of fact, as might initially appear, but by some 
process of assumption a priori, lest the "critical method" 
should not be maintained.
SGlbid.
S^Washington, p. 48.
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In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant begins his in­
quiry by examining the conditions of fact (experience) first. 
But throughout the Foundations for the Metaphysic of Morals, 
the Critique of Practical Reason, and his other works on 
ethics, Kant does not hesitate to assert that what man is, 
whether he is or is not a rational being, has little import­
ance in deciding the essential elements of moral responsibil­
ity. He argues that since moral laws ought to hold good a 
priori for every rational being, they must all be derived from 
the general concepts of morality. Consequently we must not 
make the principles of the moral law dependent upon the par­
ticular interests of individual human nature. As a result, 
Kant, rather than following the procedure of the first Cri­
tique, begins his inquiry into the nature of morality with 
the establishment of a principle (i.e. the moral law as for­
mulated in the categorical imperative) and then moves to a 
consideration of its application to human actions.
First in importance in the inquiry into the nature of 
moral principles is the conditions necessary for the existence 
of pure a priori principles of morality, namely, freedom. In 
Kant's consideration of freedom, the two concepts of freedom 
Willkur and Wille, play prominent roles as has been shown.
The existence of the double components of freedom makes
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possible the existence of pure a priori moral laws, on the 
one hand, and laws that yet may be morally considered but 
still account for phenomenal existence on the other. As 
later demonstrated, the pure a priori laws of morality, i.e. 
the categorical imperative, are developed under the freedom 
of the Wille, while the Willkur mediates laws of morality 
with nature. In other words, the law of morality is under 
the freedom of the Wille, while the meanings that generalize 
sense stimuli with their response are under the freedom of 
Willkur and called "maxims."
To explain this important factor of relating the 
sense perceptions to their responses in a slightly varied 
and less encumbered manner, two different but interrelated 
factors need to be considered. The first of these is im­
pulse. Man possesses a dynamic moving force, a want, desire, 
need, or wish. We generally assume that this dynamic force 
is the prime mover of animals. Certainly, men feel pushed 
or pulled in this way or that by their wants, desires, needs,
and passions.GO
But we are equally certain that man in full possession
^^See Beck, p . 33 and forward for a more elaborated 
discussion and explanation of this particular facet of Kantian 
philosophy.
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of his faculties is not always appropriately responsive to 
the demands of his impulses. Occasionally, action may be 
denied or deferred and a need may be left unfulfilled for an 
agonizingly long period of time. Happily, behavior in man, 
unlike the brutes, is not automatically triggered by impulse. 
Rather, impulsive demands are moderated, directed, redir­
ected, and sometimes thwarted by our taking thought of the 
meaning of an impulse to act. Thus the second factor in 
Kant's ethical system is meaning which gives a conception of 
the kind of response appropriate for each impulse.
Meanings that direct impulses to responses are called 
"maxims" in Kantian terminology. These maxims are derived 
from a process of generalization. In the course of human 
activity, the impulse and response not only become associated 
together through trial and error in such a manner that this 
response is related to that impulse, but each impulse and 
each response also become generalized. Much of this general­
ization takes place below the level of consciousness. But 
in the more novel, complex, and problematic situations, a 
conscious effort must be made toward (1) identifying the dy­
namic impulse and (2) accumulating the needed knowledge to 
generalize that impulse with its proper class of responses. 
These two functions are respectively termed "conative" and
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"cognitive." Thus, in any purely non^sub-conscious act, the 
conative and cognitive factors are always present.
But what man has and the planets lack, however, is a 
conception of the relation between things and events. Such 
a conception as comprises the "conative function" in the 
process of human activity may take many forms: the barely 
conscious conception identifying things of a particular aroma 
with the satisfaction of hunger, for example; or the concep­
tion of a natural law contending that poisonous things are in­
jurious to the individual's well-being; or the conception of 
the moral precept that one should overcome temptations to lie.
Likewise, the conception comprising the cognitive 
function of securing maxims may also take various forms. It 
may take the form of a policy formulated in very specific 
rules to govern a specific habit, or it may be expressed in 
general terms to cover many different behaviors.
While the "conative function" is concerned with the 
conception identifying things with events (impulses with re­
sponses), the "cognitive function" is concerned with identi­
fying the rule or law that generalizes each impulse with its 
appropriate response. In this connection the Wille states 
the conditions of the moral law in its pure a priori form and 
the Willkur states the maxim that actually generalizes the
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impulse with its particular response. The Willkur is not 
required to state its maxim out of obedience to the moral 
law supplied by the Wille; but when it does identify its max­
im in obedience to the moral law the ensuing act is said to 
be moral. Maxims exist under the law but cannot be said to 
be subsumed in the law. They are always a part in experience, 
the third thing existing in unity with the analytic and the 
synthetic. As such, maxims can neither be wholly analytic as 
are laws nor wholly synthetic as is the content of phenomenal 
existence.
Supreme Maxim of Practical Reason
Kant seems to indicate that all maxims are grounded 
in sensuous inclinations. Certainly, maxims have the function 
of treating inclinations by means of generalizing them with 
their particular response. Yet Kant has previously shown 
that a morally good action cannot have as its determining 
motive any mere sensuous inclinations to produce certain re­
sults. If this is so and if the maxim of an action is, as it 
were, a generalization of the action and its motive, it fol­
lows at once that the moral maxim cannot be based on sensuous 
inclinations but must follow directly from the moral law.
In order to distinguish between maxims that are based
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upon sensuous inclinations and those that are not, Kant re­
calls the distinction made in the first Critique between a 
posteriori and a priori. Maxims based on experience or de­
sire are a posteriori and those not so based are universal 
and necessary, making them analytical. As such, maxims not 
based on sensuous inclinations are a priori. Kant further 
distinguishes between those maxims by calling them material 
and formal.
Since a man who shows his good will acts for the 
sake of duty, he is acting on a formal maxim and not a mater­
ial maxim. A good man, in Kant's concept of things, does 
not act merely for the purpose of producing certain results 
he happens to desire. This doctrine is already established 
under the arguments favoring the good will. Deductively 
speaking, for Kant the supreme maxim is in simple terms the 
maxim of the moral law. It is the formal maxim and not the 
material maxim. The supreme maxim is not, "this is the kind 
of thing I will do if so inclined to do it," but rather, "I 
will do my duty whatever it may be." Essentially this is 
the moral law and the supreme maxim. Because it is supreme 
in terms of moral value it coincides with the law of the 
morally good.
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Laws and Maxims Differ In Time
Homo noumenon and homo phenomenon, as previously as­
serted, are not two separate entitles having no possible In­
terrelation, but rather two Irreducible elements of the one 
man. A law might then also appear to be a maxim at certain 
times under the conditions of the one singularly unified per­
son of a noumenal-phenomenal man. The noumenal-phenomenal 
man Is, however, one and the same being with exception only 
to time. Washington so adroitly states this particular as­
pect of man's existence when he says that "noumenon Is the 
man out of time, phenomenon Is the man In tlme."^^ Washing­
ton explains the matter In this way; Before an event occurs, 
reason may forecast It with a certain degree of accuracy, and 
decide on using Its causality In some direction or another. 
Reason, therefore, acts "out of time," I.e. before time, and 
sets conditions that ought to govern "In time" happenings. 
Reason, says Washington, always asks, "What next?" and not 
"What am I doing now?"^^
Phenomenon, on the other hand. Is concerned with the 
business of consciousness. Phenomenal being always asks,
^^Washlngton, p. 48.
G^ Ibld.
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"What am I doing now?" In other words, phenomenal being is 
concerned with the "is" and not the "ought" of man's activity. 
Accordingly, maxims are always a part of the "is"--they are 
the actual regulative factors "in time." Every happening 
that occurs in the consciousness of man demands that a regu­
lative factor be present for the actual determining of impulse 
responses. Each impulse has its own "generalization with its 
response" that is the maxim in action. The maxim reflects 
the differences of each individual's desires in the conative 
and not the cognitive components of their volitions.
While a maxim may be in accord with a law and corres­
pondingly a law may use its causal influence to direct a 
maxim, a law itself is never in time with a maxim as such.
The Willkur, as may be recalled, does not act in accord with 
the Wille from necessity, but rather is left to its own 
volition for generalizing each impulse and response. The law 
itself remains a law and hopefully the maxim of an action 
will assume its direction from the causal influence thereof; 
but of necessity such an occurrence can only remain in a hope­
ful state of affairs. The necessity of freedom dictates that 
this be the case.
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The Summum Bonum
Accepting the view, then, that the maxim, functioning 
under obligation to the moral law, is the third element in 
Kant's principles of a moral act and the element connecting 
pure a priori concepts with sensory stimuli, what is the na­
ture of the act with the greatest moral value? The summum 
bonum, or the highest good, has reference to two terms that 
must be distinguished from each other: the "supreme" and the 
"perfect," and unless the ambiguity contained therein is clari­
fied, needless disputes may arise. According to Kant, "the 
former is that condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e. 
is not subordinate to any other (originarium); the second is 
that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the same 
kind (perfectissimum)."63 The supreme good, therefore, is 
that which is absolutely unconditioned and presupposes nothing 
higher than itself. Consequently it is not subordinate to 
anything else; it is itself the complete good as a whole.
Now the condition of virtue, or worthiness of being 
virtuous, is the supreme condition of all that we can regard 
as good and consequently is the supreme good. In the "ana­
lytic," however, Kant shows that worthiness is a condition of
63Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 206.
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being happy, but from this it does not follow that happiness 
"is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires 
of rational finite b e i n g s . T h e  objects of desire require 
happiness also; however, objects of desire are not complete 
goods as a whole, but parts of a larger whole. Virtue is 
thus the supreme good. Yet it is not the whole or complete 
good which finite beings seek to obtain and impartial reason 
declares to be a legitimate object of desire. The highest 
good of a possible world must therefore consist in the union 
or harmony of virtue and happiness in the same person, i.e. 
it must consist in happiness in exact proportion to morality. 
What has to be especially observed, however, is that virtue, 
or the supreme good, is the necessary condition of the com­
plete good. Happiness is not a good in itself, but only a 
good under the condition that conduct is in conformity with 
the moral law.
Kant has reason for the existence of a two-part sum- 
mum bonum. The proper object of moral judgment is not the 
law but man as an end in himself. Man's activities are the 
means, and the laws thereof are intended only to serve the 
ends of man's being. The moral law performs three offices:
64
Ibid.
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(1) it is the formal determining principle of action by 
means of practical reason; (2) it is also a material and ob­
jective determining principle of the objects of action in so 
far as willing an object is to be decided in terms of good 
and bad; and (3) it is a subjective determining principle, a 
motive to action; it is a motive that deprives the will from 
taking account of every material inclination.^^ Thus the law 
is at once the objective moral motive and the subjective 
motive in respect for the law.
The basis of moral duty springs from this two-part 
nature of the moral law which is in itself an interpretation 
of the summum bonum in each of its parts. A man is a moral 
agent only if his acts meet two demands: (1) they must pro­
ceed from maxims that comply with the moral law and (2) they 
must be adopted for the guide to actions because the law de­
mands them, not because of any extenuating results that may 
be incurred. Virtue is a good, but it is the highest good 
only when happiness of doing good in accord with the law be­
comes the motivational principle of action.
Summary
Morality, according to Kant, can claim objectivity 
and universality only by being founded upon pure reason
" ■ " I'A I. ■ ■ — ' " '
G^ibid.. p. 168.
179
itself. This view is based upon the development of the con­
clusions of the Critique of Pure Reason. The essence of the 
Critical philosophy is based upon the assumption of reason's 
capacity for discovering the necessary forms for characteriz­
ing all things. While reason attempts to complete man's knowl­
edge by bringing his phenomenal and noumenal being into unity, 
it is frustrated in this speculative function by certain 
antinomies that defy resolution. Kant's ethical system is of 
major importance not only as the attempt to create a purely 
rational ethic, but also for demonstrating that rationality 
is not restricted to cognitive meanings. The will is not di­
vorced from reason, controlled by drives, impulses, or stimuli, 
external or internal. Will in its fulfilled capacity is pure 
reason. Consequently, morality is dependent upon discovering 
the a priori or categorical laws of the rational will.
The categorical imperative, as the moral law, is the 
free directive of man's activities by means of maxims. Man 
has certain sensory stimuli, impulses, or drives for the 
initiation of action. The will connects this initiating 
force with a maxim that determines the disposition of the 
stimuli, impulse, or drive in terms of its satisfaction 
through actions thus prescribed. When the maxim so willed is 
in agreement with the moral law, the ensuing action is said to
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be moral. And when the willing of the maxim is in agreement 
with the moral law out of simple obedience to the law, the en­
suing act is said to have the highest moral value, i.e. summum 
bonum. Each maxim strives for this ideal and the progress 
toward this ideal deserves the name "virtue."
The task that remains now is to determine in what 
nature, if at all, the categorical imperative here discussed 
may be made applicable to the practices of rhetoric as they 
were discussed in earlier chapters.
CHAPTER V
KANT'S PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRACTICES OF RHETORIC
Introduction
Relating Kant's philosophy to the practices of rhet­
oric is indeed no simple task. Drawing such a relationship 
would be facilitated if we could speak of Kant's philosophi­
cal thought as including a theory of communication or as con­
taining a natural basis for developing such a theory. How­
ever, the problem is compounded by Kant's noticeable lack of 
consideration for the literary arts in general and the art of 
rhetoric in particular. Except in a limited sense as a critic 
of literary practices, Kant seems to have been neither quali­
fied nor willing to extend his philosophical thinking to the 
practices of rhetoric.
Theodore Meyer Greene points out that when Kant under­
took to analyze man's creation of and response to the artistic 
means of expression "he was far less well equipped to deal 
with the relevant data than in the areas treated in the two
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. . . [majorl Critiques."! Kant never traveled more than 
fifty miles in any direction from his culturally bleak 
Konigsberg home in East Prussia. One should not be sur­
prised, then, that with this background Kant's ideas on lit­
erary and artistic discourse were markedly lean.
Yet Kant did not live during a deprived era of lit­
erary history. Late in the eighteenth century, mainly as an 
effect of Kant's philosophical publications, an unending 
stream of books on literary and aesthetic criticism sprang 
up in Germany. The greatest of philosophers were influenced 
by the writings of Kant and proceeded to popularize and modi­
fy the ideas propounded by that great speculative mind by 
adapting them to various systems of aesthetic and literary 
criticism. Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Schopenhauer, 
Schiller, Novallis, Tieck, and Jean Paul expounded their 
philosophies of art and literature while accrediting Kant
p
with many of their principles and ideas.
^Moral. Aesthetic and Religious Insight (New Bruns­
wick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 64.
2
See Rene Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism: 
1750-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 227- 
31, for the development of Kantian ideas in literature and 
art by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Ger­
man School of Philosophy.
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Kant apparently derived his understanding for the 
expression of art from omniverous reading and his life-long 
habit of inviting visitors to the city to dine with him and 
discuss their travels and experiences in a wide variety of 
cultural topics. Greene believes that from all this reading 
and talk Kant "did somehow acquire an appreciation of aes­
thetic taste in some of its universal aspects, as well as of 
the chief characteristics of the artistic styles which we 
[recognize] t o d a y . N o t  only was Kant acquainted with the 
various art styles, but he also displayed an uncanny ability 
to appreciate their essential merits and defects as stylistic 
trends.^ His resultant criticism seems more than indirectly 
relevant for the German aestheticians and poets. The direct 
relationship of Kantian philosophy specifically to rhetoric, 
however, remains to be explored. The task of the present 
chapter is to analyze the manner in which Kant's philosophy 
can be made applicable to ethical practices of rhetoric.
This analysis is divided into three areas of consideration: 
(1) Kant's philosophy and the problem of linguistic symbol­
ization; (2) the rhetorical objective in a Kantian-viewed
3
Greene, p. 60.
^Ibid.
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world; and (3) the categories of good reasons--instruments 
for use in rhetorical practices.
Kant's Philosophy and the Problem of 
Linguistic Symbolization
The impact of the generative theme of the "new phi­
losophy" is hardly recognized yet; but if we look at the 
actual trend of thought expressed by modern philosophy, we 
recognize that the knowing subject differs from the known ob­
ject and that which is believed to be known is the product 
of interaction of the knowing subject with his known object. 
Here we may say with Kant that all knowledge begins with ex­
perience. Such an admission is the framework from which 
human action can spring forth, for in it is knowledge not 
only of the material circumstances of man's being but also 
the whole system of man's desires and their relative strengths 
We can know man's experience only if we are able to reflect 
upon what our own nature contributes to experience and what 
is contributed by other sources. Material circumstances alone 
are not enough, for surely experience involves more than sen­
sory stimuli resulting from the presence of material sub­
stances; it must likewise contain patterns of response to 
those stimuli.
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In chapter one the paradox of an ethics of rhetoric 
was referred to by pointing up the differences of symbolic 
formulations representing differing kinds of human experience 
on the one hand (scientific, artistic, and axiological exper­
iences, for example) and the necessity for any knowledge to 
be founded in the facts of life around us in order to be re­
liably valid on the other (being extensionalized). The be­
ginning of modern philosophy with Descartes raised this ap­
parently insoluble problem by positing the method of doubt 
culminating in the cogito ergo sum. Descartes' unprovable 
belief seems so expansive as to leave little or nothing to 
certainty save the cogito itself. According to this view, 
the existence of objects apart from the subject can only be 
asserted and never known with more than a degree of belief. 
But merely to assert the existence of an object of cognition 
is insufficient to explain the nature of such knowledge; for 
if our knowledge does not have an independent reality as its 
object, then it is unknowable; but if such independent real­
ity does exist, then the knowledge of its existence and not 
just the assertion therefore is of major importance.
Kant, we may recall, found the necessary conditions 
for explaining the existence of a physical reality in the 
manifold sense perceptions schematized under the categories.
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Oscar W. Miller succinctly describes the perceptions to
which Kant refers as
empirical representations from the influence of mov­
ing energies of matter which affect the subject. These 
energies affect the subject because he is a physical 
being. The inner changes wrought in him by the activ­
ity of consciousness are perceptions. The moving ener­
gies of matter are, in the mind of the subject, the 
cause of his perception. . . . [These] objects of 
sense, metaphysically speaking, are appearances.^
These sense perceptions distinguishable in space and 
time are organized according to the rules of the categories 
of the understanding. For example, categorical judgments 
contain a referring expression known as the grammatical sub­
ject and a characterizing expression called the predicate. 
Many factual claims normally made are of this same basic 
form--substance and predicated property. For Kant the con­
cept of substance is a kind of category of knowledge. In­
cluded in this category of substances are all such substan­
tive words as "chair," "table," "tree," etc. Kant views the 
categories as ordering principles. What they order or syn­
thesize are the phenomenalistic items of experience--colors, 
tactile impressions, odors, sizes, sounds, and so forth.
The problem of the ordering principles of experience
^The Kantian Thine-in-Itself or The Creative Mind 
(New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956), p. 21.
187
which Kant so recognized concerns the a priori principles of 
empirical data. Kant, as we have seen, finds the resolution 
for this problem in the mediatory power of the categories of 
causality and time. By merging the category of substance 
with the categories of causality and time, universal and 
necessary (a priori) laws for things making up the natural 
world emerge.
Since the concepts of substance, causality, and time 
are not analytic (i.e. their denials are not self-contradic­
tory) ; and since we know them to be necessarily true (and no 
empirical generalization is ever necessarily true), Kant be­
lieves they are, therefore, synthetic a priori. But, as 
Copleston points out, we must not here assume that Kant means 
to imply we are all explicitly aware of the application of a 
priori principles.^ Given our ordinary experience, however, 
these principles can be distinguished by a process of analysis 
of the formal and material elements in our theoretical knowl­
edge of objects. Because of this conceptual nature of our 
knowledge of objects, Kant concludes that knowledge initiated 
by sense-experience is inadequate to explain the "object-in- 
itself." At best such knowledge has reference only to the
^Fredrick Copleston, S. J. A History of Philosophy,
VI (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1961), p. 309.
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object in consciousness. Kant here merely took for granted 
the existence of objects in our ordinary knowledge. But what 
we know of these objects in a process of extensionalized be­
havior is only that which we have as an object in conscious­
ness .
With this in view the whole scope of metaphysics is 
cast onto a new plane which leads to the conclusion that 
without the consciousness of the subject the object could not 
be. Heidegger explains that "the 'Being' of things is now 
seen to be grounded in the possibility of experience. The 
search for 'Being' is now directed not toward a 'reality in 
itself but toward the subjective roots of the transcendental 
horizons of consciousness."^ Yet, while this may explain the 
nature of our knowledge when we become extensionalized, 
nothing in sense perceptions nor Kant's explanations thereof 
prevents the possibility of gaining knowledge by intellection 
only. Contrarywise, the very nature of phenomenal being im­
plies the existence of noumenal being in which case there is 
implied a nature knowable by an experience different from the 
experience of scientific knowledge. Having grasped the nature
^Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Meta­
physics. trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington, Ind.;
Indiana University Press, 1962), p. x.
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of extensionalized knowledge, the problem becomes one of 
analyzing the nature of ethical knowledge The specific 
problem is one of examining Kant’s philosophy further to de­
termine if it can explain how ethical knowledge can differ 
from scientific knowledge (or, said differently, knowledge 
of objects) and still be extensionalized.
In chapter two ethics was characterized as being
concerned with "ought type questions." On this basis, moral
knowledge appears to be in direct contrast to extensionalized
knowledge which is concerned with the nature of objects. As
Copleston remarks in considering Kant's philosophy of ethics:
Now besides our knowledge of objects which are orig­
inally given in sense intuition there is also moral 
knowledge. We can be said to know, for example, that 
we ought to tell the truth. But such knowledge is 
not knowledge of what is, that is to say of how men 
actually behave but of what ought to be, that is to 
say, of how men ought to behave.®
Just because a thing happens to exist gives us no claim to 
the absolutes of its hidden nature. Throughout the ages men 
have sought to pluck out the golden thread of absolute real­
ity, but unfortunately they have not been able to hold the 
thread long enough to discover the spool from which it un-
Q
winds. Consequently we live much of our lives dealing in
Q
Copleston, p. 308.
^As an explanation of Reality here suggested, see
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probabilities where reason alone and not experience carries 
on those inquiries which, owing to their importance, we con­
sider more excellent and in their purpose far more lofty than 
all the understanding acquired through sense perceptions.
As Kant's explanation of the phenomenal world depends 
upon the a priori laws of cognitive activity, so his views of 
the noumenal world--the world capable only of being thought-- 
depend upon the a priori or categorical laws of a rational 
will. As we have seen in the first Critique, Kant held that 
no knowledge is prior to experience in time and that with 
experience all knowledge begins. The principles of ex­
perience, however, point beyond experience itself; but, when 
given our ordinary experience and scientific knowledge of 
things, we can analyze the formal and material elements in 
our knowledge to discover those principles according to 
which moral judgments are possible. These formal elements 
in our knowledge must, of course, be consistent with what 
we know of the world around us--the material elements in our 
knowledge; for if an inconsistency existed it would mean that 
either our scientific knowledge or moral knowledge was
Oscar W. Miller’s account of ”A Reconstruction of the Thing 
in Itself," The Kantian Thing-in-Itself or The Creative Mind, 
pp. 50-51.
191
inaccurate. Accordingly, if the qualifications for under­
standing knowledge of objects are universality and necessity, 
as Kant believes, then such qualifications should likewise 
be the qualifications for moral knowledge.
In his ethical treatises Kant attempts to delineate 
these specific boundaries of moral knowledge: universality 
and necessity. The particular distinctiveness of moral knowl­
edge, according to Kant, is the good will which is the con­
necting of reason with its practical application in action. 
Kant begins his argument by dramatically proclaiming that a 
good will is without limitation. But what is meant by a good 
will? We have already noticed how G. E. Moore and Bertrand 
Russell believe that "good" is an indefinable concept. Fur­
thermore, does Kant mean to imply that a "good will" is abso­
lutely good? The difficulty for Kant is this; if there is 
such a thing as knowledge of a good will it must be knowledge 
a priori in the sense that it does not depend on men's actual 
behavior. The statement, "men ought to tell the truth," is 
true independently of their actual conduct. Here two things 
are to be observed. First, in its formal function reason 
determines the object given in sense perception; and second, 
in its practical function reason is itself the source of ob­
jects; it is concerned with the production of choices which
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bring objects out of time in accordance with the laws of the 
will which proceed from themselves. Copleston lends assist­
ance in understanding this particular aspect of Kant's phi­
losophy by explaining in plain language that formal reason 
"is directed towards knowledge, while practical reason is 
directed towards choice in accordance with moral law . . .  to 
the implementation of choice in a c t i o n . K a n t ,  of course, 
is not here saying that we must find the whole cause for a 
moral act in the concept of practical reason. What he is 
saying is that the "law" of practical reason is located in the 
a priori element of the moral judgment.
What, then, does Kant's philosophy have to suggest 
when considering the problem of linguistic symbolization as 
it was discussed in chapter one? First, Kant's philosophy as 
described in the preceding chapters suggests that the knowl­
edge involved in extensionalization is that which exists in
the object of consciousness derived through the application
of categories to sense stimuli; and second, our ethical knowl­
edge which differs from our scientific knowledge is not di­
vorced from internal impulses and drives or external stimuli 
but rather is different because it comes under the a priori
^^Copleston, p. 310.
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law of practical reason. When Kant points out that nothing 
can be called absolutely good except a good will, he simply 
means that morality can claim objectivity only by being 
founded upon reason alone and the a priori element in reason 
on matters of morality is the categorical imperative better 
known as the moral law. We must here point out that Kant, 
although he does not explain his reasons for so doing, does 
not define "good" in the concept of the "good will," but 
rather, like Moore and Russell, merely describes those condi­
tions under which an act of the will is right, namely, when 
done out of obedience to the a priori moral law. According 
to this reasoning the good will is the only thing without 
limitation whose goodness is not the goodness of a means to 
something else and is rooted in the integrity required by 
reason itself determining the acts initiated in objects of 
consciousness.
The Rhetorical Objective in a 
Kantian-Viewed World
Having just examined the nature of linguistic symbol­
ization, the task becomes one of discovering the objective to 
which such symbolization may be employed. According to Kant's 
philosophy, as we have here examined it and as it was
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developed in chapters three and four, all knowledge is either 
formal or practical; the former considers the form of the 
understanding and of the reason itself with the universal 
laws of thought in general; the latter is concerned with the 
a priori law in the choice of action and includes the distinc­
tion of the objective of such actions. While we have seen 
the formal aspects of linguistic symbolization, the practical 
application remains to be investigated. Accordingly the im­
mediate task is to examine the objective of that action con­
sidered as the practice of rhetoric.
For Kant each aesthetic criticism "is a mere subjec­
tive feeling, but it claims universal validity and can do so 
justly because we must assume a common sense of mankind as an 
ideal norm."^^ Therefore to know Kant's philosophy explain­
ing acts such as those of rhetorical practices requires know­
ing not only the material circumstances of such acts but also 
the whole system of men's desires and their relative strengths. 
A Kantian theory of rhetoric demands the discovery of a be­
havioral theory suitable to the practices of rhetoric which 
will at once incorporate deterministic nature and moral free­
dom: a behavioral theory of persuasion suitable to chart a
Wellek, p. 230.
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course, as it were, between authoritarianism and nihilistic 
relativism. Generally speaking, authoritarianism claims that 
good is an absolutely real and objective quality in man's 
existence and further that this good can be known with cer­
tainty. Obviously, even if a Kantian should admit to the 
first of these two claims--which is unlikely since even if an 
absolute real and objective good did exist it would be un­
knowable in the realm of the world of the external being and 
thus could only be thought--he certainly could not admit to 
the second. In contrast, the nihilistic relativists deny the 
objective reality in the authoritarian's good and accordingly 
reject the very possibility of moral insight, fallible or in­
fallible. Neither of these two extremes is in accord with a 
world viewed from the point of Kant's philosophy, and anyone 
seeking an interpretation of rhetoric in terms of that philos­
ophy must reject them. As previously noted, characteristics 
of sensory stimuli and rationality both play important roles 
in Kant's philosophy.
The Kantian man views himself as a rational being.
His intellect is regarded as the governor of his emotional 
stimuli. As a rational being he counts himself as belonging 
to the intelligible world; and as considered solely of the 
intelligible world, all his reasons for propositions and
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judgments would be in perfect conformity with the principle 
of the autonomy of a pure will. But the intelligible world 
also contains a grounding in the sensible world; and there­
fore a being must be recognized as containing such elements 
as are not altogether of the intelligible world. The orator 
treats his findings in the sensible world (examples, statis­
tics, and the like) by supplying laws of reason for their 
adaptation to an audience. The orator may, by virtue of his 
freedom to act in accordance with the laws of reason, be 
conceived as cause acting a priori upon the audience's will 
to accept or reject his proposal. This is to say, the 
"springs of human action" are found in man's behavioral pat­
terns whereby sensory stimuli are brought together with 
rational consideration, the unity of which acts as a cause 
in nature influencing the actions of the audience toward ac­
cepting or rejecting the orator's proposition or judgment. 
This is -the function of practical reason; and practical rea­
son, Lewis White Beck remarks, "is not concerned with the 
relation of knowledge to objects which may be given to us 
[through sensibility], but with the bringing into existence 
of objects which are not passively given u s P r a c t i c a l
12
A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Rea­
son (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 67.
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reason is reasoning utilized causally against behavior for 
the sake of bringing Into existence the satisfaction of some 
desire, the transcendency from things In time to things which 
are presently out of time. And, as Kant would say, unless 
this cause of practical reason Is brought Into more or less 
close combination with the moral law, the fate of discontent-
1 3
ment will be Its ultimate destiny.
The source of this theory of rhetoric Is found In 
the manner by which nature (natural phenomena) and the rules 
of the art are combined. And, according to later developments 
of German philosophy, Kant's Idea Is that artistic works and 
nature are strict analogies. Wellek aptly remarks that for 
Kant "the work of art Is a parallel to an organism, not only 
In a metaphorical sense which compares the unity of a work of 
art to that of an organism, but because both art and organic 
nature must be conceived of under the terms of . . . [pur­
posefulness]
The overcoming of the deep dualism basic to Kant's 
philosophy Is pointed up In the union of art with its organic
13
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, 
trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), p. 126.
14
Wellek, pp. 230-31.
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n a t u r e . Kant's world, as we have seen, is divided into
two realms; (1) that accessible to our mind by the senses
and the categories of our understanding and known as the
phenomenal world; and (2) that of moral knowledge accessible
only in action and known as the noumenal world, Kant sees
in artistic expression a possibility of bridging the gulf
between the necessary world of deterministic nature and the
world of moral freedom; and among the "arts of expression,"
Kant classifies poetry and rhetoric as the "arts of speech"
and places them first among all the arts.^^ Of all the arts,
says Kant, the art of speech, which owes its origin almost
entirely to genius,
maintains the first rank. It expands the mind by 
setting the imagination at liberty; and by offering 
within the limits of a given concept amid the un­
bounded variety of possible forms accordant there­
with, that which writes the presentment of this con­
cept with a wealth of thought, to which no verbal 
expression is completely adequate; and so rising 
aesthetically to Ideas. It strengthens the mind by 
making it feel its faculty--free, spontaneous and 
independent of natural determination--of considering 
the Judging nature as a phenomenon in accordance 
with aspects which it does not present in experience 
either for Sense or Understanding, and therefore of
ISlbid.. p. 231.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. 
Bernard (London: Macmillan and Co., 1914), pp. 207 and 215.
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using it on behalf of, and as a sort of schema for, 
the super-sensible.17
In this way the "art of speech" exists for the pur­
pose of uniting the two realms in Kant's world into an auton­
omous whole. For Kant art accomplishes a union of the gen­
eral and the particular, of sensuous intuition and thought, 
imagination and reason.1® There is little doubt that from 
the beginning Kant's view was taken from this pragmatic 
standpoint. Something had to exist consisting within the 
framework of the critical method that could reciprocate be­
tween the noumenal and phenomenal worlds and bridge the deep 
dualism involved therein. This something is found in man's 
artistic expression and first among the arts is the "art of 
speech."
The Categorical Imperative--An Instrument 
for Use in Rhetorical Practices
Having seen the objective toward which the practices 
of rhetoric are directed in a system of rhetoric based on 
Kantian philosophy, we need now determine the rules for 
proper action provided for in Kant's philosophy. Since the
l^Ibid.. p. 215.
l&Wellek, p. 231.
200
days of Aristotle many rhetoricians have believed that rhet­
oric is an instrument quite detached from the moral judgments 
of the orator's practices. However, others believe that 
rhetoric's sole purpose is to supply the methodology by which 
man may both express and activate principles they believe in, 
the substance of things for which they live, by influencing 
others in the direction of truth and j u s t i c e . I n  the theo­
retical relationship of ethics and rhetoric, ethics has the 
function of discerning the concept of the good; and without 
this discernment as a command to future actions, rhetoric is 
without impetus.20 Not only as measured by the standard of 
lasting attainment of rhetorical accomplishments, but from 
the very circumstances of the phenomenal-noumenal worlds, 
ethics cannot be divorced from the practices of rhetoric as 
viewed in terms of Kant's philosophy. Kant's whole episte- 
mology depends upon the existence of the conditions necessary 
for moving from the phenomenal world and the "is" to the 
noumenal world and the "ought" and back again to the phenom­
enal so that not two wholly independent worlds but one
l^Richard Murphy, "Preface to an Ethic of Rhetoric," 
The Rhetorical Idiom, ed. Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca, N. Y .: 
Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 141.
^^See Chapter II of this dissertation, "The Inter­
dependency of Rhetoric and Ethics."
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unified world of two parts emerges. This method, according 
to Kant, is found in man's artistic expression primarily in 
the "art of speech," guided in its activity by the precepts 
of moral reason.
Objections to General Rhetorical Practices
Yet Kant subsequently remarks that most of his re­
spect for the place and importance given to the "art of 
speech" is primarily reserved for that art known as poetry. 
In the opening statements of the classification of the arts 
Kant defines poetry "as the art of conducting a free play of 
the imagination as if it were a serious business of the Un­
derstanding."^1 Poetry holds "first rank" among the arts of 
speech because the poet merely promises an entertaining play 
upon ideas--there is no deception about the poet's designed 
intent. The poet promises little and announces his occupa­
tion as a mere play with ideas. Conversely, rhetoric is de­
fined by Kant as "the art of carrying on a serious business
of the Understanding as if it were a free play of the imagl- 
9 9
nation." Later he points out that this "business of the 
understanding" is too often an "art of persuasion" designed
21
Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 207.
^^ Ibid.
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"to win minds to the side of the orator before they have 
formed a judgment, and to deprive them of their freedom. 
Consequently rhetoric, when so practiced by design, loses its 
place of respect as an enduring art form, for it functions 
against the vary nature of man's being and disregards the 
forms of its own existence. Too often, Kant feels, the orator 
fails
to supply what he did promise, which is indeed his 
announced business, viz. the purposive occupation of 
the understanding. . . .  It cannot therefore be 
recommended either for the law courts or for the pul­
pit . For if we are dealing with civil law, with the 
rights of individual persons, or with lasting instruc­
tion and determination of people's minds to an accu­
rate knowledge and a conscientious observance of their 
duty, it is unworthy of so important a business to 
allow a trace of any exuberance of wit and imagination 
to appear, and still less any trace of the art of talk­
ing people over and captivating them for the advantage 
of any chance person. For although this art may some­
times be directed to legitimate and praiseworthy de­
signs, it becomes so objectionable, when, in this way 
maxims and dispositions are spoiled in a subjective 
point of view, though the action may objectively be 
lawful. It is not enough that we do what is right; 
we should practice it solely on the ground that it is
right.24
But Kant proceeds by recognizing that rhetoric "is 
not a work like that of a tradesman, the magnitude of which 
can be judged, exacted, or paid for, according to a definite
Z^ibid., p. 216.
Z^ibid.. p. 208.'
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standard; and again, though the mind is occupied, still it 
feels itself contented and stimulated, without looking to 
any other purpose (independently of r e w a r d ) W h a t  Kant 
seems to be saying is that rhetoric, unlike the products of 
a tradesman, has a capacity for making the mind at once con­
tented and stimulated without possessing the qualities for 
properly determining contentment and stimulation. This is 
the moral problem that Kant envisions in rhetoric--a problem
) fi
prevalent even in contemporary rhetorical practices.
Once the artist-orator has determined his desires, 
that will becomes a natural cause of his subsequent actions, 
specifically that cause which directs the orator to the ob­
jective he seeks when confronting an audience. Primary in 
the development of objectives are the artist-orator's con­
cepts, the art form, the manner of presentation which the 
artist, working from his observations and judgments, pur- 
posively designs in order to achieve his desired objective 
or will. By purposeful design Kant does not mean conscious
25Ibid.
p fi
Kant views the moral problem in rhetoric as funda­
mentally the same as for other art mediums. Therefore it is 
primarily from his discussion of the moral problem in art in 
general that an analysis of the moral problem in rhetoric is 
possible.
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intention and aim, but harmony of parts, unity, totality, 
with every member having its proper place in the system.
From this view of purpose, Kant is able to speak of art as 
analogous to an organism, an organic unity of the two-part 
world: the phenomenal and the noumenal. The concept of this 
ordered organism directs (or is, as it may be) the artist- 
orator' s objective. Such concepts are of two kinds: natural 
concepts resulting in the legislation of knowledge, and con­
cepts of moral legislation resulting in choices of actions. 
The essential determinative element is not natural concepts 
for
even impetuous movements of the mind--be they allied 
under the name of edification . . . or, as pertaining 
merely to culture, with ideas involving a social in­
terest- -no matter what tension of the imagination 
they may produce, can in no way lay claim to the honour 
of a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind 
them a temper of a mind which, though it be only in­
directly, has an influence upon the consciousness of 
the mind's strength and resoluteness in respect to 
that which carries with it pure intellectual finality
(the supersensible).27
Thus rhetorical practices in a Kantian view find 
their determinations of good or bad, right or wrong, in the 
temper of mind which they leave behind. Such determinations
27
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, p . 
216. The Meredith translation is used here because of its 
comparative clarity in relation to the Bernard translation 
of the same passage.
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are found, not in sensible perceptions of the phenomenal
world, but rather in the intellectual qualities of the
noumenal world as they may be measured by moral precepts,
i.e. the "ought" and not the "is" of the here and now. As
Kant contends, presentations which omit concepts of moral
legislation make
the spirits dull, the object gradually distasteful 
[i.e. the object of the artist-orator's purpose], and 
,the mind, on account of its consciousness of a dis­
position that conflicts with purpose in the judgment 
of Reason, discontented with itself and peevish, 
i If the beautiful arts are not brought into more 
t»r less close combination with moral ideas, which 
alone bring with them a self-sufficing satisfaction, 
this latter fate must ultimately be theirs.28
Implicit in Kant's characterization of general rhet­
orical practices is the need for a rational form of presen­
tation- -a form that brings together (i.e. legislates the de­
velopment of) an organic unity comprising the two part world. 
When the orator determines his objective (i.e. his method for 
developing an organic unity) he is required to have "good 
reasons" (i.e. moral ideas) as to why he chooses a particular 
objective as opposed to other alternatives. The reasons here 
employed are considered the determinants of the moral value 
of the act proposed. The problem, therefore, that Kant's
2 8
Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 214.
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philosophy must be prepared to resolve if indeed it has 
value for an ethics of rhetoric is the reasons determining 
right from wrong actions. As Minnick remarks, "Social pres­
sures are such in our society that we, at least as far as 
public action is concerned, are encouraged to offer good 
reasons for our behavior. We are expected to be reasonable, 
and acts which can be justified by good reasons are praised, 
while capricious and whimsical action is condemned."29 Re­
cently Karl R. Wallace gave a fine accounting of a categori­
cal system for the deduction of good reasons, and a good 
reason he defined as a statement offered in support of an 
ought-type proposition or a value j u d g m e n t . O n  this par­
ticular point, Wallace is quite Kantian, for in this very 
system of good reasons we find the "universalizable" method 
of man's behavioral patterns. The task, then, seems clear: 
(1) determining the manner of employing statements in sup­
port of ought-type propositions or value judgments for 
bridging the phenomenal and noumenal worlds--as is required 
of a system of rhetoric in terms of Kant's philosophy (such
^^Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), p. 23.
30
"The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," The 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIX (October, 1963), 247.
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statements will be referred to as "good reasons" in accord­
ance with Wallace's definition)--and (2) determining the 
method for discovering statements in support of ought-type 
propositions or value judgments as provided for in Kant's 
philosophy.
Employing Good Reasons
The problems to be treated rhetorically are those 
derived from actual human affairs: sometimes characteristi­
cally political, other times vocational or recreational in 
nature. These wants, needs, desires, and passions are not 
some kind of "vague and amorphous restlessness," but are cer­
tain dynamic existences that must be identified in order to 
receive the benefit of the orator's efforts. The Kantian 
orator, then, begins his rhetorical practices by identifying 
(discovering-choosing) dynamic wants, needs, etc■ which 
exist in his experience; for with experience all knowledge 
begins . Without this sensibility the will is incapable of 
stimulating or directing activity, as it lacks any content 
to regulate and motives to give it life. Without content of 
experience the Kantian orator's presentations are simply a 
vehicle for responding to reason alone without involvements 
with the extensionalized world. The responses to such
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practices must be baseless and without firm cause. Sensi­
bility must be the springs of the orator's practices, the 
facts by which he is motivated to perform certain actions; 
for without these sensible impressions the orator, like men 
in general, would be without the raw material from which 
propositions and judgments may be d r a w n . The function of 
identifying this content of experience Kant terms the "cona­
tive" element in action.
But the orator is more than a "knowing being," more 
than a being of the phenomenal world and the "is." He is 
also an active being, a being of the noumenal world and the 
"ought." With the knowledge of the "is" acquired conatively 
from phenomenal existence the orator possesses the raw 
material from whence spring the impulses of human action.
The orator in a Kantian interpretation of rhetoric, however, 
must put his knowledge to work--he must employ knowledge in 
stating enthymematic premises which support judgments to 
regulate, influence, and direct the behavior of his noumenal 
self and audience. And he does this by practical reason
31
See Kant's accounting of the importance of the 
sensibility in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1953), 
p. 41. Also note Chapter III of this dissertation, especi­
ally the section titled "The Distinction of Pure and Empir­
ical Knowledge."
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which Kant understands as human intelligence concerned with 
ethical concepts, or the reason so far as it deals with hu­
man actions.
Man as a rational being is not an object of natural 
causation; by virtue of the Wille man must at least assume 
the characteristics of an agent who uses his reason in "prac­
tical situations that involve choice and decision. Practical 
reason is revealed in judgments that guide man's conduct,
i.e. judgments are statements having to do with action, 
motives, feelings, emotions, attitudes and v a l u e s . P r a c ­
tical reason is the act of subsuming the particular under 
the universal, the impulse under the moral law, the stimulus 
under its valuation and obligation. Theoretically at least, 
the proposition an orator chooses to support in a Kantian
32
Wallace, p. 242. Wallace is here summarizing his 
findings from several modern treatises on ethics. Chief 
among these are; Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory : The 
Problem of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959); Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of 
View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (Ithaca, N. Y . : Cornell 
University Press, 1958); Paul Edwards, The Logic of Moral 
Discourse (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1955); P. H.
Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin Press, 1954); and 
Stephen Edelston Toulmin, ^  Examination of the Place of 
Reason in Ethics (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960). Wallace's explanation of practical reason in 
rhetoric seems to be quite consistent with the way Kant 
would probably explain it. Thus Wallace's description of 
practical reason is valuable to a Kantian interpretation of 
rhetoric.
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ethics of rhetoric is that proposition arising out of fac­
tual data (sensibility) being molded, modified, and justified 
by reason taking thought of alternative actions for resolving 
some want, need, desire, or passion. Lewis Beck remarks:
The taking thought of his action is one of the causes 
of his action; but until he himself has taken thought 
and thereby reached his own decision, the specific di­
rection of the action that will issue from his taking
thought cannot be known to him. To him, the act of
taking thought is not so much a cause of a particular
action, related to it by causal laws, as it is a
search after a ground or good reason which will lead 
him to choose a specific act. The acting is a product 
of choice or decision which is reached just in his 
process of taking thought.33
The "taking of thought" or "search for good reasons" 
in the process of choosing a specific act is called the cog­
nitive element of action. The Kantian orator utilizes the 
medium of the public platform to resolve and satisfy some 
social want, need, desire, or passion by generalizing cona­
tive content with cognitive determinants. That is to say, 
the orator, after finding the relevant sensible experiential 
data, seeks to discover premises (generalized concepts of 
the good) which can be used for uniting the speaker and his 
audience concerning some ought-type proposition or value 
judgment. These premises, utilized in enthymemes, take the
^^Beck, p. 30.
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form of good reasons which are given in support of a propo­
sition or judgment. And as good reasons, supports for a prop­
osition or judgment are derived from thought and are analogous 
to maxims utilized in a Kantian system to channel human be­
havior into certain activities.
A "good reason," however, is a special kind of state­
ment offered in support of an ought-type proposition or a 
value judgment. Some ought-type propositions and value judg­
ments are legitimately good while others are not. Some prop­
ositions and judgments which are believed good are indeed 
proved to be so by subsequent events. These reasons are 
called legitimately good reasons. Yet, on still other occa­
sions, reasons may be given to indicate a proposition or judg­
ment is good and right when in reality the conclusion to such 
a proposition or judgment legitimately indicates otherwise.^4 
Surely, then, a good reason must be more than just a state­
ment offered in support of a proposition or judgment; for it 
would be a contradiction of terms to call propositions and 
judgments good when they are legitimately not good. Beck
34
Wallace, p. 247. See the distinction between sub­
jective and objective good to distinguish explicitly between 
statements which are "legitimately good" and those which are 
merely believed to be good. See pages 48-55 of this 
dissertation.
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reminds us that Kant ascribed to reason the task of going 
beyond the order of things, as given, to an Ideal order of 
systematic connection of experience, a systematic connection 
that Is never passively found In knowledge but must be 
striven for according to a certain regulative Idea.35 The 
regulative Idea Beck refers to Is the "categorical Impera­
tive:" "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that It should become a universal law.
Wallace tends to use "good reason" and "practical reason" as 
Interchangeable terms; and this Is entirely proper, for 
practical reason Is "will acting according to a conception 
of the moral law"; and when the will does so act It Is called 
the will of the greatest good or the summum bonum. Good 
reasons, then, are statements that guide Impulses in the for­
mulation and acceptance of ought-type propositions and value 
judgments In obedience to the moral law. Because they are 
derived from the moral law they are of the summum bonum and 
thus are known as legitimately good reasons. As good reasons 
they are generalized concepts of the good, where sensibility
^^Beck, p. 38.
36
Cited In H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative;
A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 129.
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is generalized with the moral law, and serve as enthymematic 
premises in the orator's attempts to persuade to future 
actions.
With this description of a "good reason," however,
one additional consideration of major importance remains:
37subjective and objective good. As pointed out in chapter 
two, good itself is in many ways an indefinable term, but 
this fact does not apply when good is associated with the 
rightness or wrongness of actions. In this latter sense, a 
good reason seems to be the cause directing the right action. 
Or, in other words, the reason guiding the impulse to the 
right action is the good reason where good is determinable 
by rightness. And, as we have just seen, the right act, or 
the act that "ought" to be performed, is the act ensuing 
straight from reason that accords with the moral law.
The doctrine of "good reasons," therefore, is a 
matter involving objective and subjective principles. Since 
the moral law is objective in nature, man ought to do what 
is objectively right. But in a real sense the determining 
of reasons to guide impulses, i.e. practical reason, is a 
subjective determination. Consequently a good reason is
37See the exposition of Russell's discussion of sub­
jective and objective good in Chapter II.
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that reason which is subjectively determined to be objec­
tively in accord with the conception of the moral law. Or, 
stated another way, the application of the categorical im­
perative as an objective law of morality is a subjective ap­
plication; and thus a reason is subjectively good when judged 
by the agent to be objectively right, and subjectively bad 
when judged to be objectively wrong.
The Deduction of Good Reasons 
If "good reasons" are the fundamental materials in a 
Kantian approach to the ethics of rhetoric, it should be 
possible to derive from Kant's ethical system a scheme of 
categories for deducing good reasons to be offered in support 
of ought-type propositions and judgments of value. Indeed 
this can be done by interpreting the main points of Kant's 
"Table of the Categories of Freedom Relative to the Notions 
of Good and Evil," offered in the Critique of Practical
Q 0
Reason.^ Beck remarks: "[Kant] assumes that the important
O Q
See Immanuel Kant, "Critical Examination of Prac­
tical Reason" in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and 
Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 158.
After giving his table of categories, Kant says, "I add 
nothing further here in explanation of the present table 
since it is intelligible enough of itself." Ibid. Lewis 
White Beck has offered an invaluable service by interpreting 
Kant's table of categories which Kant himself did not see
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formal features of practical judgments [reasons] are identi­
cal with those of theoretical judgments, and thus he avails 
himself of the division of categories arising from the table 
of judgments in the first Critique.
What Kant does is to present a four-fold classifica­
tion of the categories using the same classification of 
Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality as set forth in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. The system for developing each of 
these classes of categories similarly follows a pattern first 
established in the earlier work.
The first class is "The Categories of Quantity."
Here we are concerned with principles of right actions. 
Principles involve both maxims and laws. Maxims may refer 
either to maxims of an individual or to those shared generally 
by mankind. Laws differ from maxims by being universally 
valid and by requiring that the will under law coexist with
fit to explain. Beck's explanation of the categories will 
be relied upon extensively in the present analysis. These 
categories of necessity must be flexible and non-restrictive 
in. nature and they must be derived in strict accordance with 
the moral law lest they disregard the nature of Kant's cate­
gorical imperative. Conversely, such a system of categories 
must be wholly independent of any particular desire and thus 
comprise practical reason alone lest they be incompatible 
with the very essence of Kant's critical method. Beck's de­
scription of the categories meets both of these demands.
^^Beck, p. 145.
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the total system of e n d s . ^ O  ^he categories of quantity are 
as follows :
Categories Judgments
1. Mere maxim of individual Subjective good for the
individual
2. Maxim of human beings Objective good for the
generally generality of men
3. Laws as maxims Good for rational beings
as such, both objective 
and subjective
By utilizing the instrumentation of the categories 
of quantity, one may find good reasons for supporting the 
proposition that "one ought to contribute to a certain char­
ity." In this connection the orator has two functions to 
perform: he needs to (1) identify the dynamic impulse in the 
problem of his consideration and (2) identify the moral 
maxim (good reason) for generalizing that impulse with a 
particular set of responses. Thus, in support of the propo­
sition that "one ought to contribute to a particular charity," 
the advocate might offer the reasons: (1) contributions to 
this charity will supply food and clothing to the needy (a 
factual reason) and (2) this act is morally right because 
man (under the moral law) is obligated to those programs
4°Ibid.
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aiding the good for the generality of men (a moral reason).
In this example the factual reason serves as a premise ex­
pressing a dynamic impulse to action (some want, need, de­
sire, or passion) while the moral reason serves as a maxim 
deduced from the moral law of the categorical imperative and 
designed to generalize the dynamic impulse (factual reason) 
with the appropriate actions called for in the statement of 
the proposition.
In the example of the category of quantity here 
cited, the Kantian system establishes a three-part criterion 
for moral acts. First, the proposition is dependent upon 
the reasons (premises) given in support of it. As pointed 
out in chapter two these reasons serve as premises for the 
orator's enthymemes and may be supplied from the audience's 
stock of common knowledge or may be supplied or altered and 
modified through the orator's presentation. Without the 
establishment of these supporting premises or reasons, how­
ever, the argument loses its basis from which the inference 
or deduction of the proposition is drawn. Hostility cannot 
grievously threaten a neo-Kantian approach to the ethics of 
rhetoric for neglecting to give reasons in defense of ethical 
judgments. Reason is the very essence of the moral law as 
Kant devised it.
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Second, the Kantian system maintains a consistency 
with recognized logical systems of valid reasoning processes. 
As we previously noted, the enthymeme of rhetorical practices 
is obliged to abide by the same rules for valid reasoning as 
is the drawing of inductive inferences and deductive conclu­
sions. Accordingly, Kant's categories are especially appro­
priate, for in a very real sense the Kantian system finds its 
very essence in the generalizations formed by logical infer­
ences or deductions. Without such generalizations, the meth­
od for moving from a sensory stimulus to its satisfaction is 
non-existent in the Kantian system. One should not wonder at 
the normal logical processes of a Kantian system, for they 
are the very foundation of the critical method set forth in 
Kant's first Critique.
Third, the generalizing of sense stimuli with re­
sponses possesses flexibility by considering all available 
actions with which a particular stimulus may be generalized. 
Acting under the mediatory powers of the Willkur, the will 
of the individual may demonstrate preferences for a variety 
of actions while yet reflecting the influence of the moral 
law set forth by the static and non-flexible component of 
rationality called the Wille. That flexibility is to be the 
standard of a neo-Kantian ethics of rhetoric is not to be
219
denied, for it is the basis of the freedom of the will.
These three factors, then: (1) a system of ethics 
based on reason; (2) recognized logical processes, and (3) 
flexibility, characterize the nature of Kant's philosophy of 
ethics and form the basis of each of the classes of cate­
gories which may be developed under the rule of the categori­
cal imperative.
The second class is "The Categories of Quality." 
Practical reason with respect to quality rules either affir­
mative, negative, or infinite. If it rules affirmative, it
does so by commission; if negative, it rules by omission; if 
infinite, it rules by granting permission to make some excep­
tion to a rule of the former kind. The categories of quality 
are as follows:
Categories Judgments
1. Rules of commission The good is that which is
commanded
2. Rules of omission The good is that which is to
be achieved through the
avoidance of certain actions
3. Rules of exceptions The good is that which is
appropriate in obedience to
a general precept. 41
"Rules of exception correspond to infinite judg­
ments in theory, in that they exclude certain actions from 
the scope of one of the earlier rules." Ibid., p. 147.
220
By utilizing the instrumentation of the "categories 
of quality," the orator may discover good reasons to support 
the proposition, "We should oppose the expanding influence 
of Communist doctrine in America," because (1) historically 
Communism has impeded the promotion of individual enterprise 
(a factual reason); and (2) good may be achieved through the 
avoidance of actions injurious to individual self-reliance 
(a moral reason).
The third class is "The Categories of Relation." 
Practical reason states the relation of an act to the good 
and identifies the good of the act. But, furthermore, prac­
tical reason rules the relation in which actions of one per­
son are to be judged in relation to the effects on the state 
of another. The categories of relation are as follows: 
Categories Judgments
1. The rule that all acts be The good of the character 
judged as acts of a of the person: good sense,
subject dignity, etc.
2. The rule that all acts be 
judged as having conse­
quences for the state of
the person.42
^^This category presents considerable difficulty 
since "state" may have reference to moral condition, physi­
cal condition, or the state of well being and its opposites. 
See Beck, pp. 147-48.
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a) the rules that an ac­
tion may be judged as 
Issuing from a person 
in a certain moral 
condition
b) the rule of taking 
account of the wel­
fare of those af­
fected by an action
c) the rule that acts be 
judged by their con­
sequences for the wel­
fare of the person
The rule that in a moral 
community the acts of one 
person be decided upon and 
judged as they affect the 
state of another, and 
conversely
Goods pertaining to ac­
tion derived from spe­
cific goods of character, 
the courageous, the mag­
nanimous, etc.
The good is that suitable 
for the welfare of the 
recipient of the act
The good as the prudent
The good as justice or 
equality under a common 
law; the moral community
By utilizing the instrumentation of the "categories 
of relation," the orator may discover good reasons to support 
the proposition that "Steel prices should not be increased at 
this time because (1) an increase in steel prices detrimen­
tally depreciates the value of consumer income (a factual 
reason) and (2) the good is that suitable for the welfare of 
the recipient of the act (a moral reason).
The fourth and last class is "The Categories of 
Modality." The categories of modality tell us the weight of 
the value to be assigned to the copula "ought" in statements 
prescribing actions. The modality of the statements concern­
ing duties of actions we are about tells us if they are
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possible, really, or necessarily good.^3 The categories of
modality are as follows: 
Categories
1. The rule that certain ac­
tions are to be judged as 
allowed and certain ones 
as forbidden with respect 
to the accomplishment of 
some arbitrary purpose
2. The rule that certain ac­
tions are required or 
forbidden by an actual 
law lying in reason as 
such
The rule that certain ac­
tions are made necessary 
by virtue of the actual 
rule lying in reason as 
such
and
the rule that, while a
Judgments
The permitted and forbid­
den act; the possible good 
act and acts which cannot 
possibly be good on the 
assumption of an arbitrary 
purpose.
Dutiful actions and ac­
tions contrary to duty; 
the actual moral good and 
evil in abiding by or dis­
obeying prevailing laws
Perfect duty; an action 
directly commanded; the 
necessarily good
Imperfect duty; an action
43
The class of the categories of modality differs 
from the other classes in that each of the categories of 
modality seems to have its own individual purpose rather than 
all three categories having a single unity of purpose. The 
first category seems to treat the "good" of judgments having 
differing degrees of possibility. The second category tends 
to treat propositions prescribing an actual end to be 
achieved. The third category, rather than being a synthesis 
of the first two categories, as was the method of development 
in each of the first three classes, is a logical division of 
the first two categories in the classification of modality.
See Beck, pp. 149-51.
44
Kant elsewhere describes the permitted and forbid­
den as the maxim following from obedience to the law and the
maxim following from desire for the pleasure expected. See 
Beck, Chapter VII, pp. 90-107.
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certain maxim is neces- not fully determined by
sary for rational beings, the actual rule taken ab-
there is permissible lat- stractly, but falling
titude in the choice of within the scope of the
actions under it rule as determined by
sound judgment using the 
rule of exceptions; the 
contingently good action 
under a necessarily good 
maxim
Thus, by utilizing the instrumentation of the cate­
gories, the orator in a neo-Kantian approach to the ethics 
of rhetoric, by means of a deduction from the "categories of 
modality," might present the proposition that the federal 
government ought to guarantee an opportunity for higher edu­
cation to qualified high school graduates because (1) such 
action will alleviate certain educational needs of high 
school graduates who cannot now go to college (a factual 
reason) and (2) this act is a morally right act because the 
federal government is obligated to those dutiful actions of 
abiding by prevailing laws which include those laws requiring 
the government to administer to people’s needs which they 
cannot themselves satisfy (a moral r e a s o n ) . 45
45probably a more realistic example of the "cate­
gories of modality" would be as follows: The federal govern­
ment ought to guarantee an opportunity for higher education 
to qualified high school graduates because (1) such action 
will alleviate certain needs of high school graduates who 
cannot now go to college (a factual reason); (2) the govern­
ment is obligated by law to administer to people's needs
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Once the orator locates the dynamic Impulse in the 
problem of his own reason, he identifies the maxim (good 
reason) for terminating the impulse in a particular action. 
When audience and speaker unite in the deduction of a par­
ticular maxim, action results and with action the proposition 
or judgment which reason supports becomes a part of the "is"-- 
being brought from out of time into time, it becomes a fact 
of history. The reason itself directly deduced from the cate­
gories generalizes or directs the impulse into the proper 
solution of the problem (the proposition) in accordance with 
the dictates of the moral law (the categorical imperative). 
When the orator's audience in a Kantian ethics of rhetoric 
does not accept the speaker's moral reasons, he must revert 
to a defense of the more basic principles of morality, the 
moral law itself, and justify his reasons as a deduction from 
the moral law. As in theoretical judgments where no repre­
sentations can exist for consciousness apart from the cate­
gories, so no consciousness of morality can exist in practi­
cal judgments apart from the categories of the categorical
which they cannot themselves satisfy (a factual reason); and 
(3) the federal government ought to meet its obligations to 
dutiful actions in abiding by prevailing laws (a moral rea­
son) . The format of the preceding examples has dictated the 
form used when considering the "categories of modality" in 
the text of this paper.
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imperative. The claim of an aesthetic judgment to a univer­
sal validity for every subject, as a judgment which is based 
upon some a priori principle, stands in need of a deduction 
of justification of its pretensions; and the pretensions of 
a good reason as a moral pronouncement find their justifica­
tion in their deduction from the categorical imperative.
A rhetorical system based upon this Kantian approach 
to the ethics of rhetoric points up the responsibilities a 
practitioner of moral suasion assumes by virtue of being an 
advocate on the public platform. It describes for him the 
procedure involved in advocacy--a procedure based upon and 
consistent with an epistemology recognized as a major turn­
ing point in the history of philosophy. Not only does a 
Kantian approach to rhetorical ethics describe the procedure 
of advocacy, it also gives the practitioner the necessary 
instruments for executing this procedure in a moral manner. 
In short, the categorical structure provides the framework 
for the orator's upholding of moral responsibilities which 
are legitimately his. On this account, Kant's categorical 
imperative is an instrument of lasting value, giving assist­
ance in each of its three offices: (1) it is the orator's 
formal determining principle of action by means of practical 
reason; it informs the subject of the law that his will
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directs hlm to follow; (2) it is the material-objective de­
termining principle in so far as in willing an object its 
good or evil being is decided; and (3) to these Kant adds the 
feeling of respect the law demands as a subjective determining 
principle--a motive to action. Little else can be said about 
the categories of the moral laws--they need only be employed 
to realize beneficial results.
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